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Abstract
What explains the variation in the number of rebel groups across civil conflicts? Prior
research has established that conflicts with multiple rebels groups are among the most
severe cases in terms of duration, fatalities, and possibilities for recurrence. Yet, we know
little about why the structure of rebel movements varies. This dissertation seeks to resolve
that gap. I argue that the organization of rebellion is contingent on the identities and
ideologies that are most salient at a given moment. Organization around ethnic identity
tends to produce fragmentedmovements withmultiple rebel groups. I expect that ethnicity
will tend to be salient when civilians are targeted with repression. Three empirical analyses
provide support for this contention. I show that individuals who have been attacked are
more willing to use violence and more likely to identify with their ethnic group. Next I
show that repression significantly increases the probability that new rebel groups will enter
a conflict, and that these new groups are likelier than others to emphasize a single ethnic
identity. I also demonstrate that repression triggers a reorganization of existing rebel groups
around ethnicity, with repression being associated with increased probabilities of rebel
group splintering and the formation of ethnically-homogeneous alliances. I supplement
these quantitative analyses with case studies of several secessionist movements in Burma.
Ultimately, I find that repression substantially increases the probability that a conflict will
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Why do some civil wars havemultiple rebel groups, while others have only one? Theories of
civil war tend to focus on individual-levelmotives (e.g. Gurr 1970; Collier andHoeffler 2004)
or opportunities (e.g. Fearon and Laitin 2003) for rebellion, while giving little attention to
the organization of dissent into rebel groups and coalitions. Even those studies which do
explicitly consider rebel group formation tend to focus on group attributes such as their
relationship with civilians (e.g. Weinstein 2007), and do not consider the structure of the
rebel movement that emerges. Yet, the process of organizing rebel groups is not always
straightforward. At least two rebel groups are simultaneously active at some point in 44%
of civil conflicts.1 In the Chadian Civil War, for instance, 25 distinct rebel groups appeared
over the course of the conflict. Conflicts in Afghanistan in the 1980’s, Somalia in the 1990’s,
and Sudan in the 2000’s have been similarly complex. At its peak the recent civil war in Syria
was contested by at least two dozen armed groups. Even movements with geographically-
concentrated populations and common goals, such as the Arakanese secessionists in Burma,
often fragment into multiple rebel groups. Furthermore, the number of groups operating
in these conflicts often varies greatly over time. Returning to the Syrian example, the
opposition was largely consolidated under the banner of the Free Syrian Army early in the
1Source: Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015).
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conflict, later splintered into dozens of factions largely on the basis of religion, and now
appears to be consolidating again as groups are defeated or merge.
The importance of rebel movement2 structure has been well established, with several
studies examining the consequences of having multiple rebel groups. Generally, these
works find that the presence of multiple rebel groups is associated with greater levels of
conflict severity. Conflicts of this type last longer than dyadic competitions, as the increased
number of veto players complicate the negotiation of peaceful settlements (Cunningham
2006; Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009; Akcinaroglu 2012), and create the possi-
bility of peace being spoiled by extreme factions (Stedman 1997). Relatedly, Cunningham,
Gleditsch, and Salehyan (2009) find that the presence of multiple government-rebel dyads
decreases the likelihood that a conflict will end with a peace agreement, while increasing
the likelihood of rebel victory. Findley and Rudloff (2012) find this effect to be conditional,
however, as the fragmentation of weak rebel movements can increase the probability of
peaceful settlement. Perhaps related to the paucity of peaceful settlements, both Atlas
and Licklider (1999) and Zeigler (2016) find that civil wars with multiple rebel groups are
prone to recurrence, as new episodes of conflict frequently occur between rebel factions
that were separate in the previous conflict. Finally, conflicts with multiple dyads feature
over 20% more fatalities than dyadic ones.3 In short, conflicts with multiple rebel groups
are an unusually severe subset of civil wars.
While prior research has firmly established the importance of understanding why some
conflicts have multiple rebel groups while others do not, few existing works have attempted
to explain this phenomenon. The studies that do exist in this area tend to focus on a
narrow subset of the processes affecting conflict complexity. For example, several recent
works explore the splintering of existing rebel groups (e.g. McLauchlin and Pearlman
2012; Staniland 2014). These studies tend to focus on the internal characteristics of rebel
2Throughout this dissertation, I use the term “rebel movement” to refer to the entire set of rebel groups.
3Source: my own analysis using data from Sundberg (2008).
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groups however, and thus have little to say about why rebel groups might form alliances,
nor why entirely new groups might enter a conflict. Christia (2012) adapts realism from
international relations theory into a joint explanation of splintering and alliance formation,
but she too ignores the mobilization of new groups. I connect all three phenomena in a
single theoretical framework, providing a unified explanation for conflict complexity.
The goal of this project is to address a single broad research question: what explains the
variation in the number of rebel groups in a civil war? I address several more specific
questions in pursuit of this broader goal. How do individuals respond to violence? Under
what conditions do new rebel groups join an ongoing civil war? Why do existing rebel
groups splinter into multiple factions? Why do previously independent rebel groups form
alliances?
In brief, I argue that the treatment of civilians during wartime is a crucial determinant
of rebel movement cohesion. Violent repression should lead many civilians to calculate
that joining a rebellion is not dramatically riskier than remaining non-violent, increasing
the pool of individuals willing to fight. But as repression is often applied on the basis of
ethnicity, and ethnic groups often offer a useful basis for organizing defensive measures
and attracting external support, repression should also tend to induce greater levels of
ethnic identification. Thus, repression should expand the pool of individuals willing
to join the fighting, but also sow division among dissidents along ethnic lines. I expect
that this dynamic will influence all three processes identified in the existing literature as
determinants of conflict complexity — the formation of new rebel groups, the splintering
of existing rebel groups, and the merger of previously independent groups into alliances.
The results of my empirical chapters suggest that complex civil wars are often the result of
a sectarian spiral — an initial wave of repression mobilizes violent dissent and induces
greater levels of ethnic identification, and the rebel movement fragments along ethnic lines
to reflect these individual-level preferences. Prior work suggests that a more fragmented
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movement might lead to greater levels of conflict severity, potentially creating a vicious
circle.
In the remainder of this chapter I review the existing literature on rebel movement structure,
as well as prior work on repression and ethnic identification. Next, I summarize the broader
theoretical and policy implications of the research. Finally, I provide a summary of the
subsequent chapters.
1.1 Previous Work on the Organization of Rebellion
The existing literature and empirical record suggest that the number of rebel groups active
in a conflict is shaped by three broad processes. New groups can emerge when previously
non-violent individuals mobilize and join the conflict. Alternatively, previously cohesive
rebel groups can splinter into multiple successor organizations. Finally, the number of rebel
groups can decrease when previously independent factions form alliances. I summarize
the literature on each process in turn, and relate my contributions to the existing work.
1.1.1 Group Formation
Around 30% of conflicts have at least one rebel group that was neither active from its
beginning, nor did it split from an existing rebel group. Thus, the formation of new
rebel groups during ongoing conflicts is an important determinant of rebel movement
structure. Yet few studies directly consider this phenomenon. Even studies of civil war
onset often leave the formation of rebel groups in a black box, instead making a leap from
individual motives to war initiation. For instance, a large literature views rebellion as
an essentially criminal activity, driven by greed (Mueller 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004;
Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore 2005). Yet these works generally have very little to say
about the origins of rebel organizations. These groups could be pre-existing criminal
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organizations that initiate more violent activity in hopes of securing greater profit, they
could form for the purpose of a greed-driven rebellion after a sign of weakness from the
government, or they could begin as rebel groups with sincere political goals, which are
later seduced into less noble pursuits. The grievance school similarly tends to neglect group
formation. For example, Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) offer a nuanced explanation
of the conditions under which ethnic minorities are likely to rebel. Yet, they say little about
the logistics of organizing a rebellion, and seemingly assume that ethnic groups have an
inherent ability to spawn rebel organizations.
Scholars working at lower levels of analysis have come closer to explaining group formation.
Kalyvas (2006) suggests that individuals are often alreadymobilized for small-scale violence
such as personal rivalry, criminal activity, or ethnic conflict. Building a rebel group is thus
an exercise in building coalitions from small, pre-existing organizations, and re-orienting
individuals from localized issues to national-level political cleavages. Kalyvas gives little
attention to this process in his empirical analyses, however, instead recommending it as an
area for future research. Staniland (2014) also argues that most rebel groups can trace their
origins to pre-existing social organizations, though he sees larger, and often more political
entities such as political parties or military units as the primary source of rebellion, rather
than the localized and less formal groups emphasized by Kalyvas (2006). Staniland (2014)
focuses primarily on linking the attributes of the originating organizations to rebel group
outcomes such as durability, however, and does not give much consideration to the initial
formation of these groups. Lewis (2016) provides one of the few studies that does explicitly
consider rebel group formation, as she carefully documents the earliest activities of rebel
groups in Uganda. She finds that rebel groups, including the Lord’s Resistance Army, were
typically founded by small number of entrepreneurial individuals, and initially tended to
value stealth over broad mobilization. Only after the conflict began to escalate did groups
seek to broaden their membership, in many cases by appealing to particular ethnic groups.
Thus she sees scholars such as Cederman, Wimmer, and Min (2010) and Staniland (2014)
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as beginning their analyses after rebellion had existed for some time.
Also of relevance to group formation is the substantial literature on the contagion of civil
war. Gleditsch (2007) finds that transnational ethnic groups and political and economic
linkages between states can provide channels for civil war to spread across international
boundaries. Most of his cases, however, are pre-existing rebel groups moving into new
geographic areas, rather than instances of sui generis group formation. Other scholars find
that entirely new rebel organizations can emerge through the contagion of secessionist
(Ayres and Saideman 2000) and ethnic (Lane 2016) conflict. Such transnational processes
might shape opportunities for multiple rebellions to emerge by increasing the availability
of weapons, spreading tactical knowledge, or diverting government attention to foreign
conflicts. While contagion explains an important category of phenomena, these studies are
primarily concerned with the spread of conflict to previously peaceful areas, and do not
necessarily explain the phenomenon of new groups joining ongoing conflicts.
1.1.2 Splintering
Another process affecting rebel movement structure is the splintering of existing organi-
zations. In 1968, for example, a faction led by Ahmed Jibril broke away from the Popular
Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to form a new group, the Popular Front for the
Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC). While the two groups have often
collaborated against Israel, they maintain distinct organizational structures and member-
ship bases, and operate in different areas. The split was allegedly motivated by differing
views of Marxist ideology and military doctrine, with the PFLP pursuing a more extreme
strategy of attrition. Similar splits have occurred within dozens of rebel groups, including
the Communist Party of Burma, the Free Syrian Army and the Sudan Liberation Army. In
many cases the result is more than a nominal separation. In Sri Lanka, for example, the
Tamil Peoples Liberation Tigers not only split from the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam,
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but also defected to the government’s side in the conflict (Staniland 2012).
Compared to group formation, there is a relatively large literature on rebel group splin-
tering. One subset of this research focuses on the role of external actors, and particularly
the government. For instance, McLauchlin and Pearlman (2012) find that government
repression provides occasion for groups to evaluate their current leadership structure.
Pre-existing divisions within groups are likely to be exacerbated, leading the group to
move toward more factionalized leadership structures. When group members are satis-
fied, however, conflict tends to lead to even greater unity and centralization of authority.
Whereas the preceding studies essentially treat government repression as exogenous to
the internal politics of dissident groups, Bhavnani, Miodownik, and Choi (2011) present
evidence that governments deliberately stoke tensions among their opponents, as they find
that the Israeli government increased conflict between Fatah and Hamas by undermining
Hamas’ control of the Gaza and by tolerating Fatah’s relationship with the Jordanian mili-
tary. Relatedly, Tamm (2016) finds that support from outside states can alter the balance of
power within rebel groups, in some cases entrenching existing hierarchies, while in others
creating possibilities for fragmentation or coups. Finally, Staniland (2012) finds that the
government can sometimes attract rebel groups to their side by offering greater resources
during periods of infighting among rebel groups.
Another group of scholars emphasizes concerns about post-conflict bargaining as the
key determinant of dissident group cohesion. Christia (2012) assumes that the winning
coalition in a civil war receives private benefits, which might include any rents available
to the state, and having some portion of its interests represented in the new government.
Thus, rebels have an incentive to form minimum winning coalitions, so as to limit the
number of coalition partners with whom they must share benefits. Wolford, Cunningham,
and Reed (2015) develop a similar logic, theorizing that political factions have an interest
in joining conflicts in hopes of maximizing the likelihood that their preferences will be
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represented in the post-war government. The value of fighting decreases, however, as
the number of parties with whom they expect to share power increases. Yet, Christia
(2012) suggests that this incentive to minimize coalition size is moderated by the risk
of being outside the winning coalition, as there is a strong possibility of new waves of
violence between victorious rebels and rival rebel factions. She thus expects coalitions to
change frequently in response to battlefield events, with factions bandwagoning with battle
winners and shifting away from losing coalitions. Findley and Rudloff (2012) similarly
find fragmentation to be most common among groups that have recently lost battles. This
implies that fragmentation is essentially a process of weak actors becoming weaker.
A final category of explanations places the source of rebel group cohesion in underlying
social structure. Staniland (2014) argues that insurgent organizations will be most stable
when their central leadership is able to exercise both vertical control over its rank-and-file
members, and horizontal control over its constituent groups. This is most likely to occur
when insurgencies draw from existing organizations with extant social ties of this sort,
which might include former anti-colonial movements or ethnic political parties. Organiza-
tions are likely to fragment when constituent groups have a high degree of autonomy or
control over individual members is limited (Staniland 2014, Ch. 2-3). Asal, Brown, and
Dalton (2012) emphasize similar factors, arguing that organizations with factionalized
leadership structures are at risk of fragmentation, while groups with more consolidated
power structures will tend to remain cohesive. Finally, Warren and Troy (2015) suggest
that group size plays an important role, as small groups are able to police themselves and
resolve conflicts, whereas larger groups are more likely to experience infighting.
1.1.3 Alliance Formation
Whereas the formation of new groups and splintering can increase the complexity of
a civil war, the number of rebel groups can also be reduced through the formation of
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alliances. Many of the most successful rebel movements in history were coalitions of
formerly independent organizations. For example, the Frente Farabundo Marti para la
Liberacion Nacional (FMLN) was an umbrella organization uniting several left wing rebel
groups in El Salvador, which eventually secured many concessions in the post-war peace
process including a place as a major political party. Surprisingly, however, alliances among
non-state actors have only recently begun to receive much scholarly attention.
Asal and Rethemeyer (2008) and Horowitz and Potter (2013) conduct network analyses
of alliance formation among terrorist groups, arguing that such arrangement are used to
aggregate capabilities and share tactics. Much of the other work in the field focuses on the
downsides of alliance. Bapat and Bond (2012) assume that alliances carry two significant
costs: the dilution of each constituent group’s agenda, and the risk of having one’s private
information sold to the government by an ally. Consistent with this theory, they find
alliances to be most common when an outside state can enforce agreements, and when
all rebel groups involved are strong enough to avoid the temptation of defecting to the
government side. Christia (2012) similarly emphasizes capability, arguing that neorealist
balancing theory from international relations explains alignments in civil wars. When
one coalition - a group of rebels or government-aligned forces - becomes too powerful,
other groups will band together to prevent their own destruction. But similar to Bapat
and Bond (2012), Christia (2012) argues that this mechanism is constrained by a desire to
maximize one’s share of the post-war spoils. Thus, rebels should realign frequently, seeking
to form minimum winning coalitions. While shared identity appears on the surface to be
an important determinant of rebel alignments, Christia views these narratives as post-hoc
justifications aimed at legitimizing decisions that are really driven mostly by power.
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1.1.4 Repression
As repression is central to the theoretical argument presented here, this dissertation is
shaped by the literature on the topic. The focus in the existing work has been on explaining
why repression occurs, and identifying factors that might prevent it. Davenport (2007b)
finds that there is a “domestic democratic peace,” meaning that democratic regimes tend
to refrain from using the most violent forms of repression. However, he finds that even
democracies often engage in repression during civil and international conflicts. Others
find that international human rights treaties often have a meaningful restraining effect
on governments, reducing their use of repression (Hathaway 2002; Simmons 2009). Not
all international influences are positive, however, as economic sanctions (Wood 2008) are
associated with increased repression. An important generalization in the context of this
study is that human rights practices tend to be shaped by domestic and international
political institutions that are likely to be largely exogenous to civil war dynamics.4 Another
strand of the repression literature focuses on the consequences of repression, and especially
the potential of repression to provoke escalation. In this vein Lichbach (1987) argues that
repression should lead dissidents to substitute increasingly violent tactics for more peaceful
ones, as they will calculate that violence is more likely to achieve their goals. Moore (1998)
finds empirical support for this model, suggesting that repression has significant potential
to escalate political confrontations.
1.1.5 Ethnic Identification
Ethnic identity is central to the theoretical mechanism in this dissertation, and has long been
an area of deep interest to scholars of comparative politics. This work is often predicated
on the assumption that identity is dynamic. At a minimum, individuals can choose which
4Long-running civil wars, however, might deter democratization and participation in human rights
treaties.
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of their several social roles to emphasize. For instance, individuals might orient primarily
toward an ethnicity, a religion, an occupation, a region, or an ideology, and could potentially
alter these choices over time. Themajority of thework in this vein has focused on oscillations
between ethnic and national identities. Early on this question was explored in the context
of statebuilding. Scholars in this area suggest that external threats such as interstate wars
(Herbst 1990; Tilly 1992) or territorial disputes (Gibler, Hutchison, and Miller 2012) can
provide a unifying influence, leading individuals to orient toward national identities and
away from subnational ones such as ethnicity. Most other work in the area examines the role
of political institutions in incentivizing the use of particular identities (Posner 2005; Penn
2008). For example, Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) find that ethnic identification tends
to be strongest just prior to or just after competitive elections, suggesting that individuals
interpret politics through an ethnic lens.
A striking feature of this literature is the degree of consensus that ethnic identity ismalleable.
This perspective is shared by a diverse range of scholars ranging from constructivists (e.g.
Barnett 1995) to formal theorists (e.g. Penn 2008), and enjoys strong empirical support
(e.g. Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Gibler, Hutchison, and Miller 2012). Notably, recent
work has shown that repression is an important factor in shaping identity, with effects
that persist not only over long periods of time, but across generations as well. Lupu and
Peisakhin (2017) show that the descendants of Crimean Tatars who were deported by
Soviet forces 1940’s are more supportive of Tatar political leaders, have greater antipathy
towards Russia, and are more likely to participate in politics as compared to Tatars with no
such family history. Relatedly, Rozenas, Schutte, and Zhukov (2017) show that Ukrainian
communities that were subjected to greater levels of deportation during this period are
today less supportive of pro-Russian political parties than are comparable communities
that experienced less deportation. In short, the malleability approach provides a strong
foundation on which to build my theory.
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1.1.6 Rebel Motives
An examination of the relationships between dissident groups is also likely to offer a new
perspective on rebel motives. The literature on civil war has largely been dominated by
debates over whether rebellion is fundamentally political, or done in pursuit of private
benefits. The former views civil war as an effort to resolve economic or political inequality
(Gurr 1970; Wood 2003; Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010), and has been labeled as
the ‘grievance’ hypothesis (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The latter is composed primarily
of studies emphasizing the ‘greed’ hypothesis (Collier and Hoeffler 2004), which views
rebellion as little more than large-scale criminal activity aimed at bringing profits to its
members (Mueller 2000; Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore 2005; Ross 2004). Others have
emphasized non-material private benefits asmotive for individual participation in rebellion,
such as the ability to act on family disputes or romantic rivalries (Kalyvas 2006).
This political-privatemotive debate has yet to be definitively resolved. A number of scholars
have found greater support for the greed hypothesis than for grievance, with the presence
of natural resources being a stronger predictor of civil war than economic or political
grievances (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Yet, these findings are not robust across different
types of resources or even different measures of the same resource (Dixon 2009). Further-
more, several scholars have found that political factors such as hierarchical relationships
between ethnic groups (Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010) and poor economic perfor-
mance (Miguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti 2004) exert a strong influence on civil war onset.
Other scholars eschew the dichotomy altogether, suggesting that while private benefits
are useful to rebel recruiting efforts, this does not preclude the possibility that rebel elites
ultimately have political motives (Lichbach 1995; Weinstein 2007). Similarly, Lujala (2010)
finds that natural resources are associated with longer conflicts, implying that at least a
portion of resource revenues are devoted to fighting rather than private benefits.
One factor that has limited progress on these questions of motive is the fact that the
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competing theories have been tested almost exclusively on a single outcome — a binary
measure of the occurrence of civil war at the national level. Studying the relationships
between dissident groups and how they vary is likely to provide insight to underlying
rebel motives. For instance, if rebellion is fundamentally about maximizing the profits of
its members, we might expect to see rebels form the smallest coalitions possible that still
allow them to control resource flows. If rebellion is fundamentally political, however, we
might expect rebels to pursue coalitions large enough to pursue victory. Additionally, if
ideology and identity are not truly important to rebels, splintering and alliance formation
should be driven primarily by power calculations (see Christia 2012). If these factors do
matter, however, they should shape the choice of alliance partners and the cohesiveness
of individual groups. Ethnically homogeneous rebel groups should be less prone to
splintering in this case, and alliance should be more likely among groups with similar
identities.
1.2 The Contribution of this Project
First and foremost, this project advances our understanding of a subset of civil wars that is
crucially important for the reasons outlined above. This research explains three processes
that account for most of the variation in the number of rebel groups in a conflict — the
entry of new groups, and the splintering and mergers of existing ones. This dissertation
is among the first projects to directly address the first phenomenon of new rebel groups
joining ongoing conflicts. Existing work either considers the formation of new rebel groups
(i.e. groups that were not previously contained within another violent organization) only
in cases where it is coterminous with conflict initiation (e.g. Lewis 2016), or in the context
of contagion into previously peaceful areas (e.g. Lane 2016). Yet, I find that 27.5% of
rebel groups active since World War II were neither present from the beginning of the
conflict, nor is there any evidence that they descended from existing rebel groups. An
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important contribution of this dissertation, then, is explaining this common but mostly
ignored phenomenon.
While splintering and alliance formation have been the subject of several prior studies,
my findings largely contrast with existing work. Christia (2012) argues that realist power
politics calculations drive both alliance formation and splintering. Asal, Brown, and Dalton
(2012) and Staniland (2014) suggest that organizational structure is the key determinant of
rebel cohesiveness. I find no evidence for this, however, as rebel group centralization is
not related to splintering in my analyses. Furthermore, my argument offers much clearer
predictions than existing work regarding the timing of splintering and alliance formation,
and regarding the choice of alliance partners. Additionally, the existing research is largely
based on a small number of case studies disproportionately drawn from the Middle East
and South Asia. While these conflicts are undeniably complex, they are outliers in terms of
both their long duration and high degree of international intervention. I test my theory on
a sample of all civil wars since 1946, demonstrating that it is widely applicable.
I also build upon the existing literature by unifying explanations of group formation,
splintering and alliances into a more comprehensive theory of rebel movement structure. I
argue that all three processes reflect the level of ethnic identification by dissidents, with
repression driving changes to this trait. Connecting these phenomenon under a single
framework provides a clear delineation of the similarities and differences in the processes
through which each type of group emerges. Either implicitly through its treatment of
them as distinct phenomena, or explicitly through its theoretical arguments, previous work
suggests that these phenomena are largely unrelated. Considering these processes jointly
also allows me to make predictions regarding the overall number of rebel groups active in
a conflict, as I do in Chapter 5.
My findings also suggest several important second-order implications. One is that rebellion
seems to bemore political andmore responsive to the preferences of rank-and-file dissidents
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than much of the existing literature would suggest. A substantial number of scholars view
civil war as largely apolitical, instead being driven by material greed (Mueller 2000; Collier
and Hoeffler 2004) or personal animosities (Kalyvas 2006). I argue that dissidents have
strong preferences over the content of rebellion, and find that repression tends to induce
stronger preferences for rebel groups that represent the interests of a particular ethnic
group. While I cannot rule out the possibility that rebellions are initially driven by material
considerations, as war initiation is beyond the scope of this study, my findings do suggest
that civil war violence tends to have a politicizing effect over time. I discuss the literature
on rebel motives in greater detail later in this chapter.
This work also suggests that governments can exert a powerful influence on the structure
of dissident organizations, as repression can heighten the salience of identities that divide
dissidents. This contrasts with the most existing accounts of rebel movement structure,
which tend to focus on factors mostly internal to the rebel movement such as relative
power among rebel factions (Christia 2012), or the strength of pre-war social ties among
dissidents (Staniland 2014). It also raises several interesting questions about government
strategy in the face of dissent. My findings suggest that repression expands the pool of
individuals willing to fight, which in a vacuum makes government repression puzzling. It
is also unclear whether the other key consequence of repression I identify — the increased
salience of ethnic identity — is a desirable outcome for the government. On one hand
it could form the basis of an effective divide-and-conquer strategy. On the other hand,
fighting multiple opponents could complicate the logistics of counterinsurgency, threaten
the credibility of negotiated settlements, and undermine the prospects of a stable resolution
to the conflict. While this calculation merits greater consideration that I am able to give
it in this dissertation, my findings in Chapter 3 suggest that repression may be aimed at
deterring dissidents from political activities other than rebellion, such as voting.
To test my hypotheses, I collected data on the origins of rebel groups. This allows me to
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distinguish between groups that splintered from existing rebel groups, groups engaging
in violence for the first time, and coalitions of previously active groups. I suspect that the
causal factors behind the emergence of each of these types are related, but as the processes
are quite distinct they should be studied separately. Though I do not make much of the
distinctions in this project, the data also distinguish between several categories of groups
that were not previously engaged in rebellion, including political organizations, religious
organizations, apolitical militias, and factions of the regime military. These categories
should be useful for a variety of future studies on topics such as the durability of rebel
groups, their probability of victory, and their treatment of civilians.
In addition to resolving a gap in the scholarly literature, a better understanding of rebel
movement structure is of value to policymakers. As noted above, conflicts with multiple
rebel groups are among the most severe. Simply being able to predict which conflicts are
likely to become severe through this mechanism has several useful applications. Policy-
makers might be able to identify early on the conflicts that are most likely to benefit from
peace operations. Humanitarian organizations could predict which conflicts are likely to
produce large numbers of refugees, and distribute resources accordingly. This work also be
the possibility of moving beyond prediction and solving the underlying problem. As the
empirical analyses identify the repression of civilians as a key mechanism driving conflict
complexity, it stands to reason that protecting civilians might be an especially valuable
undertaking for non-governmental organizations or outside states.
In the next section I situate my dissertation in the literature to which it is most closely
related. I explain in greater detail my contributions over the existingwork on rebel structure,




In Chapter 2 I articulate a theory of rebel movement structure. I begin with the assumption
that rebel groups emerge from a broader pool of dissidents. While not all dissidents will
be eager to participate in violence, each will prefer to be represented by a rebel group
which advances their political interests and provides them with security. Thus, dissidents
form a constituency that constantly evaluates the performance of rebel groups, and will
consider switching their allegiance to new groups if the existing ones are lacking. In hopes
of seizing on this dynamic, rebel entrepreneurs will look for opportunities to mobilize new
groups by appealing to underrepresented identities and ideologies. These appeals should
be especially effective in the wake of repression for two reasons. First, repression lowers the
risk of fighting relative to remaining peaceful, leading new individuals to join the fighting.
Second, as repression should induce greater levels of ethnic identification. Repression is
often targeted on the basis of ethnicity, increasing its salience, and appeals for support
from outside, co-ethnic states might be especially effective in the presence of human rights
concerns. Thus repression not only creates a new pool of individuals willing to fight, it also
stokes division among dissidents along ethnic lines. This should often lead individuals
joining the fighting to form new groups rather than join existing ones, and individuals
already in rebel groups to realign into more ethnically homogeneous configurations. This
should manifest in the form of both the splintering of existing groups, particularly when
existing groups are multi-ethnic, and the formation of ethnically-homogeneous alliances so
as to replace the loss in capabilities due to fragmentation and streamline access to support
from co-ethnic outside states.
Chapter 3 tests the individual-level assumptions of the theory. Using a sample of over
150,000 Afrobarometer Survey responses, I find support for both of my key predictions
regarding the effects of repression. Individuals who have experienced an attack in the past
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year are 30% more likely than others to express willingness to use violence themselves.
Additionally, I find these individuals are 62%more likely to identify with their ethnic group
than respondents who have not experienced an attack. While I am unable to completely
rule out the possibility of reverse causality, the results hold after performing coarsened
exact matching, showing that attacked individuals do not systematically differ from others
on observable traits. These results suggest that my theory performs as expected at the
individual level.
Chapter 4 contains tests of my predictions regarding the formation of new rebel groups
during ongoing conflicts. I add my measure of rebel group origin to the Uppsala Armed
Conflict Dataset, resulting in a sample of all civil wars, 1946–2015. I find that the probability
of a new rebel group joining an ongoing conflict during a given year has a strong, negative
relationship with changes in respect for human rights. The largest observed increases
in repression are associated with more than a 60% chance of new rebel groups forming,
while the probability is around 3% in years with no substantial change in human rights
practices, and approaches zero in following improvements to human rights. Contrary
to my expectations, I find no evidence that ethnic diversity places a scope condition on
my theory; new rebel groups form in a variety of societies. I also do not find evidence
that rebels groups which join ongoing conflicts are more likely than others to draw their
support from a single ethnic group. However, this result seems to be driven by a large
number of rebel groups with no discernible ties to an ethnic constituency, and I do find
that these joining rebel are significantly less likely than others to be multi-ethnic coalitions.
To supplement these quantitative analyses, I illustrate the causal logic of my theory in a
qualitative case study of the emergence of the Shan State secessionist movement in Burma,
and use the Arakan separatist movement in that country to identify nuances missing from
my argument.
In Chapter 5 I explore two processes through which rebels reorganize — splintering from
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existing groups, and the formation of alliances. I find that increases in repression are
associated with an increased probability of rebel group splintering, though the result is not
entirely robust. I do not find evidence to support my hypothesis that rebel groups which
draw support from multiple ethnic groups are more prone to fragmentation. This seems to
largely reflect the fact that ethnically-homogeneous groups are disproportionately likely
to fight long-lasting, low-intensity separatist conflicts. Consistent with my expectations I
find evidence that repression increases the probability that new ethnically-homogeneous
alliances will form, while having no effect on the formation multi-ethnic alliances. Though
less robust than the findings in previous chapters, these results suggest that repression can
initiate a process of realignment whereby rebels tend to leave multi-ethnic coalitions and
form new alliances centered around a particular ethnic identity. I close the chapter with an
analysis of the total number of rebel groups in a conflict, and show that in the aggregate
repression greatly increases the probability that a conflict-year will have multiple rebel
groups.
Finally, I summarize the results in Chapter 6, discuss their theoretical and policy signifi-
cance, and propose several avenues for future research on this topic.
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Chapter 2
A Theory of Rebel Movement Structure
Why are civil conflicts sometimes contested by multiple rebel factions, while in other
cases by a single, cohesive group? At a given point in time, I argue that it is the choice
of ideologies and identities around which rebellions mobilize that determines whether
they incorporate most of the dissidents in a society, or whether many dissidents are left
to form their own groups. These arrangements are often fragile, however, as factors such
as government repression can lead dissidents to become more receptive to new bases of
organization. Drawing on the literature reviewed in Chapter 1, I identify three processes
through which these individual dynamics shape the number of rebel groups in a civil war.
First, entirely new groups can enter the conflict. Second, previously cohesive groups can
splinter into multiple successor organizations. Finally, previously independent groups
sometimes merge. In the remainder of this chapter I articulate a set of assumptions, a




I begin by laying out my assumptions about the relevant actors in a civil war, their interests,
and the structure of their interactions.
2.1.1 The Dissident Pool
I start from the assumption that rebel groups are drawn from a broader pool of dissidents.
By dissident, I simply mean an individual who opposes the government. Dissidents are
grouped into a variety of potentially overlapping organizations. Some may belong to
non-violent political organizations such as trade unions or political parties. Others may
use violence as members of a rebel group. Hereafter I “rebel movement” as a term that
encompasses all rebel groups, but excludes non-violent dissidents. In some cases this rebel
movement will consist of a single group, if there is only one rebel organization associated
with the dissident pool. In the American Civil War, for example, the dissidents were
represented by a single Confederate Army, though even in this case there were several
militias with only a loose attachment to the main rebel group. In other cases the rebel
movement may contain several distinct rebel groups, such as the Shan State conflict in
Burma, which has produced at least six rebel groups.
At the individual level, dissidents are likely to vary on several dimensions. First, individuals
differ in their level of involvement in violence. Lichbach (1995, 17) identifies five gradations
of participation which range from being constituents who may not even consent to being
represented by the dissident movement, to activists who engage in political activity but
not necessarily violence, to militants who participate in violence or work in close support
of such efforts. For instance, civilian activists may provide crucial material and logistical
support to rebels (see Weinstein 2007; Parkinson 2013). Relatedly, dissidents may utilize
different “repertoires of contention” (Tilly 1986, 2006), perhaps reflecting the resources and
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past behavior of the groups throughwhich they are mobilized. For example, some elements
of the dissident pool might specialize in non-violent actions such as boycott, others on
conventional political channels such as elections, while others in engage in violence. In
addition to varying across individuals, the willingness to use violence is often dynamic —
previously violent individuals often desert their rebel group, and previously non-violent
individuals can be moved to participate in the fighting.
Social identities form a second dimension of variation among dissidents. A few dissident
movements are exceptionally homogenous. For example, some separatist movements
benefit from a coincidence of ethnicity, language, religion, and geographic location. In
most cases, however, there is some amount of diversity along these attributes. For example,
the Kurds share a common ethnicity and language, but practice a variety of faiths. Bids to
overthrow the central government might be made by coalitions featuring representatives of
multiple ethnic groups, religions, languages, and regions. Rebel leaders often emphasize
broad, inclusive goals and identities, hoping to gain the support of a large portion of society.
Such coalitions are often vulnerable to “outbidding appeals” (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972;
Horowitz 1985), through which moderate, diverse groups lose support to competitors
claiming to explicitly represent a particular identity group.
Finally, while dissidents share a common interest in removing the incumbent government,
they do not necessarily agree on many other political questions. Rural dissidents might
make land reform their top priority in a post-war government, whereas urban dissidents
might care more about corruption or modernization programs. Some dissidents hope to
take control of the central government, as the Houthi rebels have done in Yemen, while
others hope to procure independence or greater regional autonomy as a consequence of
the war, as the South Sudanese eventually did. Broader left-right ideological divisions are
often present, and doctrinal differences often divide groups with relatively similar views.
For example, Indian communists were long divided into Maoist and Marxist-Leninist
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factions. Even when dissidents largely agree on goals, there are likely to be divisions
between hardliners and moderates, who will be more willing to accept compromises and
less willing to adopt extreme tactics. Finally, even dissidents who largely agree on questions
of policy will still find themselves in competition over the power and private benefits of
government (Christia 2012), which are subject to rival consumption. There are a limited
number of government positions, and material benefits such as oil rents are finite.
Beyond these variations in preferences, I see three key categories of dissident.
Dissident Constituents
I label dissidents who do not participate in violence, but support violent efforts to some
extent as “dissident constituents.” These constituents may support rebels in a variety of
ways, including the provision of food, shelter, and information. This constituency is also
likely to be a vital source of recruits for rebel groups. In cases where rebel groups are
associated with a political party, these constituents will be a critical source of electoral
support. Constituents have limited agency with respect to the array of rebel groups they
can choose to support. Yet while rebel groups are sometimes able to coerce support,
constituents generally have some ability to withhold support. For example, constituents
could turn on a rebel group by becoming government informants (Kalyvas andKocher 2007).
Alternatively, constituents could flee an area and become refugees or internally displaced
persons. Thus, while they tend to have little-or-no direct influence over rebel groups, rebel
leaders nonetheless have incentives to be responsive to the interests of constituents.
The most fundamental interest held by dissident constituents during civil war is likely to be
security. These are individuals who have elected not to participate in violence themselves.
Avoiding violence is thus likely to be a high priority for them, leading them to value
rebel groups that can provide protection or steer the fighting away from civilian areas.
Secondary to this, dissidents are likely to have political preferences they would prefer to
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see represented by a rebel group. For example, in addition to opposing the incumbent
regime constituents might like to see improved status for their ethnic group or land reform.
If the rebel group a constituent currently supports does not have a platform that aligns
closely to their interests and succeeds in providing protection, they should be receptive to
appeals from other groups.
Rank-and-File Rebels
Rebel groups are generally hierarchical organizations, with the majority of members having
little influence over their direction. I call the rebel group members who do not occupy
leadership positions “rank-and-file rebels.” Much like constituents, rank-and-file rebels
have limited input in group decisions, but have what Hirschman (1970) calls the “exit”
option. If members are sufficiently dissatisfied with the direction of a rebel group, they
generally can leave to form a new splinter organization, or desert the conflict entirely. As
losing a substantial number of members could devastate the fighting capacity of a group,
rebel elites again have an incentive to be at least somewhat responsive to their members.
Individuals who join rebel groups often (though not always) do so out of deep commitment
to a political cause (Humphreys and Weinstein 2008). Thus one dimension over which
rank-and-file members is political action. If group leaders stray too far from their original
platform, or are insufficiently forceful in advocating for it, they are likely to face internal
dissent from rank-and-file. Rank-and-file members also tend to have connections to civilian
family members and friends. Thus they are likely to support efforts to protect and oppose
efforts to abuse civilians, at least from social groups with whom they share a connection.
Failure to represent the interests of these rank-and-file members puts rebel leaders at
significant risk of losing members through splintering or desertion.
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Rebel Entrepreneurs
Finally, I call the dissident elites who lead existing rebel groups and form new ones “rebel
entrepreneurs.” I assume that rebel groups generally emerge through the efforts of these
entrepreneurs, rather than, say, the spontaneous organization of protesters. Leading a rebel
group is likely to be attractive for several reasons. First, leaders exercise significant, and
sometimes total control over a rebel group’s political platform. Even if a rebel group does
not defeat the government, rebel entrepreneurs may be able to secure concessions on a few
of their favored issues in post-war peace negotiations. Rebel elites also frequently receive
significant private benefits. During conflicts, rebel groups sometimes acquire control of
natural resource production, or illicit trades such as drugs. While some of these funds are
used to attract and retain rank-and-file soldiers, rebel elites often reap a significant amount
of profit.
Maintain political leverage and control of private resources requires a reasonably strong
rebel group. As these political and material benefits are often even more plentiful for rebel
leaders who defeat the government, they should generally prefer to build a rebel group
strong enough to win. Thus in general, leaders of existing rebel groups should elect to be
responsive enough to rank-and-file members and constituents to prevent significant losses
in members. At the same time, as some portion of the private benefits are often distributed
to rank-and-file members, rebel leaders should seek minimum winning coalitions, rather
than endlessly pursuing more power (Christia 2012). Thus rebel leaders may be willing
to tolerate some loss of support, placing on constraint on the extent to which they are
accountable to members.
Rebel entrepreneurs who do not currently lead their own rebel group should look for
opportunities to do so. This might entail forming a new rebel group, by appealing to
dissident constituents with a different platform than existing rebel groups offer, or by
leading a group of rank-and-file members in the creation of splinter organizations.
25
Changes to the Dissident Pool
I generally treat the dissident pool as a fixed set of government opponents. In reality,
however, it will often change in size over the course of the conflict. Throughout history
civilians have often fled conflict in large numbers to become refugees. While one might
reason that dissidents are somewhat less likely to do this than neutral civilians, in many
conflicts the dissident pool is undoubtedly depleted by fleeing members. Successful
counterinsurgency operations by the government or third parties can also reduce the ranks
of the dissidents. Both rebels and non-violent dissidents are often killed in great numbers,
and even when they are not, they may be subjected to imprisonment or repression that
makes mobilization difficult. Under certain conditions, dissidents may even defect to
the government side (Staniland 2012). In Iraq, for example, a 2007 counterinsurgency
campaign by the Iraqi government and U.S. forces persuaded many previously dissident
Sunni militias to join the government’s fight against al-Qaeda.
In other cases the dissident pool may grow. Government repression may induce previously
neutral civilians to support the opposition. Dissidents may attract support by offering a
morally or politically superior platform to the government’s, or by obtaining legitimacy
through their choice of tactics or international support (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).
Rebels may attract new supporters by demonstrating strength and by extension their
prospects for success (Christia 2012), or by offering private benefits to recruits (Weinstein
2007). Rebel groupsmay also attract or coerce support from civilians by controlling territory
(Mampilly 2011). Finally, dissidents may be bolstered by international support. The Islamic
State has recruited young Muslims from around the world to join them in Syria. At a less
violent level, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam enjoyed significant financial support
from the Tamil diaspora, effectively giving them a larger civilian support network than
they had locally.
While I am primarily interested in changes to the structure of the dissident movement
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independent of its size, it is important to consider the possibility that the dissident pool
may change in composition as well.
2.1.2 The Formation of Rebel Groups
One school of thought in the literature on the causes of civil war argues that rebellion
is motivated primarily by the pursuit of private benefits such as oil rents or profits from
illicit trades (Mueller 2000; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). This so-called “greed hypothesis”
implies that rebels are not necessarily insistent upon defeating the government. While
doing so may be desirable in some cases if control of the state brings significant revenue
streams, often rebels aspire only to preserve their control of revenue from sources such as
drug cultivation. For example, the RUF in Sierra Leone controlled several diamond mines
through much of the civil war there, procuring significant wealth for themselves and their
external sponsors. Kalyvas (2006) similarly believes that rebel violence is often motivated
by private concerns, though he sees personal animosities such as the Hatfield-McCoy
rivalry in the US as a more common priority than material wealth.
I depart from the greed school and follow Lichbach (1995) and Weinstein (2007) in viewing
private benefits such as drug revenues as a recruiting tool and secondary benefit of rebellion,
rather than as ends in themselves. The ultimate goal of rebel groups, then, are political
outcomes such as the overthrow of the central government, or autonomy for a particular
region. Thus, all else equal, rebel groups should prefer to defeat the government militarily.
Short of that, they should prefer to use gains on the battlefield to secure at least a portion of
their political goals in a postwar peace agreement. This creates an incentive for rebel leaders
to amass as much military and political power as possible. Yet, even as a secondary motive,
private benefits create a countervailing incentive to limit the size of one’s group, so as to
maximize the share of benefits distributed to each member. Ultimately, then, rebels should
seek to build minimum winning coalitions just strong enough to win the war (Christia
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2012).
I conceptualize rebellion as emerging from the efforts of rebel entrepreneurs, who seek to
recruit fellow dissidents to participate in violence. There are several challenges inherent
to such a task. First, persuading individuals to participate in collective action is generally
difficult, and especially so in the high-risk context of rebellion. Second, rebellions generally
need to build capacity quickly, to ensure that they can survive government repression. In-
deed, Lewis (2016) finds that many rebel groups fail within a few months. Third, achieving
political goals typically requires a cohesive rebel group that is able to avoid infighting and
splintering (Staniland 2014). Finally, rebel entrepreneurs should prefer to organize groups
on a basis that allows them to exclude some segments of the population from receiving
private benefits (Christia 2012).
I expect that drawing on existing organizations such as political parties, religious orga-
nizations, student groups, or labor unions will solve many of these problems. Social
networks with members who expect to interact in the future can often solve collective
action problems by sanctioning individuals who decline to participate (Marwell, Oliver,
and Prahl 1988). Many civil society organizations will produce such ties among members.
For example, members of a teachers’ union might expect to interact throughout their career,
as would most members of a political organization representing the interest of a particular
geographic area. Drawing from existing groups also offers the possibility of mobilizing a
large number of people quickly, particularly if rebel entrepreneurs can gain the support of
group leadership. Existing social organizations can also produce a cohesive rebel group,
particularly if they have strong vertical ties between leadership and rank-and-file members,
and strong horizontal ties between chapters or geographic areas, as this allows the cen-
tral leadership to exert a high degree of command and control over members (Staniland
2014). Finally, building a movement by recruiting existing groups will often allow rebel


































































































































Figure 2.1: The Origins of Rebel Groups, 1946–2015
Consistent with these notions, my own data collection1 shows that most rebel groups
can trace their origins to a pre-existing organization such as a political party, militia, or
student organization (see also Staniland 2014). Comparatively few have emerged through
grassroots processes, such as protesters steadily becoming more violent and organized (see
Figure 2.1).
The implication of this argument is that initially, at least, the structure of rebel movements
will reflect the structure of pre-war civil society. If a single organization connects most
or all dissidents in a country, it may be possible for dissidents to build a unified group
on that basis. For instance in a two-party system most regime opponents might share
common membership in the opposition party. When no such unifying organization exists,
1I begin with the set of all rebel groups in the Uppsala Armed Conflict data, 1946–2015 (Melander,
Pettersson, and Themnér 2016). I code the primary origin of each rebel group by examining the social roles
its leaders had prior to forming the group. The coding rules for each category are described in the Appendix.
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the probability that multiple rebel groups will emerge is much higher. This argument also
implies that the choice of basis on which entrepreneurs attempt to organize rebellions will
be endogenous to the degree of prior organization around said bases. For example, in much
of the Middle East freedom of assembly is granted only to religious organizations, meaning
that religious identity is likely to form the basis of rebellions there, while ideological or
occupational identities are unlikely to do so.
Staniland (2014) shows that the structure of these pre-existing organizations is a powerful
determinant of the subsequent cohesiveness of the rebel groups they produce. Groups
that have both strong vertical ties between leaders and members, and strong horizontal
ties across different units prove to be very cohesive. Many of the organizations that spawn
rebellion lack this attribute, however, meaning that in many cases division amongmembers
can lead rebel groups to splinter. Staniland (2014) also suggests that these social ties
can be dynamic. Thus while the attributes of the originating organization shape those
of the rebel group initially, it is possible for the social ties to strengthen or weaken over
time. For example, repeated interactions may facilitate the formation of alliances between
previously independent factions. Alternatively, certain counterinsurgency strategies, such
as targeting individuals who serve as key social “bridges,” might sow division within
previously cohesive groups.
2.1.3 The Role of Individual Preferences
I argue that rebel structure is shaped by a bottom-up process in which the preferences of
rank-and-file members and civilian constituents play a crucial role. Translating individual-
level preferences to group-level outcomes is not straightforward, however. Logically, the
properties of one level of analysis cannot directly explain outcomes at a higher level (Singer
1961). It is thus necessary for a bottom-up theory to specify how lower-level preferences
aggregate. I argue that rebel leaders have strong incentives to be responsive to their
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members, though the mechanisms producing this incentive vary by group.
Some rebel organizations are integrated with political structures that provide some degree
of democratic accountability. Hamas, Hezbollah, the Irish Republican Army, and the Karen
National Union, to name but a few, have political wings that are often equal to or above the
militant side of the group in the organizational hierarchy. In many cases these political
wings compete in elections, creating a strong incentive to behave in amanner that is popular
among a large portion of the population. The past behavior of the group’s armed wing
should often be an important consideration for voters, especially during periods of intense
fighting. For example, Hamas’ victory over Fatah in the 2006 Palestinian elections may
be attributable in part to the latter’s inability to end Israeli campaigns against Palestinian
territories (Zweiri 2006). Rebel groups with this sort of connection to electoral politics
should thus have an incentive to respond to the preferences of their constituents.
While rebel groups that lack a political wingmay not be directly accountable to sympathetic
civilians, they still have strong incentives to retain the favor of their members. Absent any
connections to a civilian political structure, rebel groups are by definition fundamentally
militarized organizations. As such, they tend to be very hierarchical in structure, and
therefore undemocratic.2 Yet, the ability to directly voice concerns to leadership is not
the only way for rank-and-file rebels to exert influence in an organization. In general
dissatisfied individuals also have the ability to exit an organization (Hirschman 1970).
This is especially true in the context of rebel organization, as rebels frequently break away
from their group to form new splinter organizations (see Pearlman and Cunningham
2011). While some rebel groups may be built upon sufficiently dense social networks
to prevent such fragmentation (Staniland 2014), in many cases rebels should be able to
demand accountability from their leaders by threatening to leave the group. This effect may
be exacerbated by the presence of rival entrepreneurs promoting new groups built around
2Some notable exceptions do exist. al-Qaeda, for example, lacks a political wing and yet has a deliberately
decentralized, flat structure with local cells following only loose direction from the central leadership.
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differing ideologies or identities. Civilian constituents may also have exit options. While I
expect that rebel groups usually emerge from existing social organizations, individuals
often have several overlapping affiliations. If, for example, they are dissatisfied with the
performance of a rebel group associated with their religion, they may be another rebellion
associated with their political party that they could support instead.
As these individual-level preferences are translated to rebel group leaders through an
informal mechanism, I do not expect the decision rules that determine when leaders will
respond to members, and which preferences are represented when members disagree, are
especially complex. Rather, leaders will respond in a way that simply minimizes the loss of
membership. If group members disagree on an issue, leaders will follow a plurality rule,
representing the preference of the largest group subset. If group members are divided on
the question of accepting support from an outside state, for example, leaders are likely to
side with the largest constituency. Leaders can adjust their ideologies, and sometimes even
their religions. For example, many former Ba’ath Party officials in Saddam Hussein’s Iraq
moved from the secular ideology of that movement to become pious devotees of Sunni
Islam in order to assume leadership roles in the Islamic State (McCants 2015). There are
limits to the extent to which leaders can accommodate their members, however. While
ideologies can be adjusted, leaders likely cannot claim to represent an ethnic group of
which they are not members. There may also be limits to how far a leader can move their
ideology or identity without losing credibility. Finally, some member demands may be
materially impossible to meet, such as a demand for payment in a group that lacks any
revenue streams.
In short, I expect that rebel leaders have a strong incentive to be responsive to their mem-
bers. When they fail to do so, or when members make demands that cannot be met, a
reorganization of the rebel movement is likely.
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2.2 Repression and the Dynamics of Individual Attitudes
While the availability of existing organizations plays a large role in determining which
ideologies and identities rebel entrepreneurs initially employ in recruiting members, the
appeal of these bases of mobilization can change over time. I am particularly interested in
changes in the extent to which individual dissidents orient towards sub-national identities
such as ethnicity or religion,3 which often provide a basis for division within the dissident
movement, and more inclusive priorities such as a non-sectarian ideology. I expect that
government repression will be a crucial determinant of this orientation.
2.2.1 The Relative Cost of Fighting
One dissident attribute that can be altered by repression is the willingness to engage in
violence. Participation in rebellion is largely a function of demographic traits, with impov-
erished young men accounting for a large portion of recruits (Humphreys and Weinstein
2008). The role of poverty is thought to be related to opportunity costs - individuals with
comfortable lifestyles are unlikely to take on the risks of fighting, while impoverished indi-
viduals have little to lose (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). The cost of participating in rebellion
relative to non-violence is not necessarily static, however. Indiscriminate violence against
civilians can reduce the the risk of participation in violence relative to that of non-violence,
by making non-violence more dangerous and thus less desirable (Kalyvas and Kocher
2007). If the physical risk of remaining peaceful is not dramatically lower than that of
fighting, the cost of participating in rebellion is relatively low.
Thus, individualswho experience repression, either personally or in close enough proximity
to influence their expectations of safety, should become more willing to engage in violence.
3Subsequently, I focus primarily on ethnicity. I expect that ethnicity will be the most salient cleavage in a
majority of societies, but in some cases religion or other identities may play this role.
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Individual thresholds for violence will continue to vary, meaning that some will continue
to remain peaceful. Yet in general, the number of dissidents who are willing to engage
in violence should increase with the risk of physical harm from repression. Furthermore,
repression should aid in rebel recruiting and mobilization efforts. For example, some
individuals may find the initial set of grievances voiced by a rebel group to be unpersuasive,
but are moved to join the cause after witnessing government brutality.
2.2.2 Ethnic Identity
Some theoretical perspectives view ethnic and other social identities as largely immutable,
having been the basis for conflict across many generations (Horowitz 1985). Increasingly,
however, scholars view identity as a product of individual or collective choice. Posner
(2005) argues that individuals choose to prioritize one of several identities such as ethnic-
ity, language, religion, or class, selecting that which is likely to bring them the greatest
benefit. Focusing on the realm of electoral politics, he finds that this choice is shaped by
an interaction between group size and electoral institutions. In subsequent work Eifert,
Miguel, and Posner (2010) find that individuals are more likely to identify with their ethnic
group when interviewed near a competitive election, suggesting that ethnicity is deployed
instrumentally during elections. Penn (2008) models a similar calculation in which indi-
viduals choose to orient themselves toward a national or ethnic identity. She finds that
ethnic identities become more prevalent as ethnic groups become homogenous, and as
economic inequality between ethnic groups increases. Christia (2012) extends the argument
to civil wars, arguing that ethnic identities are deployed instrumentally, with rebel elites
emphasizing particular identities to justify alignments that are in fact driven by power
politics. A key consequence of this malleability of identity is that ethnic outbidding is not
inevitable - if political actors can appeal to multiple, overlapping identities, competition
is no longer zero-sum (Chandra 2005). The opposite is also true, however - previously
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cooperative relationships can be undermined by enhancing the salience of ethnic identities.
I argue that violent repression should tend to increase the extent to which individuals
identify with their ethnic group.4 A vast scholarly literature views ethnic identity as a cause
of conflict (e.g. Horowitz 1985). Several scholars have also considered the possibility of a
causal relationship running in the opposite direction, with conflict influencing individual
identity. The bulk of this work argues that external threats such as interstate war can
promote the creation of national identities, facilitating statebuilding (Herbst 1990; Tilly
1992; Gibler, Hutchison, and Miller 2012). Gibler, Hutchison, and Miller (2012) focus on
territorial threat as the key driver of identity changes. As many territorial disputes are
driven by irredentist logics (i.e. a state seeks to acquire territory that is home to ethnic
groups prevalent within its own borders), citizens in the target state have a strong incentive
to emphasize national identities to avoid the impression that they support the challenging
state. Herbst (1990, 122) similarly sees interstate war as a crucial source of nationalism,
arguing that “. . .people realize in a profound manner that they are under threat because of
who they are as a nation; they are forced to recognize that it is only as a nation that they
can successfully defeat the threat.”
Others have speculated that an opposite process may occur in civil wars, whereby indi-
viduals become more oriented toward ethnic identities. Kaufmann (1996) argues that in
conflicts where ethnicity is the primary dividing line, individuals will experience a security
dilemma in which their survival is increasingly tied to the success of their group. However,
this does not explain why ethnicity would become the basis for conflict in the first place.
Kuran (1998) offers an explanation for this, arguing that “ethnic activists” can provoke a
cascade of increased ethnic identification, particularly when they use violence on behalf of
the ethnic group. He explains,
4Hereafter I will refer mainly to ethnicity as the primary alternative to broad identities. In some societies
other social markers such as religion are likely to be more salient, but I expect these to operate in a similar
manner to ethnicity.
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“Ethnic violence, along with the ensuing reactions, repression, and counter-
violence, creates ethnic grievances, and it revives memories of past sufferings.
Often, therefore, it makes people of all ethnic groups turn inward as a precaution
against further violence,” (Kuran 1998, 46).
Often repression is applied in a manner with the potential to highlight ethnic identities.
Distinguishing dissidents from pro-government or neutral individuals is generally quite
difficult (Kalyvas 2006). If detailed knowledge about particular individuals is unavailable,
governments may adopt crude solutions to this problem, assuming that particular social
groups or locales are generally sympathetic to the opposition. If individuals are targeted on
the basis of their ethnicity, ethnic identities should becomemore salient. This in turn should
trigger the linked fate mechanism described by Kuran (1998). Under these conditions,
individuals should tend to see banding together with co-ethnics as their best chance of
survival. By contrast, it may be difficult to trust members of other ethnic groups not to
defect to the government side.
Ethnic groups may also have logistical tools that make ethnic identification instrumentally
rational. Many ethnic groups, especially in the kinds of societies where significant ethnic
discrimination occurs, have political parties or nationalist organizations thatmight be useful
for launching a rebellion. In countries that have previously experienced ethnic conflict,
there are sometimes ethnic militias5 that can be converted into larger, more political rebel
groups. Outside states also frequently contributematerial support to co-ethnic rebel groups
(Cederman, Girardin, and Gleditsch 2009). Compared to most bases on which rebellion
could be built, ethnicity tends to offer a significant head start in terms of organizing
members and acquiring resources. Thus, individuals facing repression should often turn
to ethnicity as a means to organizing resistance.
Thus far, this discussion has focused on the responses of dissident civilians. Rank-and-file
5I distinguish militias from rebel groups as the former tend to be small, localized, and have few political
ambitions. Instead they generally exist to protect a specific group, locale, or economic activity.
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rebels have a very different experience during conflict. These individuals are likely to be
targeted by repression (or worse) regardless of whether it is applied on the basis of ethnicity.
Yet, increased ethnic identification among constituents can extend to rebels through two
mechanisms. First, these individuals can demand a rebel group that represents them on
more explicitly ethnic terms. This might be especially likely if dissidents feel that existing
rebel groups have failed to adequately protect them from the government. As I discuss in
more detail in the section below on “Group Formation,” repression can lead previously
non-violent individuals to take up arms, in some cases leading to the direct creation of new
rebel groups. Second, rebels themselves may begin to identify more strongly with their
ethnic group through their connections with family and friends who experience repression.
As members see their own communities come under threat, they are likely to become less
supportive of broad or abstract goals, and more supportive of efforts to defend particular
groups or locales. As discussed in the section on “Splintering” below, these members may
break away to form a new rebel group that places greater emphasis on ethnicity. They may
also use the threat of doing so to induce existing groups to embrace ethnic identities.
2.2.3 Government Agency
Thus far, I have treated repression as an exogenous influence on dissidents. In reality, the
government is almost certainly a strategic actor, with its use of repression being endogenous
to its expectation of how dissidents will respond. Governments might be more inclined to
repress if they expect that doing so will sow division among their opponents. Alternatively,
dissident pools that are already divided might make more attractive targets for repression
than unified ones. It is important to account for such possibilities both theoretically and
empirically. This is would be particularly true if my expectation that repression often
produces fragmentation among dissidents is borne out, as it is not entirely clear whether
this would be a desirable outcome for the government. Furthermore, if repression does
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in fact increase the number dissidents willing to resort violence, its use by governments
becomes downright puzzling.
One explanation is that influencing the size or structure of rebel groups is not the only, and
perhaps not even the primary purpose of repression in most cases. First, the governmental
institutions involved in fighting rebels may differ from those that conduct the bulk of
repression. Whereas civil wars tend to be conducted by state militaries, repression is often
conducted by police forces or outsourced to pro-government militias, with less-than-perfect
coordination between the entities (Mitchell, Carey, and Butler 2014). Second, rebellion is
not always a particularly grave threat to a government’s survival. Indeed, only about 16%
of rebel groups defeat the government (Cunningham, Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009). By
contrast, leaders routinely lose power through elections, and are sometimes forced to resign
in the face of mass uprisings. If governments use repression to maximize their chances at
political survival, deterring dissidents from voting or protesting may take priority over
preventing or dividing rebel movements. In either case, the government’s strategy of
repression would not be (entirely) endogenous to its affect on rebel structure.
Another explanation is that repression may operate largely through a deterrent effect
(Pierskalla 2010). The true target of repression, then, is not the individuals who experience
violence, but rather those who observe such actions. Thus while the individuals who are
actually repressed may become more likely to use violence, it is possible that many others
will lower their willingness to use violence in order to avoid such a fate. In this case the
government would essentially be accepting the presence of a small number of very commit-
ted dissidents in exchange for an aggregate reduction in the number of people willing to
fight. Lichbach (1987) suggests such a possibility, as he argues that while repression tends
to increase dissident violence, its affect on the total level of dissident activity is dependent
on whether it mixes repression with policy concessions.
In some cases, however, repression is likely aimed at least partially at making rebellionmore
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difficult. If, as I predict, repression reduces the cost of fighting and increases the willingness
of its targets to participate in violence, the government’s use of this tactic remains a puzzle.
One explanation is that repression is a sort of gamble. At its most successful, repression
might induce dissidents to flee the country and become refugees, deter violent mobilization
by signaling resolve (Pierskalla 2010), or physically prevent collective action from occurring.
The possibility of such a desirable outcome might lead governments to repress, even if
doing so brings some risk of an escalating cycle of repression and increasingly violent
dissent. As governments likely have incomplete information about their own ability to
identify and repress dissidents, and about dissident resolve, counterproductive uses of
repression are conceivable. Another possibility is that at least to a certain point, the unity
of the rebel movement matters more to governments than its size. Governments in this
case would be accepting an increased number of rebels in exchange for the benefits of a
divide-and-conquer strategy. Lastly, repression appears to be the default response to unrest
across the spectrum of regime types. Indeed, Davenport (2007a) finds that states almost
invariably meet challenges to the status with repression, describing the pattern as “the law
of coercive responsiveness.” Thus, it may be the case that states simply repress unless a
significant feedback leads them to revise their strategy. In this case, governments likely
would not consider the potential negative consequences until after a significant amount of
repression had been applied.
A more complete consideration of the government’s use of repression is beyond the scope
of this project. As the preceding section demonstrates, there are a number of theoretical
accounts in which the structure of the dissident movement is incidental to the decision to
repress.
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2.2.4 Non-Governmental Sources of Repression
To this point I have generally assumed that the government is the primary source of
repression. In reality, this is not always true. Both rebels and their constituents may face
violence from other rebel groups, outside states, or less political non-state actors such as
militias or criminal organizations. In general I do not expect that the source of repression
makes much difference for the process described above. If the risk of violence from any
source increases, an individual’s relative cost of participating in rebellion should decrease.
As is the case with governments, some rebel groups and militias are clearly associated
with particular ethnic groups and/or choose their targets for victimization on the basis of
ethnicity. Repression in these cases should tend to increase ethnic identification, just as it
would if it were applied by the government.
2.2.5 Testing the Microfoundations
The preceding account suggests two testable propositions about individual-level attitudes,
which I evaluate in Chapter 3. First, I follow Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) in arguing that
violent repression should reduce the relative cost of participation in violence. This implies
that individuals who have personally been repressed6 should on average exhibit a greater
willingness to engage in violence than individuals who lack such experiences.
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who experience repression should be more willing to participate in political
violence themselves
Additionally, I expect that repression will tend to induce its targets to identify more strongly
with their ethnic group7, as repression is often applied disproportionately to certain groups,
6The survey data I use (the Afrobarometer survey) only asks individuals whether they have been attacked,
without specifying the attacking party.
7In some cases a group type other than ethnicity, such as religion or clan might be more salient than
ethnicity. However, my survey data asks only about ethnic identification.
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increasing the salience of such identities. Furthermore, ethnic identification may have
instrumental value as ethnicity is often a particularly useful basis on which to organize
responses to repression.
Hypothesis 2: Repression should increase the extent to which an individual identifies with their
ethnic group
2.3 Processes of Structural Change
These individual-level dynamics produce changes in the overarching structure of the rebel
movement through three processes. First, they can drive the formation of entirely new
rebel groups. Second, they can lead individuals who already belong to a rebel group to
break away into splinter organizations. Finally, they can facilitate the creation of alliances
among previously independent groups.
2.3.1 Group Formation
By “group formation” I mean the entry of entirely new groups to the conflict. I define a
group as new if it did not originate as a faction of another rebel group. A rebel group that
draws its leadership and members from a political party that did not previously engage
in violence would constitute a new group if it were to take up arms. I would consider a
faction of an existing rebel group that breaks away to form its own organization to be a
splinter organization, discussed in the following section. At a minimum, group formation
requires that two conditions be met. First, previously non-violent individuals must change
their mobilizational calculus. This entails either participation in violence becoming more
attractive, or remaining non-violent becoming less attractive.
Second, there must be a division among the dissident constituents. Newly mobilizing
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individuals must have a reason for forming a new group rather than joining an existing one.
At their most benign, these divisions might simply reflect the difficulty of coordinating
actions across physical distance or linguistic barriers. For example, dissidents on opposite
sides of a mountain range might choose to form independent organizations. In such cases
the formation of multiple rebel groups might be a matter of convenience rather than an
indicator of animosity or divergent objectives. In other cases, however, divisions may
be deeper and more difficult to reconcile. For instance, if some rebels make improving
the status of their ethnic group a primary concern, it is unlikely that members of other
ethnic groups will join their organization, and any existing members with differing ethnic
identities will be likely to leave.
As noted in the preceding discussion of individual-level dynamics, repression can satisfy
both of these conditions. The application to the first condition requires little explanation.
Repression should reduce the relative cost of fighting, as non-violence brings fewer as-
surances of safety. Thus, the pool of individuals willing to participate in violence should
expandwith the level of repression. The crucial question, then, is whether they join existing
rebel groups, or form new ones. I argue that these new dissidents will often choose the
latter. First, if significant numbers of civilians have been repressed, they may place some of
the blame on existing rebel groups. If civilians provide material support to a rebel group,
they may expect protection in return. Being repressed would be a strong indication that
the rebel group is failing in this role. Alternatively, they may blame existing rebels for
provoking the government into repressing. In either case, they are likely to hold negative
affect toward existing groups.
I also expect that beyond changing the cost of fighting, repression should make individuals
more inclined to emphasize sub-national identities such as ethnicity. Unless there are
already rebel groups placing strong emphasis on ethnicity, a new group may be more able
to appeal to these identities. A rebel group that previously emphasized a non-sectarian
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ideological agenda, or drew support from a multi-ethnic coalition, will have difficulty
credibly pivoting to an emphasis on a particular ethnic identity. Recall that I assume there
is an ever-present set of rebel entrepreneurs seeking opportunities to build new groups of
their own. These entrepreneurs should often be able to propose a new rebel group that
makes ethnicity more central to its identity than previous organizations. The literature on
ethnic outbidding suggests that these efforts should often be successful. Outbidding is a
dynamic in which leaders make progressively more extreme proposals in hopes of winning
the support of the group (Rabushka and Shepsle 1972; Horowitz 1985). Key to these models
are the assumptions that individuals identify with a single ethnic group, that they care
only about ethnic issues, and that ethnic politics is a zero-sum game. This produces a
completely polarized bargaining space in which individuals choose ideal points at which
their group’s interests are represented fully (e.g. a preference for a legislature in which
group members hold a majority). In a spatial model of voting with such parameters, the
optimal strategy for politicians is to adopt the most extreme position possible (Rabushka
and Shepsle 1972). In Sri Lanka, for example, parties representing the Sinhala majority
proposed increasingly discriminatory policies against the Tamil minority (Horowitz 1985).
Even if amulti-ethnic coalition forms initially by creating uncertainty as towhich groupwill
be advantaged, it will eventually be undercut by challengers making more extreme appeals
to a single ethnic group. Other bases of mobilization, by contrast, tend to produce more
heterogeneous preferences - some members will actually prefer moderate positions - and
thus greater potential for compromise. While the original formulation of the outbidding
model assumes competition in an electoral context, it has also been shown to more violent
forms of competition such as terrorism (Kydd and Walter 2006; Chenoweth 2010; but see
Findley and Young 2012). Thus as individual dissidents become more oriented toward
ethnic identities, rebel groups making extreme bids should tend to attract more new
members than moderate groups.
While this process should initially re-orient a subset of dissidents around the ethnic identi-
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ties that are targeted with repression, the mobilization of one group can lead to similar
behavior in others, even if the latter groups do not experience repression themselves. Kuran
(1998) shows that ethnic identification is interdependent, meaning that if some members
of society begin to emphasize ethnic identity more strongly, the probability that others
will do so increases. Increased mobilization around one ethnicity can also pose a threat
to members of other ethnic groups, leading them to mobilize for reasons of self-defense
(Posen 1993). Perhaps for these reasons, several studies have found that contagion effects
frequently cause a proliferation of both secessionist movements (Ayres and Saideman 2000)
and ethnic conflict (Lane 2016).
I thus expect that repression will tend to ultimately lead to the formation of new rebel
groups. A set of individuals who did not fight previously will be motivated to enter the
conflict. Rather than joining existing rebel groups, however, these individuals will often
look to form new ones. Repression should induce greater levels of ethnic identification,
which will tend to make existing non-sectarian rebel groups unattractive relative to new,
more explicitly ethnic groups.
From this argument I derive three testable hypotheses. First, the probability that a new
rebel group will form should be highest when the level of repression in a country is highest.
Hypothesis 3: The probability that a new rebel group will form should increase with the level of
repression in the country
Second, the ability of repression to create new rebel groups should be moderated by the
number of ethnic identities available for mobilization. If a country has high levels of
repression, but low ethnic diversity, we should not expect the mechanism elaborated above
to produce new rebel groups. This effect should be captured by an interaction between
repression and ethnic diversity. I expect that when ethnic diversity is low, the effect of
repression on the probability of new rebel groups should be low, as there are few ethnic
groups available for activation. When diversity is high, however, the effect of repression
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should be large.
Hypothesis 4: There should be a positive interaction between repression and ethnic diversity
Finally, if the mechanism through which repression produces new rebels is in fact the
activation of ethnic identities, we should expect to see this reflected in the characteristics of
the new rebel groups. Specifically, the newly-formed groups should be especially likely to
draw their support from a single ethnic group.
Hypothesis 5: Rebel groups that join ongoing conflicts should be more likely than others to draw
their support from a single ethnic group
2.3.2 Splintering
I define a splinter organization as a new rebel group that was previously incorporated into
a larger rebel group. Whereas group formation is a phenomenon driven by dissidents who
did not previously engage in violence, splintering is driven by individuals who already
belong to rebel groups. Often these splinter organizations are a relatively small subset of
the original organization. For example, the Real Irish Republican Army was a subset of
particularly hardline members of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, who left their
parent organization in protest of its participation in a ceasefire preceding the Good Friday
Agreement. In other cases splinter organizations may eventually surpass their parent
organization. The Islamic State originated as a regional chapter of al-Qaeda, but eventually
outgrew its parent organization by pursuing a more aggressive recruiting strategy.
While rebels are generally more likely than constituents to experience violence, they are
likely to be targeted for being militants, rather than for belonging to particular ethnic group.
Thus, violence will often not have a direct effect on the identity of rebel group members.
Yet, rebels and especially rebel entrepreneurs should respond to changes in the preferences
of dissident constituents. As discussed above, the leaders of a successful rebellion are likely
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to accrue a variety of private benefits. They will typically exert substantial control over
post-war political and policy outcomes, and may have opportunities to skim profits from
the state. Even before the war ends, rebel leaders often enrich themselves through the
control of natural resources or illicit trades (Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Thus, enterprising
dissidents should look for opportunities to gain control of their own rebel group.
Shifts in the identities of dissident constituents might offer such an opportunity. Civilian
support networks can be a key source of material resources and logistical support for rebel
groups (Weinstein 2007; Parkinson 2013). If a new rebel faction could win over a substantial
number of dissident constituents, their chances of building a competitive organization
would be significantly greater than they would in the absence of such resources. A shift
among dissidents toward greater ethnic identification creates the possibility that a new
group couldwin their support through an outbidding appeal, as discussed above. Civilians
who are facing violence are quite likely to prefer a rebel group that can offer protection. If
these civilians increasingly see the conflict in ethnic terms, a rebel group making an explicit
claim to represent their ethnic group is likely to be more credible than groups lacking
such a connection. Thus, rebels who see members of their ethnic group being repressed
should have an incentive to break away from their existing organization and create a more
explicitly ethnic splinter organization.
Many rank-and-file rebels should be receptive to these new organizations as well. Although
repression may not directly influence the identity of individuals who have already rebelled,
these individuals may ultimately increase their orientation as well if they see their family
members, friends, or home communities repressed on the basis of ethnicity. These rank-
and-file members will likely wish to make protection of family members and constituents
a greater priority in response to repression. An explicitly ethnic rebel group may be
able to commit to this more forcefully than an organization with a diverse coalition, or a
non-sectarian political agenda.
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Similar to group formation, I expect that repression will induce greater ethnic identification
among dissident constituents. Entrepreneurial rebel elites should respond to this change in
attempt to attract the support of these constituents. For entrepreneurs who do not already
lead a rebel groups, this is likely to entail forming a new splinter organization.
Hypothesis 6: The probability that rebels groups splinter should increase with the level of repression
in a country
The mechanism proposed above assumes that pre-existing rebel groups are vulnerable to
outbidding appeals because they are either multi-ethnic, or organized on a basis that does
not emphasize ethnicity. If the original rebel group is strongly associated with a single
ethnicity, however, it should be less likely to experience splintering.
Hypothesis 7: Multi-ethnic rebel groups should be at greater risk of splintering than mono-ethnic
ones
Finally, this theory implies that splintering is done to create more explicitly ethnic rebel
groups. Thus, I expect that splinter organizations should be more likely than groups that
form though other means to be associated with a single ethnic group.
Hypothesis 8: Splinter organizations should be more likely than others to draw their support from a
single ethnic group
2.3.3 Alliance Formation
Both group formation and splintering can increase the number of rebel groups active in a
conflict. This number can decrease, however, when rebel groups form alliances. I define an
alliance as substantial integration of capabilities and command by two or more previously
active, independent rebel groups. Typically these alliances will result in the creation of a
named umbrella organization to coordinate battlefield operations. For example, the Syrian
Democratic Forces coordinates the actions of several Kurdish and Arabic forces in their
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fight against the Islamic State. Note that this definition entails a deeper level of integration
than most alliances between states. I choose to focus on this category for two reasons.
First, named umbrella organizations are easily identifiable, whereas less comprehensive
cooperative arrangements are often not well-publicized, as rebels lack formalized processes
such as treaties for creating them, and may have incentives to hide such cooperation from
the government. Second, mergers of this sort have a meaningful effect on the complexity
of civil wars, as rebel groups often channel most or all of their activities through umbrella
groups. Less formal alliances, by contrast, are often short-lived, and may entail a more
circumscribed form of cooperation, such as a non-aggression pact.
I expect that alliance formation is driven by a similar underlying dynamic to splintering
— as dissident constituents shift their identities and preferences, the rebel movement
should change in structure to reflect these contours. While the increased levels of ethnic
identification resulting from repression can lead existing rebel groups to splinter, they
can also facilitate the formation of alliances among co-ethnic rebel groups. Ideological,
religious, or other differences that might have previously inhibited collaboration between
some rebel groups will become relatively less important as ethnicity increases in salience.
Thus, repression can open new opportunities for ethnically-homogeneous alliances. These
alliances could be valuable for several reasons.
First, one major drawback of splintering is that it tends to produce a new group that
initially, at least, has less material capability than did the original organization. Alliances
can offset these losses, as one of their primary effects is the aggregation and coordination
of capabilities. This is perhaps the most common conception of alliances in international
politics (see Bennett 1997), and it has been proposed as a motive for rebel alliances as well
(Bapat and Bond 2012; Horowitz and Potter 2013). The logic of capability aggregation
differs somewhat between international and civil conflicts, however. Whereas international
alliances aggregate capabilities by bringing states into a conflict in which they might
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not otherwise participate, rebel groups by definition are already participating in conflict.
Nevertheless, these alliances can bring great value because rather than simply aggregating,
they can concentrate capabilities in space and time. For example, two rebel groups might
be unable to capture a government-held town on their own, but in a joint operation would
be sufficiently powerful to do so.
Second, alliances can allow also for burden-sharing and specialization. Burden-sharing
has been offered as an explanation for international alliances such as NATO (Sandler and
Forbes 1980), though it may not occur under all circumstances (see Olson and Zeckhauser
1966). Alliances can ensure that a single rebel group is not responsible for defeating the
government, and might serve as a mechanism for reigning in the temptation to free ride
off of another group’s efforts. Relatedly, alliances can facilitate specialization by rebel
groups. For instance, one alliance partner might specialize in holding territory, while
another specializes in launching offensives in new areas. Furthermore, they can share
strategies and technical information. For example, Hamas is believed to have learned how
to use suicide bombings through its alliance with Hezbollah (Horowitz and Potter 2013).
Third, alliances can manage conflict between members and ensure that their resources are
directed toward common enemies. Weitsman (1997) argues that alliances often serve to
tether powerful states to one another, so as to reduce the probability of conflict between
them. Gibler (1996) finds that alliance treaties are often used to settle territorial disputes
between the signatories. Similar alliances can be seen in civil wars, for example as a number
of Syrian rebel groups agreed to focus their efforts in different regions of the country. This
allows rebels to avoid conflict with each other. Compliance with such agreements is
incentivized by the fact that reneging on the territorial arrangement would likely result in
the loss of the other benefits of the alliance, such as capability aggregation.
Fourth, operating as an alliance bloc may be beneficial to the members groups in bargain-
ing situations. An alliance with a set of coordinated demands might command greater
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bargaining leverage than individual members, who collectively have similar power, but a
more disparate set of demands. Perhaps more crucially, alliances might mitigate credible
commitment problems. Peaceful settlements to conflicts can be derailed by concerns that
the other side will not adhere to the agreement (Fearon 1995). In civil wars, this is often
borne out by extreme “spoiler” factions. A rebel commitment to a peace agreement is more
likely to be viewed as credible if it has formal control over other factions.
While the benefits are often many, most alliances between rebel groups are not without
cost. The post-war political outcome, whether it comes in the form of a rebel victory or a
compromise with the incumbent government, is likely to be shaped by all factions within
the winning coalition. Thus, allying with another group holding differing ideologies and
interests will tend to force a rebel faction to compromise on at least some issues, or to
de-emphasize certain priorities. If, as I assume, rebels are motivated by political goals,
the value of an alliance will decrease as its ideological similarity to its alliance partners
decreases (Bapat and Bond 2012). Furthermore, any private benefits deriving from the
conflict outcome (such as seats in a post-war legistlature) must be divided among the
members of the winning alliance (Christia 2012). These concerns should tend to constrain
the value of alliances in civil war. The existing literature finds that these concerns limit
the size of rebel coalitions (Christia 2012). Logically, they should also shape the choice of
partners with whom rebels ally.
I do not expect that repression will directly affect the willingness of rebel groups to form
alliances. If alliances are intended to aggregate or coordinate capabilities, external factors
such as rebel strength relative to the government, or battlefield events should be the primary
influences on the attractiveness of alliances. The experience of civilians should affect these
calculations only insofar as they alter the level of resources available to rebel groups. I do,
however, expect that repression will influence the choice of alliance partners, as it leads
the rebel movement to reorganize around ethnicity. Alliances with co-ethnic rebel have
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the benefits of aggregating capabilities and managing conflict among members. As rebel
interests increasingly become tied to ethnicity, partnerships between co-ethnic rebel groups
should avoid the cost of agenda dilution (see Christia 2012; Bapat and Bond 2012). Relatedly,
ideological and other differences that might normally inhibit cooperation will become less
important following a wave of repression. Thus, I expect that repression should tend to
increase the incidence of ethnically-homogeneous alliances.
Hypothesis 9: The probability that new mono-ethnic alliances will form should increase with the
level of repression
Partnerships with rebel groups of differing ethnicities should become less attractive, how-
ever, as these could undermine a rebel group’s claims to represent its ethnic group, and
leave it vulnerable to outbidding appeals. At the same time, factors that might otherwise
serve as a unifying force such as shared ideology should decline in relative importance, and
ethnic differences should become harder to overcome when pursuing alliances. Repression
should thus make rebel leaders disinclined to enter into multi-ethnic alliances.
Hypothesis 10: The probability that new multi-ethnic alliances will form should decrease with the
level of repression





In this chapter I test the theory articulated in Chapter 2 at the individual level, using
data from the Afrobarometer survey. This analysis allows me to directly test whether the
hypothesized mechanisms linking repression to rebel movement structure are in fact at
work. Findings consistent with my expectations in this chapter would allow me to rule out
many alternative explanations for the findings in the national-level analyses in subsequent
chapters.
I argue that the size and structure of the rebel movement is shaped by two parameters -
the number of dissidents willing to engage in violence, and the extent to which dissidents
are oriented toward broadly inclusive ideologies or identities, rather than particularistic
identities or causes. One process that should influence these attributes is the repression of
dissident civilians. As the risk of violence to civilians increases, the relative cost of fighting
decreases, increasing the number of individuals willing to participate in rebellion.
Hypothesis 1: Individuals who experience repression should be more willing to participate in political
violence themselves
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As repression is often targeted on the basis of sub-national identities such as ethnicity or
religion, and as these groups often offer a basis for collective defense, repression should
induce individuals to identify more strongly with sub-national groups.
Hypothesis 2: Repression should increase the extent to which an individual identifies with their
ethnic group
I proceed with a discussion of the general attributes of the Afrobarometer survey, fol-
lowed by descriptions of the variables of interest, and finally analyze multilevel models of
individual attitudes toward political mobilization and ethnic identity.
3.1 Research Design
3.1.1 The Afrobarometer Survey
To examine the relationship between repression and individual attitudes toward political
participation and ethnic identities, I use waves 3-61 of the Afrobarometer survey. The
Afrobarometer is administered by researchers at Michigan State University, the Institute
for Democracy in South Africa, and the Center for Democratic Development in Ghana.
In each wave the survey attempts to obtain a nationally-representative sample of 20-25
African countries. This is accomplished by randomly sampling geographic areas (villages,
neighborhoods, etc), with selection probabilities weighted by population. Within each
geographic area a starting point is chosen at random, from which interviews begin ran-
domly selecting households. Individuals are then randomly selected within households,
alternating betweenmen andwomen to ensure gender balance. The sample in each country
usually numbers either 1,200 or 2,400, depending on the size and diversity of the country.
Respondents are asked over 300 questions on their demographics and background, and
1The ethnic vs. national identity question was not asked in waves 1 and 2.
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their opinions on a wide range of political and cultural questions. One advantage of using
such a general survey is the relatively low likelihood that individuals will be primed to
answer questions about ethnicity in away that is not representative of their normal opinions
(Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010).
Attributes for each survey wave are summarized in Table 3.1. The four waves span the
period 2005–2016, cover 38 countries, and collect a total of 158,362 individual responses.
Response rates are generally quite high, averaging 76.5% in wave 6, and 77.7% in wave 5. A
detailed summary of included countries is provided in Table A.1 of the Appendix.
Wave Years Total Responses Countries
3 2005 25,397 18
4 2008 27,713 20
5 2011–2013 51,587 34
6 2016 53,935 36
Total 2005–2016 158,362 36
Table 3.1: The Afrobarometer Survey by Wave
The Afrobarometer is one of only a few surveys (the primary alternative being the World
Values Survey) that provides a cross-national measure of ethnic identity. Given that the
baseline salience of ethnicity varies greatly across countries, it is crucial that my theory be
tested across a variety of contexts. But while the Afrobarometer facilitates such an analysis,
it is not without its limitations. Cross-national comparability comes at the expense of
studying country-specific nuances. Perhaps relatedly, the survey often does a poor job of
defining abstract concepts, creating the possibility that respondents could interpret the
same question in starkly different ways. The survey is conducted by a research assistant,
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creating the possibility of social desirability bias, as well as potential response biases
resulting from the interviewer’s ethnicity, gender, or other attributes. Finally, the prevalence
of undemocratic regimes and other potential sources of repression in Africa create the
possibility that individuals will not feel free to answer the questions honestly.
One more specific concern relevant to the present application is that in rare cases the
Afrobarometer excludes geographic areas experiencing significant violence or other factors
that would pose a danger to interviewers. Additionally, questions about ethnic identity
are not asked in some countries where doing so is deemed to be potentially harmful to the
sampled communities. It is impossible to estimate the direction or magnitude of the bias
introduced by these decisions. The external validity of this analysis is therefore limited; I
am unable to infer whether the patterns identified in the sample are likely to hold in the
most violent and ethnically-polarized societies.
Variable Question Text Responses
Attitude Toward
Violence
"During the past year, have you





4. "Three or More Times"
5. "Don’t Know."
Ethnic Identity "Let us suppose that you had
to choose between being a [EN-
TER NATIONALITY] and being
a [Respondent’s Ethnic Group].
Which of the following best ex-
presses your feelings?"
1. "I feel only [ethnicity]"
2. "I feel more [ethnicity] than
[nationality]"
3. "I feel equally [ethnicity]
and [nationality]"
4. "I feel more [nationality]
than [ethnicity]"
5. "I feel only [nationality]"




"Here is a list of actions that
people sometimes take as citi-
zens when they are dissatisfied
with government performance.
For each of these, please tell me
whether you, personally, have
done any of these things during
the past year. If not, would you
do this if you had the chance: Par-
ticipated in a demonstration or
protest march / Attended a com-
munity meeting / Used force or
violence for a political cause."
1. "No, would never do this"
2. "No, but would do if had
the chance"
3. "Yes, once or twice"
4. "Yes, several times"
5. "Yes, often."
Voting "Understanding that some peo-
ple were unable to vote in the
most recent national election in
[20xx], which of the following
statements is true for you?"
1. You were not registered to
vote"
2. "You voted in the elections"
3. "You decided not to vote"
4. "You could not find the
polling station"
5. "You were prevented from
voting"
6. "You did not have time to
vote"
7. "You did not vote because
you could not find your
name in the voters’ regis-
ter"
8. "Did not vote for some
other reason"
9. "You were too young to
vote"
10. "Don’t Know/ Can’t Re-
member"
Intimidation "During election campaigns in
this country, how much do you
personally fear becoming a vic-




3. "A little bit"
4. "Not at all"
5. "Don’t know"




The first dependent variable explored in this chapter is willingness to use violence. To
distinguish factors that influence an individual’s willingness to engage in violence from
those that make them more active generally, I include several other forms of political
behavior, including voting, attending community meetings, and protesting. The question
wordings and possible responses are reported in Table 3.2. The violence, meeting, and
protest questions share a common question stub. The voting question differs as individuals
generally vote only once, and it solicits explanations for why individuals did not vote. I
collapse each variable into binary categories with individuals who engaged in the activity
at least once coded as one, and individuals who did not participate in the activity for any
reason, including those who are willing but have not actually done the activity, coded as
zero. Leaving the measure as a five-point scale and using does not substantially alter the
results (see Table A.2 in the Chapter 3 Appendix).
Each of these measures is self-reported, and not subject to any independent verification. It
is well established in the US context that self-reported surveys overestimate the prevalence
of voting, introducing bias to models of political participation (Bernstein, Chadha, and
Montjoy 2001). It is unclear whether such effects are similarly prevalent in Africa. 70.4% of
respondents in the full sample reported voting, though the number varies wildly across
countries in a manner that generally matches variation in actual voter turnout (see Kuenzi
and Lambright 2007). Social desirability bias may lead not only the voting figure, but
participation rates for the other forms of political activity to be inflated. Alternatively,
it is possible that not participating is the more socially-desirable position in some cases,
particularly with regards to participation in violence. I therefore cannot rule out the
possibility that any relationships between being attacked and political participation are the
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result of inaccurate self-reports on both measures.
Variable Yes No Percentage Yes
Violence 1473 50077 2.9%
Protest 16492 142056 10.4%
Meeting 92849 65719 58.6%
Vote 111632 46952 70.4%
Table 3.3: Summary of Participation (waves 3-6)
The participation measures are summarized in Table 3.3. Participation in violence is
rare, with only 2.9% of respondents reporting to have done it at least once in the past
year. Participation rates increase as the degree of commitment required decreases - 10.4%
participated in at least one protest, 58.6% participated in a community meeting, and 70.4%
voted.
Ethnic Identity
The second dependent variable is ethnic identification. The Afrobarometer asks individuals
about the extent towhich they identifywith their ethnic group, relative to their nation. Refer
again to Table 3.2 for the question wording. I collapse the measure into a binary variable,
with respondents who identify only with their ethnic group and more with their ethnic
group than their nation coded as ethnic identifiers, and all others as non-ethnic identifiers.
Using the raw five-point scale (ranging from ethnically-oriented to most nationalist) yields
similar results when used in an ordered logit (see Table A.2 in the Chapter 3 Appendix).
Individuals self-report their ethnicity earlier in the survey. The question is open-ended,
allowing for the possibility that respondents may conceive of ethnicity in ways that do not
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comport with scholarly definitions. Indeed, around 1.5% of respondents provide answers
such as “African” or the name of a sub-national region. The vast majority, however, choose
ethnicities that appear in externally-imposed classifications, such as the Ethnic Power
Relations data (Vogt et al. 2015).
Count Percentage
Missing 0 0.0
I feel only (ethnic group) 6397 4.3
I feel more (ethnic group) than (national identity) 11160 7.4
I feel equally (national identity) and (ethnic group) 53641 35.8
I feel more (national identity) than (ethnic group) 13448 9.0
I feel only (national identity) 51048 34.1
Not applicable 7961 5.3
Don’t know 1382 0.9
Refused 0 0.0
Not asked in country 4798 3.2
Table 3.4: Summary of Ethnic Identification (waves 3-6)
Relatively few respondents identify with their ethnic group, with 4.3% answering that they
feel only an ethnic identity, and 7.4% saying that their ethnic identity was more prevalent
than their national identity (see Table 3.4). A plurality of respondents (35.8%) said that
they felt equally attached to their national and ethnic identities, and a large percentage
(34.1%) said that they feel only a national identity.
3.1.3 Independent Variables
H1 predicts that individuals who experience violent repression should be more likely to
participate in violence than others, and H2 predicts that repression should increase the
extent that individuals identify with their ethnic group. I test these propositions using both
individual-level and national-level measures of repression. At the individual level, I use an
Afrobarometer question that asks respondents whether they or a family member has been
attacked in the past year (see Table 3.2 for question text). I recode the variable into a binary
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measure with individuals who experienced any attacks coded as 1, and individuals who
experienced no attacks coded as 0. This question has two noteworthy limitations. First,
it does not differentiate between individuals who were personally attacked from family
members of people who were attacked. However, I expect that this feature is more likely to
introduce bias against my hypotheses, than in their favor. The effect of violence on family
members of people who are attacked should be less than or equal to that on people who
personally experience violence. If this assumption holds, including family members should
either have no effect or understate the effect of being attacked. Second, the question does
not identify the source of the attack. While government repression may account for some
attacks, the measure likely also includes violence from non-state actors including rebel
groups, as well as common criminal activity. Again, however, I expect that any potential
bias is more likely to work against my hypotheses than in the same direction. Attacks that
clearly should not be characterized as repression, such as domestic violence, should be less
likely to influence willingness to engage and violence or identify with an ethnic group.
Thus, including these types of attacks in the measure is more likely to understate the effect
of repression than overstate it. With these coding decisions, 10.4% of respondents report
having experienced an attack.
I also include a measure of intimidation, as I expect that the belief that the risk of non-
violence is approaching that of violence should be sufficient to alter an individual’s attitudes.
While the question is somewhat limited in scope (see Table 3.2), only asking about election-
related violence, this does bring the advantage of shedding light on the reason why an
individual might be targeted. 28.6% of respondents reported at least some fear of being
attacked during an election.
An individual may not need to experience violence personally to update their calculations
about their probability of experiencing it in the future. For example, if an ethnic minority
in one part of a country is repressed, members of other minority groups may increase their
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expectation of being repressed themselves. Thus, I include a national-level measure of
repression, the Latent Human Protection Scores, version 2 (Fariss 2014; Schnakenberg and
Fariss 2014). The project uses a Bayesian measurement model to estimate latent human
rights scores using several data sources including US State Department and Amnesty
International country reports, and several scholarly datasets on repression andmass killing.
This data improves on previous approaches to measuring human rights by accounting for
the fact that the standards by which government and NGO reports have judged countries
have generally improved both over time and cross-nationally. The result is an aggregate
measure that ranges from roughly -3 (most repressive) to 3 (most respectful of human rights).
The score is calculated yearly, 1946–2015 for each country. I match the Latent Protection
Human Protection Scores to each Afrobarometer respondent by the respondent’s country
and the year in which the survey was conducted. Within the sample, the measure ranges
from -2.18 (Sudan in 2013) to 1.81 (Botswana in 2012), with mean of 0.26.2 The sample thus
lacks any cases with the exceptionally levels of respect for human rights, as would be seen
in many European democracies. The average, however, is quite close to the full sample
mean of 0.29.
3.1.4 Control Variables
I draw on previous studies of participation in rebellion (e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein
2008) and ethnic identity (e.g. Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010; Gibler, Hutchison, andMiller
2012; Masella 2013; Robinson 2014) to identify a set of relevant control variables. Each of
these measures comes from the Afrobarometer, though some are not included in all waves.
First, I include the respondent’s gender, asmen are substantiallymore likely to participate in
violence than women. Next I include age and an ordinal measure of educational attainment
as both have been shown to be negatively related to the probability of participation in
2Calculated with all country-years included in the data weighted equally.
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violence. Additionally, I include binary indicators of whether the respondent is employed
at least part-time, as unemployed individuals are more likely to rebel, whether they reside
in an urban area, as urban-dwellers have been shown to rebel at higher rates, and whether
they support the ruling party, as these individuals would obviously be less likely to take
political action against the government. I have examined several other controls, but exclude
them from the models reported here as they are neither statistically significant nor do
they alter the performance of my variables of interest. These include a binary indicator
for individuals who work in agriculture (farming and fishing), an index of the level of
economic development in the respondent’s community, and the size of the respondent’s
ethnic group.
At the country level I control for a curvilinear effect for ethnolinguistic fractionalization,
using data from Fearon and Laitin (2003). The intuition behind this choice is that at
very low levels of fractionalization, meaning most individuals belong to the same ethnic
group, ethnicity is not likely to be an important social cleavage. The same is likely to
hold at the opposite extreme, where individuals might fragmented into a sufficiently large
number of groups that ethnicity is unlikely to be a salient. A curvilinear effect should
thus identify the cases in the middle of the spectrum where ethnicity is likely to matter.
Additionally, I include the country’s Polity IV regime score (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers
2016), as Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) find that elections can induce greater levels
of ethnic identification. Finally, as forms of violence besides repression might influence
I include indicators of whether the country had a separatist war or civil war over the
central government during the year the respondent was interviewed, constructed from the
Uppsala Conflict Data (Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016).
At the country level I control for a curvilinear effect for ethnolinguistic fractionalization,
using data from Fearon and Laitin (2003). The intuition behind this choice is that at very
low levels of fractionalization, meaning most individuals belong to the same ethnic group,
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ethnicity is not likely to be an important social cleavage. The same is likely to hold at the
opposite extreme, where individuals might fragmented into a sufficiently large number of
groups that ethnicity is unlikely to be a salient. A curvilinear effect should thus identify the
cases in the middle of the spectrumwhere ethnicity is likely to matter. The fractionalization
measure does have limitations. Notably, it assumes individuals have a single, stable
ethnic identity, whereas recent research suggests identity can vary across contexts and
time (Chandra 2009). Furthermore, the measure is extrapolated from a single underlying
measurement from 1964, and may be subject to some measurement error, particularly in
later years. The strength of the fractionalization measure relative to alternatives lies in its
ability to capture to some extent the magnitude of differences between ethnic groups, as it
is interpretable as the probability that two randomly selected individuals will be able to
communicate. Thus, closely-related ethnic groups that are able to communicate do not
contribute to fractionalization, whereas more stark differences do.
Additionally, I include the country’s Polity IV regime score (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers
2016), as Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010) find that elections can induce greater levels
of ethnic identification. Finally, as forms of violence besides repression might influence
I include indicators of whether the country had a separatist war or civil war over the
central government during the year the respondent was interviewed, constructed from the
Uppsala Conflict Data (Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016).
3.1.5 The Model
As I am interested in the effects of variables measured at both the individual and country
levels, and my dependent variables are all binary, a multilevel logistic regression model is
the appropriate method of analysis. I begin with a relatively simple model with random
intercepts for each country. The intuition behind this model is that the baseline values for
each dependent variable vary by country, while the independent variables have a consistent
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effect in each country. For example, the baseline probability of ethnic identification might
vary from country to country, but the model assumes that the effect of repression will
be the same across all countries. For robustness, I estimate more complex models with
random intercepts for each ethnic group nested within each country, and with random
intercepts for each survey wave. Additionally, I utilize the survey weights provided by
Afrobarometer, meaning that individuals from under-sampled groups are weighted more
heavily in the regressions.
Individual-level variables are interpreted normally, with coefficients representing the
increase in the logged odds ratio of the dependent variable associated with a one-unit
increase in the independent variable. The country-level variables are used in a separate
model, estimated simultaneously, in which the dependent variable is the group-level
intercept. Thus, country-level coefficients predict the change in baseline probability in a
country associated with a one-unit increase in the independent variable.
3.2 Use of Violence Results
The results for the use of violence are reported in Table 3.6, Model 1. Consistent with
H1, repression at the individual level is associated with an increased probability that a
respondent has engaged in violence, or is willing to do so. The effect is substantively
large, with the probability that an individual engaged in violence increasing by roughly
30%. As the baseline probability is quite low, the effect is small in absolute terms, moving
from around 0.02 for individuals who have not been attacked, to 0.09 for individuals who
have (see Figure 3.1). Furthermore, it is statistically significant at the 99.9% level. Neither
the individual-level threat of violence, nor the country-level degree of respect for human
rights significantly influences violent mobilization. Collectively these results suggest that
the presence of violence does not generally make individuals more willing to engage in
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violence themselves. Experiencing violence personally, however, produces such a drastic
change in one’s outlook that they are likely to increase their own willingness to engage in
violence.
It is possible, however, that this result is endogenous. The Afrobarometer is not a panel
survey, meaning that I am unable to track individuals over time. I therefore cannot de-
termine whether attitudes toward the use of violence change in response to repression,
or whether such attitudes might predate being attacked. It could be that individuals
experience violence because they have engaged in violence themselves. Such individuals
might be especially likely to be targeted with repression by the government. Furthermore,
if individuals have engaged in violence, perhaps as members of a rebel group or in a
riot, there is a strong possibility that their opponent will have fought back, leading the
individual to report being attacked in the survey. I argue, however, that the potential
for endogeneity should be substantially lower among individuals who are willing to, but
have not yet engaged in violence. Identifying insurgents who intermix with the civilian
population is immensely challenging for governments (Kalyvas 2006). Thus if the effect
of repression on attitudes towards violence is endogenous, we might expect a weak or
non-existent relationship between repression and the willingness to use violence, as it
would be difficult for the government to target such individuals. As Model 2 shows, this is
somewhat true. The effect of repression on willingness to use violence is weaker than the
effect on the actual use of violence. Yet, the effect is still relatively large and statistically
significant, suggesting that the relationship matches my causal story in at least a portion of
cases.
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M1 Violence (Used) M2 Violence (Willing)
(Intercept) −3.70∗∗∗ −1.78∗∗∗
(0.66) (0.48)
Human Rights 0.05 −0.01
(0.24) (0.18)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization −1.45 0.64
(2.76) (2.03)




Civil War −0.32 0.17
(0.18) (0.18)




















Log Likelihood -4706.69 -8843.85
Num. obs. 38778 38778
Num. groups: Ethnic:Country 501 501
Num. groups: Country 26 26
Var: Ethnic:Country (Intercept) 0.56 0.18
Var: Country (Intercept) 0.35 0.22
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.5: Multilevel Models of Attitudes Toward Violence















Figure 3.1: Predicted Probability of the Use of Violence (Model 1)
violence. Consistent with previous findings (e.g. Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), women
are less likely than men to engage in violence, and are less likely to report a willingness to
use violence. Individuals with at least a primary school education are slightly more likely
than others to participate in violence, perhaps reflecting the fact that student organizations
generally account for a substantial portion of political violence. This pattern does not hold
for willingness to use violence, however. Urban individuals are less likely to be willing to
use violence, while the measure is unrelated to the use of violence. Finally, willingness to
use violence declines with age, while participation in violence is unrelated to age.
I also examine the effects of repression on three other forms of political participation to shed
light on alternative explanations. For example, it may be the case that violent individuals
are simply very active in general, and thus have more opportunities than others to be
repressed. Comparative homebodies might see lower rates of repression simply because
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they spend less time in public locations where repression tends to occur, and any apparent
association with lower levels of political participation would likely be coincidental. In
Model 3 I examine voting. Repression measured at the individual level has a negative
relationship with voting. Individuals who reported an attack on themselves or a family
member were 20.4% less likely than others to have voted. The threat of election-related
violence has a smaller, but still statistically significant effect. At the national level better
human rights practices are associated with higher baseline rates of voting, but the effect just
misses the 90% level of statistical significance. These results suggest a potential explanation
to the puzzle of why governments use repression despite the negative consequences I
predict - it appears that repression is effective at deterring individuals from voting, or at
convincing them that politics is unlikely to address their needs. For two more involved
forms of political action, however, attacks are associated with increased levels of political
participation. Experiencing an attack is associated with a statistically significant, though
substantively modest increase in the probability than an individual has participated in
community meetings, as is the country-level human rights situation. The country-level
measure is not significantly related to protest activity, but being attacked once again is,
with individuals who have experienced an attack being more than twice as likely to have
participated in protest. It should be noted, however, that the same endogeneity concerns
that exist for violence apply to these forms of participation as well, as these results are
consistent
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M3 Voting M4 Meeting M5 Protest
(Intercept) −5.60∗∗∗ −2.29 −2.81∗∗∗
(0.43) (1.44) (0.51)
Human Rights 0.13 0.22∗ −0.20
(0.08) (0.09) (0.13)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization −0.53 −5.02 2.12
(1.65) (7.26) (1.89)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization2 0.84 5.59 −0.85
(1.61) (7.04) (1.84)
Polity 0.01 0.22∗∗∗ 0.05∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Civil War 0.07 0.32∗∗∗ −0.66∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.05) (0.07)
Separatist War 0.36 0.74∗ −0.37
(0.33) (0.36) (0.42)
Attacked −0.15∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.82∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Intimidated −0.12∗∗∗ 0.03 0.09∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Employed 0.36∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Primary Education 0.10∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ −0.38∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Urban −0.06∗ −0.06∗∗ 0.11∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04)
Ruling Party Supporter 0.24∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ −0.05
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
Age 1.84∗∗∗ 0.67∗∗∗ −0.16∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
Female −0.14∗∗∗ −0.44∗∗∗ −0.32∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
AIC 62740.24 73422.70 37290.70
BIC 62894.17 73576.62 37444.62
Log Likelihood -31353.12 -36694.35 -18628.35
Num. obs. 63222 63215 63195
Num. groups: Ethnic:Country 650 650 650
Num. groups: Country 27 27 27
Var: Ethnic:Country (Intercept) 0.07 0.16 0.12
Var: Country (Intercept) 0.25 1.03 0.35
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.6: Multilevel Models of Political Participation
These results are robust to a number of adjustments. Changing the cutpoints for the
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variables that I collapse into binary measures does not substantially alter the results. Fur-
thermore, leaving the violence measure as a five-point scale and using an ordinal rather
than standard logit produces substantively similar results – individuals who experienced
an attack are significantly more likely to report higher levels of participation in violence
(see Table A.2 in the Chapter 3 Appendix). Adding the additional controls mentioned in
the research design does not alter the performance of my variables of interest, nor does
removing any control variables. As mentioned in the research design section, I also explore
the effects of several additional control variables. The results are also robust to the inclusion
of random effects for the year in which the survey was administered and the survey wave,
and including these factors as fixed effects rather than random results in only slight changes
to the magnitude of the relationships.
Collectively, these results allow me to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between
repression and willingness to engage in violence associated withH1. Individuals who have
been attacked are more than three times more likely than others to engage in violence, and
roughly 20% more likely to express a willingness to use violence. The country-level human
rights measure is not significantly related to either outcome, however, suggesting that the
effect of repression is specific to the individuals who are targeted, and does not produce a
widespread spillover effect leading large swaths of society to change their behavior. Several
caveats must be noted, however. First, the repression measure is imprecise, as individuals
who experienced violence personally are grouped with individuals with family members
who experienced violence, and the actorwho perpetrated the attack is not specified. Second,
these results could be endogenous, with individuals being attacked because they used or
were known to be willing to use violence. I address this possibility in Section 3.4.
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3.3 Ethnic Identification Results
The ethnic identification results are reported in Table 3.7. Model 5 includes a random
intercept for each country, while Model 6 adds an intercept for each ethnic group nested
within each country, and to that Model 7 adds a random intercept for year.3 In all three
models, individuals who have experienced an attack are more likely to identify with their
ethnic group than their nation, relative to individuals who have not experienced an attack.
This effect size is equivalent to a roughly 42% increase, a change in probability from 0.12 to
0.17 (see Figure 3.2), but is statistically significant at the 99.9% level. Political intimidation
has a similar effect. The country-level human rights measure is statistically significant in
Models 5 and 6, with a similar substantive effect. Among the most repressive cases in
the sample, individuals have a roughly 0.15 probability of identifying with their ethnic
group, with the probability decreasing to 0.10 among the cases with the greatest respect
for human rights (see Figure 3.3). The human rights variable is not significant in Model 7,
likely because as a relatively constant measure, it has little ability to predict intercepts that
vary by year.
3I use year instead of survey wave as the country-level variables are measured in yearly intervals.
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M5 M6 M7
(Intercept) −4.43∗∗∗ −4.34∗∗∗ −3.44∗∗∗
(0.65) (0.72) (0.43)
Human Rights −0.70∗∗∗ −0.66∗∗∗ 0.12
(0.12) (0.13) (0.11)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 6.58∗ 6.38∗ 3.63∗
(2.78) (3.18) (1.63)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization2 −5.89∗ −5.77 −3.17∗
(2.74) (3.11) (1.58)
Polity 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.03
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
Civil War 0.29∗∗∗ 0.33∗∗∗ 0.62∗∗∗
(0.06) (0.06) (0.07)
Separatist War 1.26∗∗ 1.61∗∗ 0.64
(0.46) (0.53) (0.36)
Attacked 0.25∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Intimidated 0.23∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Employed −0.08∗∗ −0.09∗∗ −0.08∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Primary Education 0.42∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Urban −0.11∗∗∗ −0.08∗ −0.10∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Ruling Party Supporter −0.14∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗ −0.12∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 0.01 −0.00 −0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Female 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03)
AIC 45710.59 43941.95 43722.83
BIC 45855.99 44095.82 43885.75
Log Likelihood -22839.29 -21953.97 -21843.41
Num. obs. 65384 63039 63039
Num. groups: Country 27 27 27
Var: Country (Intercept) 0.57 0.51 0.15
Num. groups: Ethnic:Country 650 650
Var: Ethnic:Country (Intercept) 0.27 0.25
Num. groups: Year 5
Var: Year (Intercept) 0.09
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.7: Multilevel Models of Ethnic Identification
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These results are robust to alternative specifications of the dependent variable. Leav-
ing the measure as a five-point scale in an ordinal logit produces comparable results –
individuals who have been attacked have statistically-significant of being closer to the
ethnically-oriented end of the scale (see Table A.2 in the Chapter 3 Appendix). The control
variables provide a number of interesting results. As I expected, ethnolinguistic fraction-
alization has a substantively strong and statistically significant curvilinear relationship
with ethnic identification in Models 5 and 7, and a linear one in Model 6 (indicated by
the squared term not being statistically significant). The curvilinear pattern is consistent
with my expectation that ethnic identification will be unlikely at extreme levels of diver-
sity. Consistent with the findings of Eifert, Miguel, and Posner (2010), Models 5 and 6
show that the probability of ethnic identification increases as a country becomes more
democratic. Countries experiencing civil war have a somewhat higher baseline level of
ethnic identification, and the effect is considerable for separatist wars. At the individual
level, urban-dwellers, ruling party supporters, and employed individuals are less likely to
emphasize an ethnic identity. Having at least a primary education increases the probability
that an individual with identify ethnically, and women are slightly more likely than men
to adopt such an identity.
While further analysis is need to establish the direction of the causal relationship, these
results do allow me to tentatively reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between
repression and ethnic identification associated with H2. Individuals who have been at-
tacked are more than 40% more likely than others to identify with their ethnic group. The
country-level human rights measure tells a similar story, with the probability of ethnic
identification being lower in countries with greater respect for human rights. As is the
case with the violence results, I cannot here rule out the possibility of endogeneity. It is
quite plausible that individuals who identify strongly with an ethnic group are most likely
to be targeted with repression. Many governments repress ethnic minorities to prevent






































Figure 3.3: Predicted Probability of Ethnic Identification (Model 5)
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the claim that the Kurds are a distinct ethnicity from Turks, and have repressed them to
prevent a secessionist movement. I address the concern in the following section.
3.4 Causal Identification
As discussed above, the preceding results do not account for the possibility of endogeneity.
The ideal solution would be an instrumental variable. However, a valid instrument would
need to be a strong proxy for repression, but only effect political participation and ethnic
identification through the effect of repression (this is known as the exclusion restriction).
Unfortunately, few if any measures included in the Afrobarometer meet the requirements
of a valid instrument. For instance, previous work has often used distance from the capital
to instrument for an individual or location’s probability of experiencing violence (e.g. Voors
et al. 2012). While this measure may meet the exclusion restriction for some outcomes,
there is reason to believe that it does not for ethnic identification. Robinson (2014) finds
that orientation toward national identities is driven in part by modernization. Thus living
in a remote location may affect ethnic identification directly, rather than only through the
variable it is intended to instrument. At the country level democracy is strongly correlated
with repression (Davenport 2007b), but also may have a direct effect on ethnic identification
(Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010), and almost certainly has one with political participation.
As an alternative to an instrument, I use coarsened exact matching (Iacus, King, and
Porro 2012). Matching seeks to create a subset of the data with a “treatment” (in this case
the individual-level attack variable) and “control” group with similar values on a set of
observable covariates. In this case I seek to balance the sample on individual-level measures
of education, age, urban residence, support for the ruling party, and employment status,
and country-level measures of ethnolinguistic fractionalization, Polity IV score, the Latent
Human Protection Scores, and indicators for the presence of civil and separatist wars.
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Coarsened exact matching achieves balance by collapsing each continuous and categorical
variable into a smaller number of strata, and identifying pairs of treated and control units
that fall into the same strata on each variable. While there was a statistically significant
difference of means between the treated and control groups on each of the covariates
prior to matching, there are no significant differences on any variable after matching, and
the mean difference between the groups reduces to zero for each variable except age and
the categorical education measure, which each differ by less than 0.1. The trade-off for
pursuing such exact matches is a loss of observations, as cases with no close are match
are discarded. The problem is not especially dire in this case, however, as the number of
cases reduces from 38,681 (the number of cases with no missing values on any covariate)
to 28,251. The limitation of matching is its inability to address unobservable sources of
bias. Thus, if certain individuals are disproportionately likely to be attacked for reasons
that are not entirely captured by the included covariates, this bias is likely to remain in the
post-matching sample.
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M8 Violence (Willing) M9 Violence (Used) M10 Ethnic ID
Human Rights 0.05 0.08 −0.19
(0.17) (0.25) (0.13)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 1.33 −0.44 4.99∗∗
(2.04) (3.04) (1.63)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization2 −1.01 1.60 −4.78∗∗
(2.06) (3.04) (1.62)
Polity −0.04 −0.01 −0.03
(0.03) (0.04) (0.02)
Civil War 0.21 −0.44∗ 0.13
(0.20) (0.20) (0.19)
Separatist War −0.17 −0.82 0.30
(0.53) (0.86) (0.43)
Attacked 0.47∗∗∗ 1.09∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.08) (0.06)
Intimidated 0.14∗ 0.11 0.29∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.04)
Employed −0.05 −0.06 −0.00
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05)
Primary Education 0.01 0.16∗ 0.39∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.08) (0.05)
Urban −0.17∗ −0.19∗ −0.06
(0.07) (0.09) (0.06)
Ruling Party Supporter −0.08 −0.14∗ −0.16∗∗∗
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
Age −0.22∗∗∗ 0.01 −0.07
(0.06) (0.08) (0.05)
Female −0.22∗∗∗ −0.31∗∗∗ 0.04
(0.05) (0.07) (0.04)
AIC 13661.19 7297.64 18584.48
BIC 13801.42 7437.88 18724.71
Log Likelihood -6813.60 -3631.82 -9275.24
Num. obs. 28251 28251 28251
Num. groups: Ethnic:Country 497 497 497
Num. groups: Country 26 26 26
Var: Ethnic:Country (Intercept) 0.19 0.39 0.30
Var: Country (Intercept) 0.16 0.35 0.09
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 3.8: Models with Matched Data
The results using the matched data are reported in Table 3.8, and the estimates for the attack




















Figure 3.4: Predicted Probability of the Use of Violence (Model 8)
an attack are substantially more likely to express willingness to engage in violence, with
the effect being statistically significant at the 99.9% level (Model 8). The substantive effect
is modest, however, increasing the probability from 0.08 to 0.11 (see Figure 3.4). These
individuals also report higher probabilities of having engaged in violence, and the effect
is significant at the 99.9% level (Model 9). Individuals who have been attacked are three
times more likely than others to have used violence themselves (0.09 vs. 0.03, see Figure 3.5).
Additionally, being attacked is associated with a modest increase (0.14 vs. 0.11, see Figure
3.6) in the probability of ethnic identification, which is again significant at the 99.9% level.
Many of the covariates are no longer significant after matching, as attack and non-attack
subsets have identical means on these variables.
As noted above, matching cannot guard against all potential threats to causal inference.





































Figure 3.6: Predicted Probability of Ethnic Identification (Model 9)
violence or identify ethnically for reasons that are not captured by the covariates, this bias
will remain. One might imagine, however, that governments (and other actors) often make
decisions of who to repress based on the sort of observable characteristics such as age and
sex that are included in the matching. The matching analysis ensures that these observable
measures do not bias the results. Thus while there is still some possibility of endogeneity,
these results should increase our confidence that individuals who are attacked are not
systematically different from others.
3.5 Conclusion
The results in this chapter provide strong support for the microfoundations of my theory.
I expected that repression would make individuals more willing to engage in violence.
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Consistent with this hypothesis, I find that while such sentiments are generally rare, indi-
viduals who have experienced a violent attacked are roughly 30% more likely than others
to report a willingness to use violence, and are nearly three times more likely to report
having used violence. I also predicted that repression should induce greater levels of ethnic
identification among its targets. Indeed, I find that individuals who have experienced an
attack are 42% more likely than others to identify more with their ethnic group than with
their nation. The results hold after conducting coarsened exact matching, meaning that
the results are not driven by any observable differences between the individuals who have
been attacked and those who have not.
This analysis has several important practical and theoretical implications. First, it suggests
that repression is often counterproductive. Presumably, governments use repression to
mitigate and deter threats to their rule. Yet, my findings suggest that repression could
increase the number of individuals using violence, and entrench identities that could form
the basis of an opposition to the government. As discussed in Chapter @ref(#theory),
this makes the government’s use of repression puzzling. My other findings on political
participation hint at an answer, however. Repression does seem to reduce the probability
than individualwill vote, suggesting that governmentsmay be accepting increased numbers
of violent individuals in exchange for the opportunity to shape the electorate. Second,
the results suggest that repression can trigger a vicious cycle, in which the government
responds to an initial threat in a way that further entrenches the opposition, leading to
ever-greater levels of violence.
In the remaining chapters, I build on the foundations established here to explain variations
at the level of the rebel movement. I find evidence that the dynamics discussed here shape
the formation of new rebel groups, the fragmentation of existing ones, and the formation
of alliances between previously independent groups.
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Chapter 4
The Formation of New Rebel Groups
This chapter builds on the individual-level findings fromChapter 3 to explain one aggregate
manifestation of repression— the formation of entirely new rebel groups. Specifically, I am
interested in cases where entirely new rebel groups join ongoing civil wars. By new I simply
mean a group that has not previously participated in violence. Pre-existing non-violent
organizations such as religious organizations or political parties could constitute a new
rebel group so long as they have not used violence previously, as would entirely new
organizations that form during a conflict. I distinguish this sort of group formation from
the splintering of existing organizations, as I expect the causal processes to be somewhat
different. While splintering is driven by individuals who have already resorted to violence
deciding to reorganize, group formation has the additional requirement of mobilizing
previously non-violent individuals. To the best of my knowledge, no existing study directly
addresses this question.
I expect that repression should increase the probability that a new rebel group will enter an
ongoing conflict. As previously peaceful individuals experience violence, the relative cost
for them to join a rebellion decreases. These individuals will not necessarily be inclined to
join an existing rebel group, however. If an individual has been repressed, existing groups
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have in some sense failed to protect them. Furthermore, repression should tend to induce
greater levels of ethnic identification. Repression is often targeting on the basis of ethnicity,
increasing the salience of such identities. Ethnic identification may also have instrumental
value in attracting support from outside co-ethnic states, and repression may give these
outside states both motive and political cover for supporting new rebel groups. Thus, there
should be a relationship between repression and the emergence of new rebel groups.
Hypothesis 3: The probability that a new rebel group will form should increase with the level of
repression in the country
If ethnic polarization is themechanism behind rebel group formation, the ethnic diversity of
a country should provide an important scope condition. It would be unlikely for repression
to induce ethnic identification in a very homogeneous society, for instance. In such cases a
different social cleavage might be activated, or repression might not sow division among
dissidents at all. I thus expect a positive interaction between repression and ethnic diversity,
with repression increasing the probability of new rebel groups at higher levels of diversity,
while being less effective at low levels of diversity.
Hypothesis 4: There should be a positive interaction between repression and ethnic diversity
My theory suggests that individuals form new rebel groups largely because repression
begins to polarize society on the dimension of ethnic identity. This argument has a testable
implication regarding the new rebel groups that emerge — they should be likelier than
pre-existing groups to draw their support from a single ethnic group.
Hypothesis 5: Rebel groups that join ongoing conflicts should be more likely than others to draw
their support from a single ethnic group
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4.1 Research Design
To test the preceding hypotheses I use a dataset of conflict-years derived from the Uppsala
Conflict Data Program and Peace Research Institute Oslo’s Dyadic Dataset, version 4-2016
(Harbom, Melander, and Wallensteen 2008; Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016).
This dataset includes one observation for every government-rebel group dyad for each
year in which it produced at least 25 fatalities. I exclude all interstate conflicts from the
data, and include all civil wars, anti-colonial wars, and internationalized civil wars. The
remaining rebel dyads are grouped into conflicts, with all rebels seeking to overthrown the
central government considered to be part of the same conflict, and separatist movements
grouped together if they are pursuing independence for the same territory. Thus conflicts
can contain multiple rebel groups, and countries can contain multiple conflicts. I then
aggregate this data to the conflict-year, as my outcome of interest is whether a new rebel
group joined the fighting in a given year. This results in a dataset of 2,048 observations,
covering the period 1946–2015.
The advantage of using conflict-years rather than aggregating to country-years is that I am
able to examine the effects of several covariates measured at the conflict level, including
conflict intensity and the type of issue at stake. Disaggregating to the conflict level, rather
than the country also avoids conflating situations in which multiple rebel groups compete
for similar objectives from those in which multiple rebel groups form for completely
different purposes. Using yearly observations rather than a single count for each conflict is
useful because the number of rebel groups tends to vary over time, and thus a yearly count
allows me to identify factors that can account for the timing of new group formation, rather
than only cross-sectional correlates. The use of conflict-years does create a methodological
challenge, however, as many of my covariates are measured at the country level. To combat
this I cluster the standard errors by country. Additionally, aggregating the data to the
85
country-year does not substantially change the results.
4.1.1 Dependent Variables
Entry of New Rebel Groups
My primary dependent variable in this study is the entry of new rebel groups to an ongoing
conflict. To qualify, a rebel group must meet two criteria. First, it cannot have previously
participated in political violence. To determine this I use rebel origins data I collected
(described in the Chapter 2 Appendix), and exclude groups that originated as portions
of different rebel groups — splinter organizations and alliances. This leaves rebel groups
that emerged out of non-violent organizations such as political organizations, as well as
militarized, but not political organizations such as local defense militias. Second, the group
must join an ongoing conflict. I define a conflict as ongoing if it has produced at least 25
fatalities in at least one of the past three years. If three consecutive years of peace occur, I
consider the next round of fighting to be a new conflict episode, and any new rebel groups
that appear in the first year of an episode are considered to have initiated that conflict
rather than joined it.
Of the 503 rebel groups that appear in my data, 83 fit the definition. As some of these
entered the same conflict in the same year, 73 of 20451 (5.6%) of conflict-years are coded as
having a new rebel group.
Rebel Group Ethnicity
H5 predicts that because the formation of new rebel groups is driven by a broader reorgani-
zation of society along ethnic lines, these newly-formed rebel groups should be likelier than
1Some observations are left-censored, meaning I am unable to determine whether there was conflict
during the previous three years as it would predate the beginning of the dataset.
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others to draw their support from a single ethnic group. To test this I use the ACD2EPR
2014 dataset (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011; Vogt et al. 2015), which links rebel groups from
the Uppsala Armed Conflict Data v.4-2014 (Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016) to
ethnic groups from the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR-Core 2014) (Cederman, Wimmer, and
Min 2010; Vogt et al. 2015). This dataset identifies three forms of linkages between ethnic
groups and rebel groups. First, a rebel group can claim to operate exclusively on behalf of a
particular ethnic group. The dataset does allow for the possibility that a group could make
such claims for multiple ethnic groups, as was the case for several of the South Sudanese
separatist groups. Second, the data records all of the ethnic groups from which a rebel
group recruits a significant number of soldiers. Finally, the data codes whether at least
50% of the members of an ethnic group support a rebel group. I collapse these measures
into a single count of the number of ethnic groups to which a rebel group is tied. I then
categorize rebel groups as “mono-ethnic,” “multi-ethnic,” or “non-ethnic,” if they have no
such ties. The distribution of cases across these categories is reported in Table 4.1.
Non-Ethnic Mono-Ethnic Multi-Ethnic
97 309 47
Table 4.1: Rebel Groups by Ethnic Affiliation
4.1.2 Independent Variables
Human Rights
To measure repression I use the same country-level measure employed in Chapter 3, the
Latent Human Protection scores, version 2 (Fariss 2014; Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014). The
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motivation for this data project is the fact that human rights measures are typically based
on media reports, creating the possibility that both the depth of coverage and standards
against which human rights practices are evaluated might vary across space and time.
To solve this, the dataset uses thirteen data sources including U.S. State Department and
Human RightsWatch reports andmost major scholarly datasets in a Bayesian measurement
model. This produces an estimate for each country-year based on a mix of the data for that
particular year and the average score for that country and year. While this creates a human
rights measure that is comparable across contexts, one disadvantage is that the units are
not inherently meaningful, only providing a basis for comparison across observations.
The measure ranges from roughly -3.1 (most repressive) to 4.7 (most respectful of human
rights). The average score across the full sample of post-World War II country-years is
0.29, while in my sample of countries experiencing civil war the mean is -1.24, with a
range from -3.11 to 1.51. Thus, the sample includes the full range of repressive states,
while unsurprisingly lacking any states with especially strong human rights practices. For
reference, recent country-years with scores around 1.5 including Hungary in 2011, and
France in 2007. In other words, these are typically cases in which citizens are generally safe
from physical harm, but some minorities such as Muslims in France experience political
and economic discrimination. Russia in recent years falls in the middle of the spectrum,
with scores around 1.0. Examples of cases towards the more repressive end of the spectrum
include Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, which had a score averaging around -2.5, and Sudan,
which had scores around -3.0 during the genocide in Darfur.
The raw Latent Human Protection Scores tend to be relatively static over time. Yet, my
theory suggests that it is changes in human rights practices, in the direction of being more
repressive, that should change dissident behavior. To ensure that I am capturing these
phenomena, I use the year-over-year change in human protection score. While the average
conflict-year sees very little change from the preceding year (the mean change is -0.01), 110
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cases experience a negative change of at least 0.25, and in one case the score decreased by
2.52 in a single year. I lag the measure by one year, meaning that I am ultimately using the
change in human rights practices at time t to predict the formation of new rebel groups at
time t+1.
Ethnic Diversity
H4 suggests that ethnic diversity should place a scope condition on my theory, with the
formation of new groups being less likely at very high and low levels of ethnic diversity. I
first test for the effect of ethnic diversity individually by including the raw and squared
ethnolinguistic fractionalization as predictors. This tests for a curvilinear relationship,
allowing for the effect of the variable to differ at moderate and extreme values. The data
come from Fearon and Laitin (2003), and can be interpreted as the probability that two
individuals drawn at random will be able to communicate. In addition to testing whether
ethnic diversity affects the probability of new group formation on its own, I also test
whether it alters the performance of the human rights measure, by interacting the latter
with both the raw and squared ethnolinguistic fractionalization measures.
New Rebel Group Entry
H5 predicts that the rebel groups that form during ongoing conflicts should be more likely
than others to be tied to a single ethnic group. Thus the new rebel group entry variable




I control for several factors that might confound my results. To account for the possibility
that human rights scores are simply a function of conflict intensity, rather than discrimina-
tory intent, I include the maximum conflict intensity value from the UCDP Dyadic data.
The measure is binary, with a value of 1 indicating that the dyad produced between 25
and 999 fatalities in a given year, and a value of 2 indicating that the dyad produced 1,000
or more fatalities. This measure is moderately correlated with the human rights score
(Pearson’s r = -0.30). The exact measure of fatalities available for the post-1989 period is
even less correlated (Pearson’s r = -0.25). Thus, human rights practices are for the most
part measuring something distinct from conflict intensity.
Conflicts that already have multiple rebel groups may have some unobserved quality that
makes them more likely to have fragmented rebel movements. For example, there might
be a history of personal animosity between rebel elites (see Christia 2012). To capture such
effects, I include a binary indicator of whether a conflict had multiple rebel groups in the
previous year.
Two standard controls from past conflict studies are also likely to be relevant. One potential
mechanism that might produce increased numbers of rebel groups in a conflict is the
movement of groups from a neighboring civil war into a new conflict. To control for this
possibility I construct an indicator for the presence of a civil war in a state that is contiguous
by land using the UCDP Dyadic data and the Correlates of War Direct Contiguity data,
version 3.2 (Stinnett et al. 2002). As secessionist movements are often (though not always)
tied to a specific ethnic group, my hypothesized theoretical mechanism should be less
likely to apply in such conflicts. Thus, I include a binary indicator of whether a conflict is
secessionist as opposed to being fought over control of the central government.
I also control for several country-level factors. Conceivably, the number of rebel groups in
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a country might simply be a function of the country’s size. I thus include a measure of the
countries area in logged square kilometers from theWorld Bank (TheWorld Bank 2015), and
logged population and logged GDP per capita from Gleditsch (2002). The characteristics
of a country’s terrain might also matter, with mountainous areas both creating more
opportunities for rebellion, andmore challenges in coordinating rebel activities across space.
To control for this affect I include Fearon and Laitin’s (2003) measure of the percentage of a
country’s terrain that is mountainous. As democratic competition might provide another
incentive for ethnic identification (Eifert, Miguel, and Posner 2010), I include the country’s
Polity IV regime score (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016). The international context could
conceivably play an important role in rebel group formation, for instance by shaping the
availability of external support. I thus include a binary indicator of whether a country-year
occurred during or after the Cold War.
Finally, the presence of natural resources may influence the functioning of my theoretical
mechanism. My theory assumes that rebel elites desire the support of dissident constituents.
If rebel groups are able to procure sufficient funds and war materiel through the sale of
natural resources, however, they might care little about civilians (see Weinstein 2007). I
thus include a count of the number of locations in a country containing ‘lootable’ natural
resources, meaning those which can be extractedwith relatively unsophisticated operations.
The resources included in the measure are oil (Lujala, Rød, and Thieme 2007), diamonds
(Gilmore et al. 2005; Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore 2005), gold (Balestri 2012), gems (Lujala
2008), and drugs (Buhaug and Lujala 2005).
4.1.4 Statistical Model
As the dependent variable in this study is a binary measure of whether a new rebel group
entered a conflict in a given year, I use a logistic regression model. While I examine the
influence of each of the control variables listed above, I also fit models with only the
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controls that are statistically-significant or that substantially alter the performance of my
independent variables. This practice is consistent with the advice of Achen (2002) and Ray
(2003), who caution that including too many covariates can obscure meaningful patterns
and inhibit thorough vetting of model assumptions. For robustness, I examine several
variants of the model. These include a model with fixed effects for country and year, and a
rare-events correction to account for the fact that group formation occurs in only a small
portion of my cases. I also cluster the standard errors by country, as many of my variables
are measured at the country-level, creating the possibility that errors could be correlated
across different conflicts in the same country. I also estimate models (not reported) with
the country-year as the unit of analysis. None of these changes substantially alters the
results for my variables of interest.
4.2 Results
4.2.1 Group Formation Results
The logistic regression results are reported in Table 4.2. Model 1 includes only the change in
human rights measure, Model 2 adds a battery of controls, Model 3 includes an interaction
effect between human rights and ethnolinguistic fractionalization, and Model 4 replaces
the (mostly) static country-level variables with fixed effects for conflict and year.
In the three models without interaction terms the Change in Human Rights variable
performs as I expect. It has a consistent, negative relationship with the probability of
new rebel group formation. As human rights improve, the probability that new rebel
groups will form decreases, while increases in repression increase the probability of new
groups forming. The relationship is statistically significant at the 99% level in all three
models. The substantive effect is large, with a one-unit (which equates to roughly 1.5
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standard deviations) decrease in human rights practices being associated with a roughly
400% increase in the odds of new rebel group formation. While the predicted probability
of a new rebel group emerging is quite low when the change in human rights practices
is zero (around 0.03, see Figure 4.1), at the largest decreases (a change of -2.5 in one year)
the probability of a new rebel group emerging is 0.72. The effect size is similar across
models. With these results I am able to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between
repression and the formation of new rebel groups, consistent with my expectation in
Hypothesis 4.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) −3.27∗∗∗ 5.79∗ 5.59 15.71
(0.13) (2.91) (2.96) (14503.27)
Change in Human Rights −1.37∗∗∗ −1.39∗∗ −3.31∗ −1.79∗∗
(0.33) (0.43) (1.29) (0.59)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 0.23 0.61
(0.86) (0.91)
Human Rights X Fractionalization 3.32
(2.09)
Intensity Level −0.23 −0.25 −0.23
(0.39) (0.40) (0.44)
Prev. Multi-rebel 0.23 0.25 −0.95∗∗
(0.38) (0.38) (0.36)




Logged Area −0.25 −0.23
(0.19) (0.19)
Mountainous Terrain −0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
Logged GDP per capita −0.38 −0.39
(0.24) (0.24)




Post Cold War −0.21 −0.18
(0.38) (0.38)
Lootable Resource Sites −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
AIC 521.11 319.37 318.68 585.79
BIC 531.86 389.01 393.30 1263.99
Log Likelihood -258.55 -145.69 -144.34 -164.90
Deviance 517.11 291.37 288.68 329.79
Num. obs. 1597 1069 1069 1478
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 4.2: Logit Models of Rebel Group Formation
Model 3 provides a test of the interaction proposed in H5. Whereas I expect an interaction
effect between the human rights measure and ethnolinguistic fractionalization, the inter-
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Figure 4.1: Predicted Probability of New Rebel Group Formation (Based on Model 2)
either, as there is no evidence of a curvilinear effect, nor of a linear effect (not reported). I
am thus unable to reject the null hypothesis of no relationship between ethnic diversity
and the probability of new rebel groups forming. I also test for a curvilinear relationship
between ethnolinguistic fractionalization and rebel group formation, and an interaction
between human rights and the curvilinear measure. Neither is statistically significant. It
is unclear whether this means my hypothesized mechanism of increased ethnic salience
operates even at extreme levels of diversity, or if other mechanisms might operate in those
cases. The analysis later in this chapter sheds light on that question.
Only a few control variables are significant, likely reflecting the fact that rebel group
formation is a rare and time-varying outcome, while many of the predictors are largely
static. New rebel groups are less likely in secessionist conflicts. As these conflicts are
often fought by an ethnically homogeneous movement, this result is consistent with my
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overarching belief that the formation of new groups is about fighting on behalf of previously
underrepresented ethnic groups. The ‘Previously Multi-Rebel’ measure is negatively
related the probability of further groups joining, though only in the fixed effects model.
This result perhaps suggests that rather than portending further fragmentation of the
rebel movement, the presence of multiple rebel groups might signal that a conflict has
become saturated with factions, and further additions are unlikely. Contiguous civil wars
have a significant positive relationship, suggesting that some new rebel groups might be
transnational in character. Again, however, the result is only significant in the fixed effects
model.
These results are robust to a number of manipulations. The raw Latent Human Protection
Score also consistently predicts the formation of new groups, though the substantive effect
is slightly smaller than that of the differenced measure I employ. As mentioned, the results
are similar when the data are aggregated into conflict years rather than treating separatist
movements as distinct conflicts. I also include attributes of the largest rebel group active in
the previous year, such as its size, degree of centralization, and whether it received foreign
support. None change the performance of my human rights measure.
The core results also hold when disaggregating observations by severity (see the Chapter
4 Appendix). Among conflict-years with at least 25 but fewer than 1,000 battle-related
fatalities, the results are substantively identical to those drawing on the full sample (Table
A.3). The lagged, differenced human rights measure has a statistically-significant, negative
relationship with the formation of new groups across a variety of model specifications.
Within the category of wars (years with 1,000 or more fatalities), the results are similar,
with the exceptions that the relationship is not statistically-significant in a model with
fixed effects for conflict and year (Table A.4), and the interaction between repression and
ethnolinguistic fractionalization is statistically significant.
The results do substantially differ, however, between different types of rebellions. Conflicts
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over control of the central government exhibit similar patterns to the full sample of conflicts,
with the change in human rights measure having a consistent negative relationship with
the probability of new group formation (Table A.5). Among secessionist conflicts, however,
the relationship is not statistically-significant in any specification (Table A.6). In light of my
theory, however, this discrepancy is not entirely surprising. My framework suggests that
repression should induce individuals to identify more strongly with their ethnic group.
Whereas campaigns to overthrow the central government are often diverse and therefore
might produce multiple ethnically-focused rebel groups, secessionist movements are often
organized around ethnic identity, and thus we should not expect to see many new rebel
groups form through this mechanism.
I do not perform any sort of causal identification in this analysis. I have examined several
measures of oil production as potential instruments for repression, but none came close to
the conventional standard for a strong instrument.2 Matching is not an ideal choice here, as
it requires a binary treatment, and my human rights measure is continuous. I cannot rule
out the possibility that my results actually reflect the government’s ability to anticipate
new rebellions. Given that a rebel group must produce 25 fatalities in a calendar year
before it enters the data, it is possible for an organization to exist, and for the government
to be aware of it, in the years prior to it being coded as a new group in my data. However,
I am skeptical that the temporal structure of such a process would be consistent enough
to produce the results I report here — it is unlikely that the increase in repression would
consistent occur one year before the rebel group produces 25 fatalities, rather two or three
years prior.
Ultimately, these results provide strong support for H4, as changes in human rights are
robustly related to the formation of new rebel groups. I do not find support that ethnic
diversity is related to this outcome, as I predicted in H5. Yet, this hypothesis is intended to
2An instrument is considered strong if the first-stage F-statistic is at least 10 (Angrist and Pischke 2009).
The scores for the oil measures were generally around 4.5.
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establish scope conditions. The lack of support could then be an indication that my theory
applies more broadly than I expected.
4.2.2 Group Composition Results
H6 predicts that the groups which join ongoing conflicts should be more likely than others
to draw their support from a single ethnic group. This proposition is tested in Table 4.3.
These analyses use the rebel group as the unit of analysis, with the ethnic composition of
the group being the dependent variable. In Model 5 the dependent variable is mono-ethnic
composition, in Model 6 it is multi-ethnic composition, and in Model 7 it is non-ethnic
composition, meaning the group has no discernible ties to a politically-relevant ethnic
group. I include two group-level covariates from theNon-StateActorDataset (Cunningham,
Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009): binary indicators of whether the group was active in a
previous conflict, and whether it is a transnational organization.
M5 Monoethnic M6 Multiethnic M7 Nonethnic
(Intercept) 0.22 −3.67∗∗∗ −0.11
(0.29) (0.63) (0.30)
Joiner 0.69∗ −1.13 −0.37
(0.34) (0.65) (0.37)
Secessionist 1.10∗∗∗ −1.10∗ −0.82∗
(0.30) (0.49) (0.36)
Previously Active 0.10 0.34 −0.37
(0.36) (0.49) (0.46)
Ethnlinguistic Fractionalization 0.20 2.10∗ −1.18∗
(0.45) (0.85) (0.51)
Transnational 0.08 1.06∗ −0.71∗
(0.26) (0.41) (0.31)
AIC 393.55 193.44 323.48
BIC 416.22 216.11 346.14
Log Likelihood -190.78 -90.72 -155.74
Deviance 381.55 181.44 311.48
Num. obs. 323 323 323
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 4.3: Logit Models of Rebel Group Ethnic Composition
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Consistent with H6, I find that rebel groups that join ongoing conflicts are nearly twice
as likely as others to be mono-ethnic. This relationship is represented by the “Joiner”
coefficient in Model 5. Relative to all other rebel groups (splinter organizations, alliances,
and groups that initiate conflicts), groups that join ongoing conflicts are substantially more
likely to draw their support from a single ethnic group. The relationship is statistically
significant at the 95% level. Joining status is not related to multi-ethnic or non-ethnic
composition. Secessionist groups are also more likely than others to be mono-ethnic, while
being significantly less likely to be multi-ethnic or non-ethnic. Unsurprisingly, the level of
ethnolinguistic fractionalization in a country is positively related to the probability that
rebel groups there will be multi-ethnic, and negatively related to their likelihood of being
non-ethnic. Finally transnational groups are more likely than others to be multi-ethnic,
and less likely to lack an ethnic affiliation.
These results are not entirely robust, however, to disaggregation by conflict severity or type
(see Chapter 4Appendix). Being a “joiner” group is not a statistically significant predictor of
being mono-ethnic among rebel groups which were never involved in a conflict producing
at least 1,000 fatalities (Table A.7). Among groups that were involved in full-fledged wars
with at least 1,000 fatalities in a calendar year, the result is also not statistically-significant,
but this appears to be the result of small sample sizes as being a “joiner” group is nearly a
perfect predictor of being mono-ethnic (Table A.8). The results hold among conflicts over
control of the central government, as “joiner” groups are significantly more likely than
others to be mono-ethnic. Among secessionist conflicts, however, the relationship is not
statistically-significant. Again, this discrepancy is not entirely surprising in the context of
my theoretical argument. Whereas in central government conflicts there are potentially
several ethnic groups that have not yet been fully mobilized into the conflict, in secessionist
conflicts this is typically not the case. Thus, my theory seems to be more applicable in
government conflicts than in separatist conflicts.
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This analysis provides support both for Hypothesis 6, and for my broader theoretical frame-
work. I expect that the entry of new rebel groups to ongoing conflicts is the manifestation
of increased mobilization around ethnic identity. The fact that rebel groups of this kind
are significantly more likely than others to draw their support from a single ethnic group
provides strong evidence for this argument. Future work should delve deeper into group
attributes, looking not only at recruitment and claims of representation, but also the plat-
form that rebel groups adopt. I would expect that joining groups would tend to place
greater emphasis on ethnic grievances than others.
4.3 Burma Case Study
To provide a more detailed examination of the processes leading to the formation of new
rebel groups, I conduct a qualitative case study of Burma.3 Burma is in many respects
among the most ethnically-polarized societies in the world, as it has 11 separatist move-
ments. I argue that some of these movements have followed a pattern of rebel organization
that tracks closely with my theory. One advantage of choosing this case is that potentially
confounding factors such as the presence of natural resources and support from outside
states varies substantially across separatist movements, while holding many other factors
constant including government attributes and colonial history. Burma is also home to
several rebel groups that do not conform perfectly to my theoretical framework, providing
an opportunity to refine my explanation and identify scope conditions.
As a whole, Burma is an ethnically diverse society, though ethnic minorities tend to be
concentrated on the largely mountainous periphery of the country, while ethnic Burmans
predominate in the central lowlands (Steinberg 2010). In the pre-colonial era these ethnic
identities were relatively fluid, both in terms of their content and their membership (South
3The country’s military regime began using the name “Myanmar” in 1989, but most dissidents and the
U.S. government continue to use “Burma.”
100
Figure 4.2: Administrative Districts of Burma. Source: Aotearoa.
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2008). British colonial rule from 1885–1948 led ethnic categories to become both more
calcified and more salient, as they practiced direct rule over the ethnic Burmans in the
lowlands, while delegating significant autonomy to the ethnic minorities of the mountain-
ous regions (South 2008). Furthermore, administrative practices such as frequent censuses
required individuals to declare their ethnicity (Charney 2009), and most positions in the
colonial bureaucracy and security forces were given to minorities, as the majority Burmans
were viewed as a greater threat to colonial rule (Steinberg 2010). Japan occupied Burma
throughmuch ofWorldWar II, further entrenching ethnic divisions as the Burmanmajority
collaborated with the Japanese, while many ethnic minorities including the Karen and
Kachin supported the Allies (Steinberg 2010).
Late in the war the most prominent faction of pro-Japanese Burmans, led by Aung San,
switched sides to support Allied efforts to liberate the country. Most of the politically-active
population of Burma, including most ethnic minorities, joined together to form the Anti-
Fascist People’s Freedom League (AFPFL). The organization remained mostly cohesive for
several years after the war in pursuit of independence (Charney 2009). As soon as Aung San
succeeded in negotiating a peaceful conferral of independence from the British in January
1947, however, ethnic tensions re-emerged. The Panglong Agreement the following month
established the boundaries of the new Burmese state, placing the minority-dominated
Frontier Areas under Burman control. As several of the minority groups, including the
Karen, had received tacit promises from the British that they would receive independence
as separate states, turmoil ensued (Steinberg 2010). Almost immediately upon gaining
independence in 1948, Burma faced two civil wars — a secessionist campaign led by the
Karen National Union, and a bid to overthrow the central government by the Red Flag
faction of the Communist Party of Burma.
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4.3.1 The Shan Secessionist Movement
Shan State is a large, mountainous area in eastern Burma, bordering Thailand on the south,
Laos on the east, and China on the north. The Shan people and language are both closely
related to the Thai, and in pursuit of its historical rivalry with Burma the Thai government
has frequently supported Shan rebellions to form a sort of buffer zone between the two
countries (Steinberg 2010). Adding to the international character of the region are the facts
that it has long been one of the world’s most productive areas for opium cultivation, and
that it was used as refuge by Kuomintang (KMT) forces fleeing China in the 1950’s and
1960’s (Cowell 2005). Shan State initially faced less repression than most other areas of the
country, as it had been granted the right to secede in the Burmese Constitution (Silverstein
1958).
The initial formation of rebellion in Shan State is consistent with the process of group
formation proposed in my theory.4 Following their defeat in the Chinese Civil War in
1950, a contingent of KMT soldiers fled into Shan in search of refuge. During the same
period, the Communist Party of Burma and separatists from the Kachin region frequently
used the area as a base of operations (Smith 1999). In hopes of defeating the Communists
and Kachin, and expelling the KMT, the Burmese army sent a large troop deployment to
the region in the late 1950’s. These forces were undisciplined, however, and frequently
committed abuses against the local population (Fredholm 1993, 156).
Meanwhile, student groups began developing and promoting Shan nationalism, including
through the dissemination of magazines. The abuses by the Burmese Army allowed this
nationalist movement to gain traction among the broader population as it became the basis
for opposing the military occupation (Fredholm 1993, Ch. 8). The process of increased
ethnic identification in this case is largely consistent with my theoretical argument. Shan
4According to the coding rules used in the quantitative analysis, the first Shan rebel group initiated the
conflict there, rather than joining it. However, as there was significant fighting in the area between the
Burmese government and other non-state actors, I would argue that it is consistent with my theory.
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elites, especially the leaders of student organizations, began developing and advocating for
a distinctly Shan identity in the mid-1950’s. Repression by the Burmese army significantly
enhanced the efficacy of these appeals, leading large portions of the Shan to embrace ethnic
nationalism (Fredholm 1993, 156–57). In 1958 this nationalism culminated in the formation
of the first Shan rebel group, the Young Brave Warriors (Lintner 1999). In theory, Shan
dissidents could have joined the Communist Party of Burma, partnered with the Kachin
Independence Army that often operated in Shan, or perhaps even partnered with the KMT.
Yet as my theory predicts, the chose to form an explicitly Shan organization.
4.3.2 The Arakanese Buddhist Rebels
The Arakan state is located in Western Burma, along its border with Bangladesh. Today the
district ismore commonly known as Rakhine state (or Rakhaing in Figure 4.2), and is notable
for being the location of the humanitarian crisis centering around the forced migration of
the Rohingya people. In this case study I will relax the assumption that different issues
of contention constitute entirely separate conflicts. While the country ultimately saw
separatist movements associated with 11 different territories, the dissident elites who led
these movements were mostly united within the AFPFL prior to independence. In some
cases rebels from different separatist regions collaborated, even while pursuing different
goals (Smith 1999). Furthermore, in some cases smaller ethnic groups initially participated
in the movements of larger ethnicities, before launching their own rebellion. For example
the Karenni originally participated in the separatist movement of their relatives the Karen,
before later launching their own rebellion (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2016). In some
cases, then, it might be more accurate to view the new separatist movements in Burma as
having joined a larger ongoing conflict, rather than initiating an entirely new one. Under
this conception, even the first Arakan separatist groups, the Arakan People’s Liberation
Party (APLP) and the Mujahid Party, would be considered as joining an ongoing conflict
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in 1948. Even when applying the coding rules of the quantitative analysis and treating
these groups as initiating a new conflict, two other Buddhist groups clearly qualifier as
new groups — the Arakan National Liberation Party (ANLP) in 1964, and the Arakan
Liberation Party in 1977.
While Arakan is considered an ethnicity largely because it has a long history as a unified
polity, its residents are divided along religious lines. Indeed, even in its earliest days
(beginning in 1948) the secessionist movement there was divided into a Muslim faction
(the Mujahid Party) and a Buddhist one (the APLP) (Fredholm 1993). This illustrates
an important limitation of my theoretical and empirical approach. I focus on ethnicity
as I expect that it will be the most salient social cleavage in most countries, because its
importance in the context of civil war has been well-established (see Cederman, Wimmer,
and Min 2010), and because ethnicity is more easily measured than most other dimensions
of identity. Clearly, however, other cleavages can take priority in some cases, and can
sub-divide ethnicity as is the case in Arakan. Thus, even though both factions of Arakan
residents share a common purpose of securing independence from Burma, they adopt the
potentially counterproductive arrangement of being organized into separate rebel groups
on the basis of religion.
Ultimately, however, I view the Arakan separatist movement as largely consistent with
my theory. While I expect that repression will ultimately lead ethnic groups to produce
cohesive rebel groups organized around their identity, and this stops short of occurring
in Arakan due to religious divisions, the reasons why Arakanese organize as they do are
largely consistent with my theory. I expect that individuals will turn to ethnicity in the face
of repression because 1) repression is often targeted on the basis of ethnicity, increasing
the salience of such groupings, and 2) ethnicity often provides a useful basis for defense
from repression, as ethnic groups often have militias, and may be able to attract support
from co-ethnic outside states.
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While Burma was nominally democratic from independence in 1948 until a military coup
in 1962, the quality of human rights in the country was low. The Latent Human Protection
Score for the country was around -1.47 during this period, making it a relatively repressive
regime as the global average over the period was 0.03. For comparison, the score changed
little after what is generally considered to be a very repressive military regime took power.
Thus, at the dawn of the Arakan independence movement the Burmese government em-
ployed a level of repression that I would expect to provoke increases in the number of
individuals resorting to violence, and to levels of ethnic identification. But whereas I
suspect that repression is generally targeted disproportionately at certain ethnic groups, in
Arakan the targeting was more specific, with Muslims being disproportionately targeted
relative to Buddhists. In fact, the government renamed the state “Rakhine,” a name that
previously referred only to the Buddhist subset, to emphasize their stance against the
Muslim minority known as the Rohingyas (Fredholm 1993). The Burmese government has
maintained a military deployment to the region through much of the conflict, and while it
has applied significant repression to both religions, it has been especially brutal toward the
Rohingya, ultimately seeking to force the minority to migrate into Bangladesh (Steinberg
2010). Thus, the underlying logic of my theory would imply that as repression is applied
with respect to both ethnicity and religion, both dimensions of identity should be salient.
Once deciding to rebel, it would not be a foregone conclusion that an Arakanese dissident
would choose to form a new rebel group. The Communist Party of Burma had a strong
following in Arakan; joining the Red Flag faction, or later the Communist Party of Arakan,
might have been a viable option for many. The Karen National Union was also active
prior to any significant military mobilization in Arakan. It is not obvious, a priori, why the
various separatists would not band together, as individually none could pose a serious
threat to the Burmese government. Indeed, most of the separatist movements agreed to
ceasefires in the 1990’s and 2000’s without winning any concessions, or coming at all close
to military victory. Later in the conflict there were in fact attempts to build multi-ethnic
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alliances (Smith 1999). Initially, however, dissidents generally choose to organize on the
basis of ethnicity, in some cases further subdivided by religion. Geographic isolation surely
played some role in the lack of coordination across regions, but in several cases separatists
operated outside of their own secessionist territory, and Communist forces frequently
traveled between different separatist regions (Smith 1999). Furthermore, the Arakanese
and Karen separatists had been unified under the banner of the AFLFP just a few months
prior, meaning that at least at the elite level, they had communication channels and a
history of interaction. As Staniland (2014) notes, social groups with these sorts of ties are
often able to build national rebel groups. The fact that this did not occur suggests that
ethnicity was an important factor in preventing the consolidation of dissent.
After accounting for the religious cleavage, the organization of Arakanese rebels is consis-
tent with my expectations. Buddhists and Muslims generally consolidated into a single
rebel group each. Interestingly, the specific organizations changed over time, with one
group being defeated and another taking its place. For example, when the Arakan conflict
began in 1948, Buddhists were represented by the Arakan People’s Liberation Party. The
APLP was defeated in the late 1950’s. Surviving members joined with new recruits to
form the Arakan National Liberation Party a few years later. The ANLP too was defeated,
only to be later replaced by the Arakan Liberation Party. Thus while three new Buddhist
organizations joined the ongoing conflict in Arakan, they seemingly replaced one another,
and represented the same underlying constituency. This suggests that dissidents only
form new organizations if there is not already a group representing their particular set
of identities. Furthermore, it suggests that there is a persistent demand for rebel groups
to provide representation. If an existing rebel group is defeated, the potential support of
dissident constituents provides an incentive for entrepreneurs to create a replacement.
Other elements of the Arakan case are broadly consistent with my theory, while also
suggesting nuance. Most of the ethnic minorities faced significant repression starting
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almost immediately after World War II, as the central government sought to create a
unified Burmese state. The Arakanese groups that joined later in the conflict seem to fit
my prediction that repression reduces the disincentive to participate in violence, though
accounts from individual rebels are virtually non-existent. It should be noted, however,
that the initial Arakanese rebellion, the APLP, was comprised largely of individuals who
had fought the Japanese in World War II (Charney 2009). While the core logic of the theory
likely applies to these individuals — the brutal Japanese occupation reduced the relative
cost of fighting — I fail to account for the fact that conflicts often cluster in space and
time, meaning that the most recent wave of repression will not always be the only violent
experience shaping dissident preferences. The Arakanese also ultimately formed new
rebel groups around the identities that formed the basis for repression, as I expect. Yet
the logic of forming a new group does not seem to follow the logic I propose. Whereas
I expect that new groups to constitute a rejection of existing rebel groups in response
to their lack of representation for some ethnic groups and inability to protect civilians,
in Arakan the decision was mutual and collaborative. The Karen National Union was
uninterested in recruiting Arakanese dissidents, but did support the movement and aided
in the establishment of several of the rebel groups there (Smith 1999).
4.3.3 Discussion
The onset of conflict in Shan State provides an excellent illustration of my theory. Shan
civilians were caught in the crossfire of conflicts between the Burmese government and two
non-state actors, the KMT and the Kachin Independence Army. The abuses perpetrated
against civilians during this time made them receptive to the nationalist movement being
propagated by Shan elite, facilitating the creation of a distinctly Shan rebel group. I return
to this case in Chapter 5, as it provides mixed evidence for my predictions regarding
splintering and alliances.
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The Arakan case suggests some refinements for my theory, but in most ways is consistent
with its logic. As I predict, the emergence of rebellion in Arakan followed a period of
political and physical repression, though the residual effects of World War II likely played
a role in producing a pool of individuals wiling to fight. I also expect that repression
will lead individuals to identify more strongly with their ethnic group. In Arakan state
this prediction is not inaccurate, but is underspecified. The fundamental groups to which
Arakanese turned was a subdivision of their ethnicity that combines ethnic identity with
religion. While I focus on ethnicity for reasons of clarity and data availability, Arakan
shows that a full understanding of any particular case requires knowledge of the social
cleavages there. Identities such as religion can crosscut ethnicity, and in some cases might
even take priority over it. Indeed a split between Muslims and Christians led to conflict
in the ethnically-homogeneous South Sudan almost immediately upon its independence.
A question raised by this analysis is how rebel elites are sometimes able to overcome
such divisions and produce a movement that coheres around a broader identity. The
Iraqi Kurdish population, for example, contains Muslims, Christians, and adherents to a
number of smaller religions such as Zoroastrianism. While at times the Kurds have divided
along these lines, they’ve tended to come together in the face of conflict (McLauchlin and
Pearlman 2012). Future work should explore why the Kurds have been able to accomplish
this, while the Arakanese have not.
4.4 Conclusion
I have argued that repression should increase the probability that new rebel groups will
join ongoing civil wars. This is so because repression reduces the relative risk of fighting
for previously non-violent individuals, creating a pool of individuals willing to join the
conflict. Yet because repression also tends to enhance the salience of ethnic identities, due
to the fact such identities often form the basis for targeting and emphasizing such identities
109
is often a good strategy for procuring foreign support, these new fighters are not always
interested in joining existing groups. Rather, they should form new rebel groups that
provide explicit representation to their ethnic group.
Consistent with my expectations in H4, I find that decreases in human rights practices are
associated with a substantial increase in the probability that a new rebel group will join
the conflict in the following year. A change of -1 in the Latent Human Protection Score for
a country, roughly the difference between France and Russia in recent years, triples the
probability that a new group will emerge. I do not find support for H5, which predicted
that ethnic diversity would limit the scope in which the repression mechanism should
apply. I do find support forH6, which tests the implication that new rebel groups emerging
through this process should be more likely than others to draw support from a single ethnic
group. Rebel groups that join ongoing conflicts are nearly twice as likely as others to have
ties to only a single ethnic group.
These results suggest that the government plays a surprisingly large role in shaping rebel
movement structure. Existingwork on rebel structure tends to focus on the social (Staniland
2014) or economic (Weinstein 2007) context from which rebels emerge, and studies that do
consider the role of the government have often found that repression increases cohesion
among target groups (Simmel 1955), though the effect may be contingent on internal group
dynamics (McLauchlin and Pearlman 2012). The findings also contribute to the school
of thought which suggests that ethnic diversity is not inherently dangerous (Fearon and
Laitin 1996), with ethnic conflict instead being contingent on the treatment of ethnic groups
(Cederman, Wimmer, and Min 2010). Similarly, these results suggest that policymakers




The Realignment of Rebel Groups
Having explored the formation of new rebel groups in the previous chapter, I turn now to
the other major process affecting the number of rebel groups in a conflict— the realignment
of existing rebel factions. There are two ways in which rebels can realign. First, subsets of
existing groups can break away to form splinter organizations. For example, Hezbollah
split from the Amal movement during the Lebanese Civil War to form a more radical
organization. I define a splinter organization as an independent rebel group, signified by
having an identifiable name and leadership that are not shared with any other rebel group,
that was previously subsumed within another rebel organization. Thus, entirely new rebel
groups are excluded, even if they constitute a subset of a larger non-violent organization.
Splinter organizations generally emerge during ongoing conflicts, though sometimes they
are formed during periods of peace to initiate a new wave of fighting, as the Real Irish
Republican Army did (Stedman 1997).
Second, previously independent rebel organizations can form alliances. Here I focus on
alliances with meaningful integration of command structures, defining an alliance as an
organization with a distinct name that merges a substantial amount of the decision-making
for two or more previously independent rebel groups. This might occur if one group
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absorbs another, or two groups create a formal umbrella organization to coordinate their
activities. An example of the latter case is the Syrian Defense Forces, under which the
Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) have joined with several Arab rebel groups to
coordinate their campaign against the Islamic State. Note that this definition excludes
cooperation that falls short of formal integration. Such behavior is difficult to measure
systematically in any case, though multiple forthcoming data collections should facilitate
research on the topic in the future.
I expect these process to be closely related as part of a broader process of realignment
around ethnic identity. Repression should make civilians more likely to identify with their
ethnic group. While I do not necessarily expect this effect to extend directly to rebels —
almost by definition, they experience violence — I do expect that there will generally be
a strong connection between rebels and civilians dissidents. Except for a few cases with
exceptionally large endowments of natural resources or foreign support, rebels depend
on dissident civilians for recruits, shelter, and material resources. As civilians often have
the ability to defect to the side of a rival rebel group or the government, rebels have an
incentive to represent the interests and identities of these constituents. Furthermore, ethnic
identification can be an effective means of securing support from foreign co-ethnic states,
and such appeals might be especially likely to succeed during periods of repression. Thus,
rebels should tend to identify more strongly with their ethnic group following episodes of
repression.
This dynamic should lead rebels to reorganize on the basis of ethnicity. In some cases
rebel leaders may be able to reorient their group to emphasize ethnicity more strongly (see
Christia 2012). Often, however, it will be difficult for them to do so credibly. For example, if
a rebel had previously maintained a multi-ethnic coalition of support, it would be difficult
for them to emphasize a particular ethnic identity. In such cases, entrepreneurial members
of the group may see opportunities to form a new splinter organization that “outbids” the
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original rebel group with a more credible, extreme appeal to ethnic identity (see Horowitz
1985). As doing so could potentially win the support of a large number of dissident civilians,
and leading a rebel group is likely to bring private benefits such as resource revenues, this
should often be an enticing opportunity. As I expect this cycle of ethnic outbidding to
be especially likely in the wake of repression, I expect that the level of repression should
predict the likelihood that new splinter organizations will form.
Hypothesis 6: The probability that rebels groups splinter should increase with the level of repression
in a country
I argue that splintering often reflects a process of reorganization around ethnic identity.
The ability of this process to produce new rebel groups should depend, however, on the
pre-existing configuration. A rebel group that is already composed primarily of members
of a single ethnicity may be able to adapt to increased ethnic identification, though they
may still fragment as a result of outbidding appeals. Nevertheless, groups that draw their
support from multiple ethnic groups should be much more vulnerable to fragmentation as
the result of increased ethnic identification.
Hypothesis 7: Multi-ethnic rebel groups should be at greater risk of splintering than mono-ethnic
ones
My theory also suggests a testable implication regarding the characteristics of the splinters
groups that emerge. If splintering is motivated by a desire to form rebel groups that more
clearly represent a particular ethnic group, the rebel groups that emerge from this process
should be likelier than others to draw their support from a single ethnic group.
Hypothesis 8: Splinter organizations should be more likely than others to draw their support from a
single ethnic group
While this process of realignment around ethnic identities should lead to the fragmentation
of some groups, in other cases it might create opportunities for aggregation. One disadvan-
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tage of splintering is that it will generally result in a weaker organization than members
had previously, as it will have only a subset of the parent group’s members at its disposal.
As a crucial function of alliances is the aggregation of capabilities, forming new alliances
is a potential solution to this problem. Alliances may also have the benefit of managing
potential conflict between their members (Gibler 1996), ensuring that resources are directed
toward fighting the government rather than other rebel groups. Finally, outside states often
attempt to maximize the impact of their support by channeling it to a coalition of rebels,
rather than a series of smaller, independent groups. Interventions of this sort might be
especially likely in the wake of a humanitarian crisis.
As is the case with splintering, my theory offers predictions regarding not only when
new alliances should emerge, but also what their ethnic composition should be. I expect
that the ethnic polarization sparked by repression should lead rebels to leave multi-ethnic
coalitions, but also to form new alliances with co-ethnic factions.
Hypothesis 9: The probability that new mono-ethnic alliances will form should increase with the
level of repression
Conversely, the emergence of multi-ethnic alliances should be less likely when this dynamic
is at work.
Hypothesis 10: The probability that new multi-ethnic alliances will form should decrease with the
level of repression
I proceed with an explanation for a research design for these four hypotheses. After
presenting the findings, I assess the effect of repression on the total number of rebel groups.
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5.1 Research Design
While I believe them to be the result of closely related theoretical processes, the splin-
tering of individual rebel organizations and the formation of alliances between separate
organizations require distinct research designs. This is so because the unit of analysis in
the splintering study is the rebel group-year, whereas alliance formation is a decision by
multiple rebel groups, and thus the unit of analysis is the conflict-year. I first explain the
research design for splintering in greater detail, before explaining the differences in the
alliance formation design.
5.1.1 Splintering
The first phenomenon I explain in this chapter is splintering. As the explanatory factors in
H7 and H8 are group attributes, the unit of analysis in this portion of the study is the rebel
group-year. I seek to explain not simplywhich conflict years produce splinter organizations,
but also which rebel groups within those conflict years. I drawmy sample of cases from the
UCDP Dyadic Dataset, version 4-2016 (Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016), which
includes an observation for every non-state actor in every year in which it was involved in
conflict with the government producing at least 25 fatalities. After collapsing observations
for rebel groups that appear in multiple conflicts in a single year, I am left with a dataset of
2,656 rebel group years covering the period 1946–2015.
Dependent Variables
Splintering
The first dependent variable in this portion of the analysis is the splintering of existing
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rebel groups. I use my own data on rebel group origins to identify splinter groups.1 A
group is coded as a splinter organization if most of its leadership were previously members
of another rebel group. I follow the UCDP coding decisions for distinguishing cases where
a new group has emerged from simple name changes. Essentially, a group is considered
new if its leadership, organizational structure, or membership differs substantially from
previous existing organizations. When two groups disagree about which is the original
organization and which is the splinter, the larger group is considered the original.
113 of the 506 rebel groups in my data are splinter organizations. As there are four cases in
which a rebel group produced two splinter organizations in the same year, the number
of years in which a new splinter organization emerged is 109. However, a large portion
of these are coterminous with dissolution of the original organization. Typically in these
cases the main organization will agree to a peace deal, and a radical faction will form a
splinter organization to continue fighting. While this is an interesting and consequential
phenomenon, it has already received a substantial amount of attention from scholars (e.g.
Stedman 1997). Though empirically they may overlap in some cases, the division between
hardliners and moderates is analytically distinct from ethnic divisions, suggesting it is
a separate process from what I theorize. Furthermore, I am interested in processes that
increase or decrease the number of rebel groups in a conflict. Replacing a large, moderate
organization with a more radical splinter has important implications for the probability
of peace and the tactics likely to be deployed. Ultimately, however, it does not alter the
number of rebel groups competing simultaneously. I thus consider these cases to be beyond
the scope of this dissertation, and exclude them from my analyses. This leaves a total of 25
cases in which a splinter and parent organization were active simultaneously. This variable
is coded as 1 in the group-year in which a parent organization loses a splinter faction (i.e. I
examine the groups that splinter).
1The UCDP Actor data (Uppsala Conflict Data Program 2015) does identify splinter groups, but uses very
conservative coding rules that exclude many clear examples of splinter.
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Rebel Group Ethnicity
H8 predicts that splinter organizations should be more likely than others to draw support
from a single ethnic group. As I did for the similar hypothesis in Chapter 4, I use the the
ACD2EPR 2014 dataset (Wucherpfennig et al. 2011; Vogt et al. 2015) to determine this. The
data measures three categories of ties between rebel and ethnic groups — explicit claims of
representation, recruiting, and support from at least half the ethnic group. I collapse these
forms to code a trichotomous measure indicating whether a rebel group is multi-ethnic,
mono-ethnic, or non-ethnic, meaning it has no observable links to any ethnic group.
Independent Variables
Human Rights
I again use the Latent Human Protection scores, version 2 (Fariss 2014; Schnakenberg and
Fariss 2014) to measure repression. As I do in Chapter 4, I combat the fact that the measure
is mostly static with a slight positive trend over time by using the change over the previous.
In this measure, a negative score indicates that a country has become more repressive,
while a positive score means that human rights have improved. In this sample the mean
change is just 0.01, but there are numerous large change in both directions.
Multi-ethnic Group
To test H7 I use the measure of rebel group ethnicity that serves as a dependent variable
later in the chapter. In this case I collapse the measure into a dichotomous indicator with
rebel groups that draw support from multiple ethnic groups coded as 1, and all others
coded as zero. There are relatively few multi-ethnic groups in the data, with the attribute
occurring in 334 of 2393 valid group-year observations.
Splinter Organization
The test of H8 uses the splinter variable from my rebel origins data as an explanatory
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factor. The coding rules are described above. 113 out of 503 rebel groups are splinter
organizations.
Control Variables
I include many of the country-level covariates from Chapter 4 in the splintering analyses
as controls. These include ethnolinguistic fractionalization (Fearon and Laitin 2003), Polity
IV score (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016), land area (The World Bank 2015), population
(Gleditsch 2002), GDP per capita (Gleditsch 2002), and a count of lootable resource sites
(Lujala, Rød, and Thieme 2007; Gilmore et al. 2005; Lujala, Gleditsch, and Gilmore 2005;
Balestri 2012; Lujala 2008; Buhaug and Lujala 2005). Refer to the previous chapter for
detailed descriptions.
Additionally I include several rebel group-level controls from Cunningham, Gleditsch, and
Salehyan (2009). These include a binary indicators of whether the rebel group is stronger
than the government, whether the group has a presence in multiple states, whether the
group has a political wing, whether the group controls territory, whether the group has
centralized control, and whether it receives external support. Each of these measures is a
snapshot, measured for each group at only one point in time.
Modeling Strategies
To testH6 andH7 I use a Cox proportional hazard survival model. This is a useful modeling
framework in this case because the probability that a rebel group will splinter is in part
a function of time. In a standard logistic regression analysis with the rebel group as the
unit of analysis, the duration of time the group was active is such a strong predictor of
splintering that it typically nullifies the significance of all other variables. Survival models
address this by treating splintering as a function of time, expressed as the probability
that a rebel group will survive a given number of years without splintering. Independent
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variables explain deviations from this baseline survival curve. The Cox model is likely
to be the proper choice of survival models in this case, as survival times for rebel groups
are heavily right-skewed, and the Cox model does not assume survival times form any
particular distribution (i.e. it is non-parametric).
The exact specification of the dependent variable in this analysis is the number of years
between a rebel group’s first appearance in the data and the first time it generates a splinter
organization. I remove a rebel group from the study once it has splintered for the first time.
This results in the exclusion of three instances of splintering from rebel groups that had
splintered previously. As many of my covariates are measured at the country level and
there are often multiple rebel groups per country, I cluster the standard errors by country.
To testH8 I use a simple logistic regression with the rebel group as the unit of analysis. The
mono-ethnic indicator is the dependent variable, and the indicator of whether the group is
a splinter organization is the main predictor.
5.1.2 Alliance Formation
The research design for the two alliance formation hypotheses (H9 and H10) closely resem-
bles the group formation analysis from Chapter 4. The unit of analysis is the conflict-year.
While I control for the number of rebel groups, I do not exclude observations that have
only one rebel group. There are several cases where a new rebel group enters a conflict
and joins an alliance in the same calendar year.
Dependent Variable
The dependent variables for the two hypotheses are the formation of two different types
of alliances — mono-ethnic and multi-ethnic. I use my data on rebel origins to determine
when a new alliance has formed. I code an alliance as any group whose members are
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drawn from at least two distinct previously active rebel groups. These alliances constitute
a substantial enough integration of command that they replace their constituent groups in
the data. In many cases, however, the alliance splinters and the members groups re-enter
the data. I combine the alliance measure with the ethnic composition variable to code two
dependent variables — the formation of new multi-ethnic alliances, and of new mono-
ethnic ones. Alliances involving this degree of integration are rare. New mono-ethnic
alliances form in 29 of 2014 conflict-years, while there are only 13 years in which a new
multi-ethnic alliance emerged.
Independent Variable
I use same measure of human rights as in the preceding analyses. I again use the lagged
change in the Latent Human Protection Score (Fariss 2014; Schnakenberg and Fariss 2014).
The mean change in this data is -0.01, with a range from -2.51 to 1.50.
Control Variables
I include two conflict-level controls: a binary indicator of whether the conflict produced
1,000 or more fatalities in a year, and a binary indicator of whether multiple rebel groups
participated in the conflict in a year. Both measures come from the UCDP Dyadic Data
(Melander, Pettersson, and Themnér 2016). Additionally I control for several country-level
factors, including ethnolinguistic fractionalization and the percentage of terrain that is
mountainous (Fearon and Laitin 2003), population and GDP per capita (Gleditsch 2002),
the Polity IV score (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016), and an indicator of whether there
was a civil war in a neighboring country.
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Modeling Strategy
As both dependent variables are binary but rare, I use a logistic regression with a rare
events correction (King and Zeng 2001). As there are sometimes multiple conflicts in a
country-year, I cluster the standard errors by country.
5.2 Splintering Results
Results of the splintering analysis are reported in Table 5.1. I fit five Cox proportional hazard
models with different batteries of covariates. Model 1 includes only the two independent
variables used to test my hypotheses— the lagged change in human rights, and an indicator
of whether the rebel group is multi-ethnic. In Model 2 I add several country-level control
variables. Model 3 combines the change in human rights with a set of rebel group-level
controls.
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Change in Human Rights −1.23† −1.34 −1.35†
(0.74) (0.94) (0.81)




















Stronger than Gov. 2.05∗
(0.92)
AIC 171.59 101.72 145.35
R2 0.00 0.00 0.00
Max. R2 0.09 0.06 0.08
Num. events 20 12 17
Num. obs. 1908 1499 1740
Missings 749 1158 917
PH test 0.06 0.59 0.74
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table 5.1: Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Rebel Group Splintering
The coefficients of a Cox model represent the effect of a variable on the hazard of failure
(splintering in this case). A positive coefficient indicates that the risk of splintering in-
creases with the level of that variable, while a negative coefficients signifies a reduced risk.
Consistent withH6 I find that the change in human rights is negatively related to the hazard
of splintering. As human rights improve the risk that a rebel group will splinter decreases;
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as a country becomes more repressive, the risk of splintering increases. However, the effect
is only statistically significant in Models 1 and 4, and even then only at the 90% level. The
effect size is large, with a one-unit increase in human rights being associated with a 70%
reduction in the likelihood of splintering in Model 1, and a 74% reduction in Model 4. The
relationship is not significant in Model 2, though it is not clear whether the relationship is
confounded by the country-level covariates, or the change is the result of missing data on
those variables.
The findings are thus mostly consistent with H6, though not as robust as most of the
analyses in the preceding chapters. Several cases from the data clearly fit my theoretical
framework. The Karenni ethnic group of Burma are close relatives of the Karen, and fought
as members of the Karen National Union (KNU) for the first several years of Burmese
independence. In 1957, however, the Karenni left the KNU to form their own rebel group,
the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP). This case illustrates that splintering does
not always lead to hostile relations between the formerly united groups, however, as the
KNU strongly supported the KNPP’s desire to pursue a separate Karenni state (Fredholm
1993). The Free Aceh Movement splintered from Darul Islam in Indonesia to pursue
independence for the Acehnese people, rather than the Darul Islam’s goals of an Islamic
State in Indonesia. A review of the cases also suggests a possible explanation for the lack
of robustness — communist rebel groups are highly prone to fragmentation, and account
for a large portion of the splinter organizations.
I find no support for H7, as the multi-ethnic variable never approaches statistical signif-
icance. As I discuss in the study of the Shan State independence movement later in this
chapter, it is seemingly common for ethnically homogeneous groups to splinter. Only
one control variable is significant — the indicator of whether a rebel group is stronger
than the government in Model 3. Being stronger than the government increases the risk
of splintering by a factor of seven. This suggests that splintering has a strong strategic
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element. When rebels are weak and cannot afford any loss in capability, they hang together.
When victory appears likely, however, they act on their internal differences, perhaps with
an eye toward post-war bargaining.
Disaggregating the sample by conflict type reveals that the findings are driven largely by
secessionist conflicts (see Tables A.11 and A.12 in the Chapter 5 Appendix). As is the case in
the full sample, worse human rights practices are associated with an enhanced probability
of splintering among secessionist conflicts in Models 1 and 3. Among conflicts for control
of the central government, the relationship is not significant except in Model 2. This result
should be interpreted with caution, however, as missing data leaves only four instances of
splintering in this model. These results are perhaps not entirely consistent with my theory.
Whereas I expect that splintering to be driven by a process of realignment around ethnic
identity. While splintering is slightly more common among rebellions against the central
government, the phenomenon is more closely related to repression among secessionist
rebellions. It may be the case that these secessionist movements are realigning around
an identity more specific than ethnicity, such as a particular combination of religion and
ethnicity. Indeed, this pattern can be observed in several of the secessionist movements
in Burma. It is also possible, however, that the activation of sub-national identities by
repression is not a common pathway to splintering.
In summary the results of this analysis are largely consistent with my broader theory,
though not robust to the inclusion of country-level controls. I interpret the results as
suggesting that ethnic polarization is a common pathway to splintering. It is not, however,
the only pathway. Communist rebellions are prone to splintering along doctrinal lines,
and splinter organizations often emerge late in conflicts to continue the fighting after the
original organization ceases its activities.
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5.2.1 Splinter Group Ethnicity
H8 predicts that splinter organizations should be more likely than others to draw their
support from a single ethnic group. If splintering is fundamentally about reorganization
along ethnic lines, it stands to reason that the leaders of splinter organizations should take
only co-ethnics with them. I test this proposition in Table 5.2. I do not find support for
H8, as splinter organizations are not likely than others (alliances and originating rebel
groups constitute the baseline) to be ethnically-homogeneous. Splinter organizations also
do not significantly differ in their probability of being multi-ethnic. I do find that splinter
organizations are less likely less likely than others to have no ties to any ethnic group,
with the effect being significant at the 95% level. This suggests that support from ethnic
constituents might be an important factor in facilitating splintering. Factions that lack
such support may be more likely to remain in the original rebel group, as they have less
assurance of being able to acquire enough resources to be a viable independent group.
The results are not significant when looking at secessionist and government conflicts in
isolation, though this may be a reflection of the reduced sample size (see Tables A.13 and
A.14 in the Chapter 5 Appendix).
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M4Monoethnic M5 Multiethnic M6 Nonethnic
(Intercept) 0.20 −3.70∗∗∗ −0.04
(0.29) (0.63) (0.31)
Splinter 0.39 0.54 −1.14∗
(0.41) (0.54) (0.57)
Joiner 0.75∗ −1.08 −0.47
(0.34) (0.66) (0.37)
Secessionist 1.07∗∗∗ −1.18∗ −0.76∗
(0.31) (0.50) (0.36)
Previously Active −0.08 0.04 0.17
(0.42) (0.58) (0.52)
Ethnlinguistic Fractionalization 0.16 2.09∗ −1.15∗
(0.45) (0.85) (0.52)
Transnational 0.06 1.06∗ −0.69∗
(0.26) (0.42) (0.31)
AIC 393.19 193.69 320.15
BIC 419.59 220.09 346.55
Log Likelihood -189.60 -89.85 -153.07
Deviance 379.19 179.69 306.15
Num. obs. 321 321 321
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 5.2: Logit Models of Rebel Group Ethnic Composition
5.3 Alliance Formation Results
The alliance formation results are reported in Table 5.3. Model 4 uses mono-ethnic alliances
as the dependent variable, while Model 5 focuses on multi-ethnic alliances and Model 6
combines all alliances. In H9 I predict that the probability of new ethnically homogeneous
alliance will be greater following increases in repression. Consistent with this prediction,
the “Change in Human Rights” variable has a strong negative relationship with the proba-
bility of new rebel group formation. A one-unit decrease in human rights (again, roughly
the difference between France and Russia in recent years) more than triples the odds of
a new rebel group forming. In the years following the largest declines in human rights
practices (-2.5), the probability of a new mono-ethnic alliance is 0.21 (see Figure 5.1). When
the change is zero or positive, the probability of such an alliance is around 0.01. This
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relationship is statistically significant at the 90% level. Given that the sample size is not
especially small (n=1209), an α of 0.1 might be considered overly permissive. However, no
other variable is significant at even the 90% level, suggesting that even after applying the
rare events correction the model has limited statistical power. Thus, I contend that it is
reasonable to interpret relationships at this significance level, and reject the null hypothesis
of no relationship between repression and the emergence of mono-ethnic rebel groups.
M4 Mono-ethnic M5 Multi-ethnic M6 All
(Intercept) 1.56 −1.25 1.71
(3.82) (12.46) (2.84)
Change in Human Rights −1.20† −1.15 −0.99†
(0.70) (1.26) (0.55)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 0.79 11.27 1.12
(1.21) (10.54) (0.95)
Intensity Level 0.09 0.54 0.03
(0.58) (0.89) (0.45)
Prev. Multi-rebel −0.42 0.35 0.31
(0.78) (0.88) (0.47)
Contiguous Civil War 0.01 0.08 −0.06
(0.15) (0.28) (0.13)
Logged GDP per capita −0.39 −0.78 −0.43†
(0.35) (1.01) (0.26)
Logged Population −0.33 −0.75 −0.29
(0.26) (0.70) (0.20)
Polity −0.04 0.00 −0.01
(0.05) (0.11) (0.04)
AIC 163.10 71.96 241.14
BIC 214.07 122.94 292.12
Log Likelihood -71.55 -25.98 -110.57
Deviance 143.10 51.96 221.14
Num. obs. 1209 1210 1210
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table 5.3: Rare Events Logit Models of Alliance Formation
In Model 5 I do not find support for H10, as the relationship between “Change in Human
Rights” and the probability of new multi-ethnic alliances does not approach statistical
significance. While repression does not seem to deter this type of alliance as I expected,
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neither does it make them more likely. Thus while I find that repression is associated
with a general increase in the probability of new alliances, the relationship seems to be
driven by ethnically-homogeneous coalitions. The effect of repression seems to be specific
to this type of alliance, rather than producing a general increase in the propensity to form
coalitions. Disaggregating the results by conflict intensity reveals that the findings are
primarily driven by less severe conflicts, as the results hold for conflict-years with fewer
than 1,000 fatalities, but not for those with greater than 1,000 (see Tables A.15 and A.16
in the Chapter 5 Appendix). The result for mono-ethnic alliances holds among conflicts
over the central government, but not among secessionist conflicts. The combined alliance
formation result holds in neither subsample (see Tables A.17 and A.18). As is the case in
previous analyses, my hypotheses perform best in lower-intensity government conflicts.
One explanation for the intensity result is that forming alliances requires an opportunity
for rebel elites to meet and negotiate a merger, which is unlikely to occur during periods of
intense fighting. The conflict type results again suggests that secessionist movements tend
to be unified around ethnic identity from the outset, and thus have less need to engage in
realignment.
The only statistically significant control variable in any of the three models is logged
GDP per capita in Model 3. The relationship is negative, indicating that alliances are less
common in wealthier countries. One possible explanation is that the variable is acting
as a proxy for the intensity or spread of the conflict, capturing an attribute distinct from
the binary measure of whether the conflict produced 1,000 fatalities. In cases such as
Afghanistan where most of the country is consumed by war, the economy is likely to suffer.
In cases where the fighting is more localized, such as Ukraine in recent years, there will
not necessarily be a significant economic decline at the country level. The former situation
might be more likely to have a plethora of rebel groups available to form alliances.
The findings in this section are broadly consistent with my theoretical framework. In-
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Figure 5.1: Predicted Probability of Mono-ethnic Alliance (Model 1)
creased repression is associated with higher probabilities of the formation of ethnically
homogeneous alliances, which supports my expectation that repression triggers a cycle
of realignment around ethnic identity. One case that is consistent with this story is the
Uganda National Liberation Front. Uganda is among the most ethnically diverse societies
on earth, with an ethnolinguistic fractionalization score indicating that there is nearly a
90% chance that two randomly selected individuals will be from different ethnic groups.
A number of small rebel groups formed there in 1978 with the goal of overthrowing Idi
Amin, to which the government responded with a substantial increase in repression (a
change of -0.5 in the Latent Human Protection Scores). In early 1979, with help from the
Tanzanian government, several ethnically Lango rebel groups responded by a forming an
alliance, the Uganda National Liberation Front. A month later they successfully overthrew
Amin. While numerous small rebel groups were active during this time (Lewis 2016), only
the bloc of Lango groups was able to successfully form an alliance.
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5.4 Combining the Processes
This project is motivated by a desire to explain variation in the number of rebel groups
across and within conflicts. To this point, I have examined individually three processes
that increase or decrease the number of rebel groups. Doing this has allowed me to discuss
very specific causal processes. Yet examining each process separately does not allow me to
speak to the total number of rebel groups we should expect at various levels of repression.
It is not clear, for example, to what extent alliances offset the increases to the number of
rebel groups brought by splintering. As a final quantitative analysis, I combine group
formation, splintering, and alliance formation and model the probability that there will be
multiple rebel groups active in a conflict-year. To do this I fit a logistic regression model
with a binary indicator of whether there were at least two rebel groups present in a conflict
year.2 The unit of analysis is again the conflict-year, and the controls are each described in
the research design for the alliance analysis.
2A count model such as Poisson regression would not be appropriate here, as rebel groups can persist
across time periods, violating the assumption of independent counts in each period.
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M7 M8 M9
(Intercept) −2.25 −1.93 −2.05
(1.48) (1.50) (1.44)




Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization −0.52 −5.17∗∗∗ −4.37∗∗
(0.47) (1.50) (1.48)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization2 5.02∗∗ 4.16∗∗
(1.54) (1.52)
Intensity Level 0.11 0.12 −0.04
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Prev. Multi-rebel 3.45∗∗∗ 3.39∗∗∗ 3.25∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.21) (0.20)
Contiguous Civil War −0.17∗ −0.14∗ −0.11
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06)
Logged GDP per capita −0.05 −0.02 −0.00
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12)
Logged Population −0.07 −0.16 −0.20
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Logged Area 0.06 0.12 0.09
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10)
Post Cold War 0.32 0.26 0.37
(0.22) (0.22) (0.21)
AIC 718.02 709.42 754.03
BIC 778.50 774.95 820.67
Log Likelihood -347.01 -341.71 -364.01
Deviance 694.02 683.42 728.03
Num. obs. 1142 1142 1244
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table 5.4: Logit Models of Multi-Rebel Conflict-Years
The combined results are reported in Table 5.4. The “Change in Human Rights” measure
has a strong negative relationship with the probability of multiple rebel groups (Models 7
and 8). As human rights improve, the probability that a conflict-year will have multiple
rebel groups decreases. As a country becomes more repressive, the probability of multiple
rebel groups increases. The relationship is statistically significant in both models, and the
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Figure 5.2: Predicted Probability of Multiple Rebel Groups
probability from roughly 0.19 to 0.26, a 37% increase (see Figure 5.2). Model 9 includes the
absolute value of the human rights measure, rather than the change. It too is statistically
significant. At the highest observed levels of repression the probability of multiple rebel
groups is roughly 0.46. At the mean value for the sample (-1.24) the probability is 0.14 (see
Figure 5.3). Both the absolute value and change in repression are thus strong predictors of
whether a conflict will have multiple rebel groups.
As is the case in previous analyses, the results hold among conflict-years with less than
1,000 battle-related deaths, but not among those with greater than 1,000 (see Tables A.19
and A.20 in the Chapter 5 Appendix). This may be the result of the relatively small number
of war-years in the latter category (n=280). Indeed, only the “Previously Multi-Rebel”
measure is statistically-significant in the war subsample. Also consistent with previous
analyses is the fact that the results appear to be primarily driven by conflicts over the central
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government, as the findings in that subsample match closely with the aggregate patterns.
Among secessionist conflicts the “Change in Human Rights” measure is not statistically
significant, though the absolute level of human rights (used in Model 9) is. Thus repression
is associated with greater numbers of rebel groups in both secessionist and non-secessionist
conflicts, but only explains the timing of new rebel group formation in the non-secessionist
sample (see Tables A.21 and A.22). As was the case for the individual processes, the
aggregate results suggest that the relationship between repression and the number of rebel
groups is strongest among less intense conflicts over the central government.
Only a few control variables are statistically significant. The strongest predictor in each
model, however, is the lagged dependent variable (“Previously Multi-Rebel”). Once a con-
flict has multiple rebel groups that arrangement is likely to persist for at least one year. This
suggest that the presence of multiple rebel groups is not simply a case of two groups briefly
overlapping, before one replaces the other. Interestingly, the contiguous civil war measure
is statistically significant, but negative in models 7 and 8. One possible explanation is that
rebel groups often seek refuge across international borders, especially when neighboring
states are weak, as they would be during a civil war (Salehyan 2007). Ethnolinguistic
fractionalization is not statistically significant as a linear effect, but a curvilinear effect is
significant (Model 8). In this case it is a U-shaped relationship, with the probability of
multiple rebel groups being highest and high and low values of ethnic diversity.
In short, repression is a strong predictor for the presence of multiple rebel groups. This is
perhaps unsurprising given that while all three outcomes are rare, new group formation
and splintering combined are more common than alliance formation. My theory has the
ability not only to explain each of these processes individually, but provides a strong




















Figure 5.3: Predicted Probability of Multiple Rebel Groups
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5.4.1 Splintering and Alliances in Shan State
To explore the processes of splintering and alliance formation in more detail, I return to
the Shan case from the previous chapter. There are instances of splintering in Shan that fit
my theory, but also some that suggest other factors are at work.
The first rebel group in Shan State, the Young Brave Warriors, splintered shortly after the
fighting began in 1959. A large portion of the group’s membership joined the new Shan
State Independence Army (SSIA). One factor in this move appears to be the fact that the
SSIA was more explicitly nationalist than its predecessor (Brown 1988; Fredholm 1993, 156).
While I expect ethnically-homogeneous groups such as the Young Brave Warriors to be
more cohesive than multi-ethnic coalitions, these groups are still vulnerable to outbidding
appeals. The Young Brave Warriors-SSIA split is consistent with my general argument
that repression induces greater levels of ethnic identification, which in turn leads rebels to
reorganize. The Young BraveWarriors did not represent Shan identity as forcefully as some
members preferred, and ultimately they left. This case also suggests an explanation for
my finding of no relationship between the ethnic composition of a rebel group and its risk
of splintering — even ethnically-homogeneous groups are at risk of splintering through
an outbidding dynamic. Thus it may be the case that the null finding is the result not
of multi-ethnic groups being cohesive, but rather of mono-ethnic groups being similarly
fragile.
The Shan secessionist movement has also seen the creation of several alliances. Almost
immediately upon splitting from the Young Brave Warriors, the students who from the
SSIA welcomed a group of defectors from the Burmese Army (Fredholm 1993, 156). In
1964, the SSIA participated in a much larger merger with the Kokang Force and the Shan
National United Front, forming the Shan State Army (SSA) (Lintner 1984). While the
Kokang are often considered a separate ethnic group from the Shan, in my data they are
coded as having no ties to an ethnic group. With the other two members being Shan, the
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SSA is coded as an instance of a new mono-ethnic alliance. Collectively, the various Shan
organizations totaled no more than 8,000 members (Fredholm 1993, 158). Thus aggregating
and coordinating capabilities was likely an important motive for the group leaders. The
timing of the merger is also consistent with my theory. Burma’s democratic regime fell to a
military coup in 1962, two years prior to the formation of the SSA. While the Latent Human
Protection Scores do not detect a sharp change perhaps due to a dearth of data sources
in that period, the tactics used by the new military regime toward the various separatists
were generally harsher than those of the previous regime (Charney 2009).
While the early years of the Shan independence movement provide strong support for
my theory, the amount of subsequent splintering observed there surpasses what I would
expect in an ethnically-homogeneous movement. My data show that four distinct splinter
organizations have appeared in the Shan conflict, and there were a number of other splinter
organizations that did not produce enough fatalities to be included in the data (see Fredholm
1993). This contrasts with the Arakanese Buddhist movement discussed in Chapter 4, which
never produced a splinter organization. Shan and Arakan are similar on many dimensions.
Each is a mountainous region on the country’s border, each is pursuing independence
for a defined territory that largely maps to historical boundaries, and each is fighting the
same Burmese government. That leaves two key differences. First, the Arakan separatist
movement had its roots in the efforts to defeat the Japanese occupation during World War
II, meaning that most of the dissident elites in the region were at one time members of the
same political organization (the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League [AFPFL]). These
dissidents then launched a secessionist campaign almost simultaneously with Burmese
independence. By contrast, elites in Shan state had been negotiating a peaceful path to
independence during British rule, and were granted the right to pursue autonomy in
the Burmese constitution (Charney 2009). Only after it became clear that the Burmese
government would not allow a peaceful move toward independence in a timely fashion did
the Shan rebel. As this occurred more than ten years after Burmese independence, the Shan
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dissident elite mostly lacked an existing social network. Staniland (2014) views pre-war
social networks as the key to subsequent cohesion. Organizations that have strong ties both
between elites and rank-and-file, and between different horizontally equal units should
tend to avoid splintering, while others should be plagued by it. It is not clear, however, that
the AFPFL meets this criteria. Steinberg (2010) describes it as a loose collection of political
organizations and strong men unified only by their opposition to foreign occupation and
left-of-center political views.
The second key difference between Shan and Arakan is the robust drug trade in the
former. A major reason why the KMT selected Shan State as a base of operations was the
opportunity to reap profits from the opium trade (Cowell 2005). After the KMT was forced
out of the region, Shan rebels largely filled this role. The emergence of at least one of the
splinter organizations in the conflict is clearly related to the drug trade. The Shan United
Revolutionary Army split from the SSA to focus on controlling drug production, rather
than political goals. While I include a measure of lootable resources in my quantitative
analyses which is not significant, the Shan case suggests that under certain conditions
resources can provoke splintering.
5.5 Conclusion
In this chapter I test whether my theory extends to the realignment of existing rebels. As
they often depend heavily on them for material, rebels should respond to the increased
ethnic identification of dissident civilians in the wake of repression. Repression should be
associated with increased instances of both splintering and alliance formations, as rebels
reorganize around ethnic identity.
Due in part to the rarity of both categories of events, the statistical results in this chapter
are not as robust as in previous chapters. Still, the findings are consistent with the theory
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that repression triggers a cycle of reorganization around ethnic identity among rebels. I
find that repression substantially increases the probability that existing rebel groups will
splinter, as I predict inH6. Contrary to my expectation inH7, however, multi-ethnic groups
are not more prone to this phenomenon than others. I also do not find support for H8,
which predicts that splinter organizations should be likelier than others to draw support
from a single ethnic group. A qualitative analysis of the Shan separatist movement in
Burma suggests that my proposed mechanism does occur. However, it appears that there
are other pathways to splintering that my current set of control variables do not capture.
The results in my analysis of alliance formation are somewhat more favorable to my theory.
Consistent with H9, I find that repression is associated with an increased probability of
new mono-ethnic alliances. While I do not find the hypothesized negative relationship
between repression and multi-ethnic alliances (H10), the relationship is null, suggesting
that the two categories of alliances do emerge from different processes.
These results suggest that repression can trigger a realignment of existing rebel organiza-
tions around ethnic identity, though the robustness of the results is limited by the fact that
both splintering and alliance formation are rare outcomes, and several other pathways to
these outcomes appear to exist. Still, my proposed causal chain in this portion of the theory
is rather long, with rebels responding to the way in which civilians respond to repression.
To find significant results at all is perhaps surprising. Especially counterintuitive is the fact
that both splintering and certain types of alliance formation are both related to repression.
This suggests that repression does not necessarily alter the aggregate number of rebel
groups in a conflict, but does reconfigure them. This contrasts with existing conceptions of
rebel movement structure, which tend to view conflicts as trending consistently toward
greater fragmentation or greater integration of rebels, but not both simultaneously (e.g.




Why do some conflicts have multiple rebel groups, while in other cases dissidents form a
single, cohesive group? As I discuss in Chapter 1, the importance of this question has been
well established. Civil wars with multiple rebel groups last longer than others (Cunning-
ham 2006; Akcinaroglu 2012), are less likely to end in a peace agreement (Cunningham,
Gleditsch, and Salehyan 2009), have more bases on which conflict could recur (Atlas and
Licklider 1999), and produce more fatalities. In short, civil wars with multiple rebel groups
tend to be among the most severe conflicts. Yet we know little about the causes of such
structures. No existing work addresses the formation of new rebel groups during con-
flicts, and existing work on the splintering and merging of existing rebel groups produces
somewhat contradictory findings (see for example Christia’s (2012) focus on power versus
Staniland’s (2014) emphasis on social structure). My dissertation seeks to fill this gap in
the literature.
In Chapter 2 I articulate a theoretical framework of rebel movement politics from which I
derive predictions about rebel movement structure. I start from the assumption that rebel
groups are drawn from a broader pool of dissidents, which includes peaceful activists in
addition to combatants. The loyalty of this dissident pool should be crucially important to
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most rebel groups as a source of material support, recruits, and political leverage. Rebel
groups thus have an incentive to be responsive to these individuals. Failure to represent the
interests of these non-violent dissidents will leave a rebel group vulnerable to competition.
New recruits may look to form a new rebel group rather than joining an existing one, and
entrepreneurial members of existing rebel groups may form splinter organizations in hopes
of capturing the supporters of their previous organization. Thus it is the interaction of the
preferences of ordinary dissidents and the decisions of rebel elites that determines rebel
movement structure.
One circumstance in which rebel elites may fail to adequately adapt to constituent prefer-
ences is the onset of repression. The threat of physical violence should increase the risk of
being a non-violent dissident, and in turn decrease the relative risk of fighting. This should
lead some individuals who previously declined to participate in rebellion to take up arms.
This influx of new recruits will not always be a boon to existing rebel groups, however.
Repression should also tend to induce greater levels of ethnic identification, as repression
is often targeted disproportionately at certain ethnic groups, ethnic groups often have
militias and political organizations that make them a useful basis for organizing defense
against repression, and appeals to co-ethnic states is often an effective means of securing
external support. Thus existing rebel groups may struggle to win over these new recruits or
even maintain their existing support, unless they happen to already place strong emphasis
on ethnic identity. Otherwise, new organizations making more credible ethnicity-based
appeals are likely to attract the new recruits and steal civilian support from existing rebel
groups. Repression should therefore be associated with both the formation of entirely
new rebel groups, and of organizations that splinter from existing rebel groups. To offset
the loss of capability that results from splintering, rebels should be open to alliances and
mergers with co-ethnic groups. In short, repression should lead rebel movements to both
grow and reorganize around ethnic identity.
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I test themicro-level foundations of this theory in Chapter 3 using data from the Afrobarom-
eter survey. Consistent with my expectations, I find that individuals who have experienced
an attack are more likely than others to express willingness to participate in violence, and to have
participated in violence, and are also more likely to identify with their ethnic group rather than
their nation. Greater levels of repression at the national level are also associated with
higher probabilities of ethnic identification. The results hold after performing coarsened
exact matching, suggesting that there are not systematic observable differences between
individuals who have been attacked and individuals who have not.
In Chapter 4 I examine the formation of new rebel groups during ongoing conflicts. As
I predict, the probability that new groups will enter a conflict increases in response to increases
in repression. Adding support for my theory is the finding that the rebel groups which join
ongoing conflicts are more likely than others to draw their support from a single ethnic group. This
suggests that the link between repression and the formation of new groups is in fact related
to ethnic identity, rather than some alternative process. Contrary to my expectations, the
ethnic diversity of a country does not limit the scope of my theory— new rebel groups form
even at relatively high and low levels of ethnic diversity. I supplement these quantitative
findings with a qualitative case study of the separatist movements in Burma. The initiation
of the separatist movement in Shan State strongly supports my theory, as the rebellion
emerged after a wave of abuses by government forces, and placed a strong emphasis on
Shan identity. TheArakan case suggests several nuances, most notably the ability of religion
to create divisions within ethnic groups.
I test my predictions regarding splintering and alliance formation among existing rebel
groups in Chapter 5. Consistent with my hypotheses, I find that increases in repression are
associated with an increased risk of splintering for existing rebel groups, though the relationship
is not completely robust. I also find that repression increases the probability of ethnically-
homogeneous alliances forming, while it does not have the hypothesized negative relationship
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with the formation of multi-ethnic alliances. To assess the relative importance of splintering
and alliance formation, I combine the processes in a single model, finding that repression
substantially increases the probability that multiple rebel groups will be present. I do not find
evidence for my prediction that splinter organizations should be more likely than others to
draw their support from a single ethnic group. Burma again provides qualitative evidence
in support of my theory, as the formation of the Shan State Independence Army appears to
have been driven by a desire to provide stronger representation for the Shan ethnic group.
The formation of alliances among the Shan rebels in response to a counterinsurgency
campaign provides further support for my framework.
Generally the results are strongest among low-intensity conflicts over the central govern-
ment, and in many cases are not statistically significant among conflict-years with greater
than 1,000 fatalities nor among secessionist conflicts. The latter result is not entirely surpris-
ing in light of my theory. As I expect the presence of multiple rebel groups to generally be
the product of combatants organizing around ethnicity or other highly-salient sub-national
identities, it makes sense that such processes would be uncommon among secessionist
movements as they tend to be homogenous on such dimensions. I thus view the null
findings for secessionist movements as an indiction that the scope of my theory is limited
to conflicts in which there is diversity within the rebel movement, and not as evidence that
the theory is altogether false. It is less obvious why the finings would not hold among wars.
One possibility is that there is an omitted variable related to opportunity. During periods
of intense fighting, it may be difficult for non-violent dissidents to mobilize new rebel
groups, and doing so is likely less attractive during such phases of the conflict. Similarly,
splintering and realigning may be especially risky during heavy fighting, and more likely





The central implication of this research is that repression can trigger a sectarian spiral,
whereby previously non-violent individuals join the fighting, and existing rebels reorganize
around ethnic identity. I find that repression increases the number of new rebel groups,
splinter organizations, and ethnically-homogeneous alliances. Given the rarity of the latter,
it is safe to assume that in most conflicts, repression increases the total number of rebel
groups.1 The level of repression against civilians explains a substantial portion of the
variation in the number of rebel groups in a conflict, and I find multiple forms of evidence
suggesting that the mechanism is related to increased ethnic identification.
This conclusion contrasts with some prominent existing works. Christia (2012) argues that
rebel realignments are a function of the distribution of power between rebel coalitions and
the government. When rebels are weaker than the government they will seek alliances.
When rebels are stronger, coalitions tend to fragment so as to minimize the members of
people with whom they must share private benefits. Her theory does not predict that
splintering and certain types of alliance formationwould be closely related, as I find them to
be. This also contrasts with Kalyvas and Kocher (2007), who expects that rebel movements
will generally become more cohesive over time. I show that the trend is contingent on
repression. While Christia (2012) does expect that ethnicity should form an important
component of the identity of new alliances, she believes such identities are deployed
instrumentally. My individual-level findings suggest that the members and supporters
of rebel groups may sincerely adopt such identities, however, suggesting that rebel elites
cannot switch identities at will as Christia expects. My findings are consistent with the
1A logit model (not reported) predicting which conflict years have multiple rebel groups without distin-
guishing between joiners, splinters, and alliances confirms this, as the level of repression is a strong predictor
of multiple groups.
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work of Lewis (2016), who argues that ethnicity is not important to the initial organization
of rebellion, but ethnic rebellions are disproportionately likely to thrive. The findings here
suggest that rebellions without a clear ethnic identity should be vulnerable to splintering
and losing recruits to new, more explicitly ethnic rival organizations.
My findings also contrast those of Staniland (2014), who views internal social structure
as the key determinant of rebel group cohesion. I find instead that an external factor,
government repression, plays a surprisingly large role in shaping rebel movement structure.
To some extent, however, this is a disagreement over the relative importance of the two
factors. Staniland (2014) essentially assumes that repression will occur, and seeks to explain
variation in resilience to it. Still, I find that repression is generally a strong predictor of
splintering, while organizational characteristics are not.
This research also suggests a strong connection between the preferences of rank-and-
file dissidents and the broader patterns of rebel organization. Existing work tends to
conceptualize rebel groups as the private armies of warlords (Christia 2012), who maintain
control either through personal loyalty or the provision of private benefits (Lichbach 1995;
Weinstein 2007). This viewpoint suggests that rebel elites have little need to be responsive to
their members. My findings that both individual preferences and rebel movement structure
respond to repression suggests that ordinary rebels do in fact have a consequential amount
of agency. When leaders fail to accommodate their preferences, rebel group members have
exit options in the formof splinter organizations and entirely new rebel groups. This implies
that there should be a surprising amount of accountability within rebel organizations. At
the same time, the formation of new rebel groups is not uncommon, suggesting that rebel
elites often fail to respond to their members.
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6.1.2 Policy
This research also has several implications for policymakers. First, my findings should aid
the policy community in forecasting the structure of rebel movements, and by extension
the severity of civil wars. If civilians face significant violent threats such as repression, the
efforts of entrepreneurial actors to promote ethnic or other sectarian identities are likely to
succeed. Repressed ethnic groups that are not already represented by existing rebel groups
will be likely to spawn new ones, existing rebel groups will be vulnerable to splintering,
and any alliances that form are likely to be among co-ethnic rebel groups. Generally, the
number of rebel groups should increase, and with it the severity of the conflict.
The understanding that rebel movement fragmentation is often driven by ethnic identity
also suggests predictions regarding the patterns of violence and challenges in peace ne-
gotiations. If civil wars take on many actors because rebels mobilize around a variety of
ethnicities, we might expect that there is some possibility for conflict between these rebel
groups. While existing work has established that conflicts with multiple rebel groups are
more severe than others, it has not explained why this is the case. Fighting between rebel
groups could account for the pattern. If ethnicity is central to rebel mobilization, it may
also become an important component of post-war negotiations. For example, rebel groups
might demand a certain number of legislative seats, or legal protections for their ethnic
group. The former creates the possibility of zero-sum bargaining between ethnic groups
over a finite amount of government power.
This work also suggests that governments facing rebellion might be well-served to refrain
from widespread repression, and instead target their counterinsurgency operations against
individuals who have already joined a rebel group to the greatest extent possible. This is so
because I show that repression increases individual willingness to participate in violence,
potentially expanding the recruiting pool for rebel groups. On the other hand, these new
recruits often form new rebel groups rather than joining existing ones, and repression
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can also provoke splintering in existing rebel groups. Thus while it enlarges the dissident
movement, repression also divides it. It is unclear whether this is a worthwhile trade-off
for governments. I propose further research on this question in the following section.
For outside states and the broader international community, the implications are clearer —
the increased severity associated with multiple rebel groups make them something to be
avoided. International actors should thus endeavor to protect civilians during civil wars.
While doing so has long been understood to be valuable from a humanitarian standpoint,
my work suggests that the potential for such policies to limit conflict severity should place
them in the self-interest neighboring states and any others likely to be affected by the
fighting. It should be noted, however, that interventions of this sort are not foolproof.
Notably, a UN effort to create a humanitarian zone in Srebrenica, Bosnia in 1995 actually
facilitated the massacre of the civilians gathered there. These sorts of humanitarian efforts
should thus only be undertaken with a sufficiently large deployment to ensure the security
of the civilians under protection.
6.2 Future Research
While this project makes significant progress toward explaining rebel movement structure,
numerous avenues for future research remain. These include both refinements to the
analyses I present here, as well as new analyses suggested by my results.
The group formation chapter raises important questions about government strategy. My
finding that repression tends to increase the number of rebel groups makes its use by gov-
ernments a puzzle. Future work should address the question of why, given that repression
increases the number of people willing to use violence, do governments elect to use it? It is
possible that repression has some hidden benefit that outweighs the cost of additional rebel
groups. My findings in Chapter 3 that repression is negatively related to voting suggests
146
one possible answers — governments are essentially accepting an increase in the level
of violence by dissidents in exchange for a reduction in the overall size of the dissident
movement. Relatedly, while repression increases the number of individuals willing to
use violence, it also provokes division among dissidents along ethnic lines. The latter
consequence might be sufficiently desirable as part of a divide-and-conquer strategy to
justify the former. Finally, the repression puzzle may be a result of incomplete information.
It could be the case the repression offers some possibility of total defeat of the dissident
movement, and governments accept the risk of inspiring new rebel groups in pursuit of
this outcome. In the Arab Spring, for example, Bahrain used repression to quickly put
down the opposition movement there. While the tactic backfired in Syria, the possibility of
an outcome similar to Bahrain may have made it a worthwhile gamble.
Additionally, other processes affecting rebel movement structure should be explored. I do
not claim to provide a complete account of rebel movement structure, but rather a proba-
bilistic theory of what I believe to be one of the most common pathways to multiple rebel
groups. Other factors undoubtedly operate in some cases. For example, many instances of
splintering occur not over ethnic lines, but over a divide between moderates who wish to
participate in a peace process, and hardliners who wish to continue fighting. While this
phenomenon has received some attention in the context of negotiating peace agreements
(Stedman 1997), there is little work that addresses the question of why and under what
conditions it occurs, nor the question of what implications this form of splintering has for
the type of violence that ensues. For example, are splinter groups more willing to target
civilians than others? I argue that attracting external support may be one reason for in-
creased ethnic identification following repression, but do not explore external sponsorship
in detail. In some cases external states may have a substantial amount of agency, however,
which merits greater attention. For example, the Gulf Cooperation Council has repeatedly
sought to establish an alliance of relatively moderate Sunni rebel groups in Syria. Future
research could ask: under what conditions do external actors aid co-ethnic rebel groups?
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Finally, future work should explore factors that run in the opposite direction, asking how
rebel groups attain cohesion. The Latin American rebellions are generally much more
cohesive than those in other regions. The explanation could relate to my theory, perhaps
being the result of more fluid ethnic identities than are seen in most parts of the world.
Alternatively, the explanation might involve the extreme levels of external sponsorship
seen during the Cold War, or some as-yet-undiscovered factor.
There are also several ways in which the research presented here could be improved. The
individual-level analysis could be refined on several dimensions in future work. One
limitation of the existing results is their inability to identify the source of repression. It
would be possible to make inferences about the likely perpetrator by matching the survey
results, which include the respondent’s city, to a geocoded dataset of battles, such as
ACLED (Raleigh 2012). If most of the violent events in a particular locale are perpetrated
by the government, it might be reasonable to assume that it is the source of most attacks on
individuals in that area. By contrast, this would not be a safe assumption in territory that
is clearly controlled by a rebel group. The use of an external conflict data source could also
address the issue of temporal ordering. The Afrobarometer data does not specify whether
individuals were attacked before or after they engaged in violence themselves. With
geocoded conflict data one could examine whether the average probability of participation
in violence or of ethnic identification in a geographic area changes after violent events there.
Finally, a more robust method of causal inference that can account for unobservable sources
of bias would enhance the validity of the results. While finding a valid instrument at the
individual level may be difficult, it should be possible to instrument for the country-level
human rights measure.
While general surveys such as the Afrobarometer provide useful data on individual at-
titudes toward violence and ethnicity, they do not provide tests of every element of my
theory. Original survey or experimental work exploring individual attitudes towards rebel
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groups would potentially strengthen my arguments regarding the connection between
individual attitudes and rebel movement structure. For instance, a finding that individuals
who experience repression from the government become less supportive of existing rebel
groups would provide strong support for my claim that dissident civilians are key drivers
of change to the configuration of the rebel movement.
The analysis of new rebel group formation could also benefit from several improvements.
Adding a causal inference technique to the analysis would greatly enhance the validity
of the results. While I did not find oil revenue to be a viable instrumental variable, it is
possible that a suitable proxy for repression exists, such as colonial history. An alternative
option could be panel data techniques that facilitate causal inference without the need for
exogenous instruments (Kim and Frees 2007). A more detailed analysis of the attributes of
the rebel groups that join ongoing conflicts could also lend further support tomy theoretical
framework. While the finding that joining groups are more likely than others to draw
support from a single ethnic group lends credibility to my argument, an examination of
the platform and recruiting appeals of these groups could strengthen the argument that
group formation is motivated by a desire to place greater emphasis on ethnic identity.
Relatedly, the relationships between newly formed rebel groups and others should be
explored. Enhanced ethnic identification might lead to conflict between rebel groups of
differing ethnicities. Alternatively, competition for civilian support might produce conflict
between co-ethnic rebel groups.
The analysis of rebel group realignment also has room for improvement. While the findings
for both splintering and alliance formation are mostly consistent with my predictions, the
results are less robust than would be ideal. This is likely due in part to the rarity of both
outcomes. This could likely be remedied, however, as the current analysis only looks at the
most extreme instances of splintering and merging — those which result in the formation
of new rebel organizations with distinct names. A less extreme, and likely more prevalent
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form of splintering is the loss of membership, either to rival rebel groups, or to desertion.
While this phenomenon would be quite difficult to measure for the entire post-WorldWar II
sample, it may be possible to track changes in rebel groupmembership for a smaller sample
of conflicts. With respect to alliances, I consider only cases where formerly independent
rebel groups merge to a significant degree. There are undoubtedly many instances of
meaningful cooperation between rebel groups that fall short of formal integration. Indeed,
a forthcoming data project (Asal and Rethemeyer 2015) should facilitate analysis of such
behavior. Including these less extreme examples of splintering and alliance formation
should mitigate concerns about the rarity of these outcomes. The concerns from the group
formation chapter also apply, as this analysis would benefit from a causal inference strategy
and closer inspection of the rationale that rebel elites use to justify the creation of their new
groups.
Finally, the severity of conflicts that experience this cycle of increased ethnic identification
suggests a need for research on ways to reverse the process. Increased sectarianism can
increase conflict severity, and as we have seen in places such as Afghanistan and the
Democratic Republic of the Congo, can hinder the prospects for lasting peace. Preventing
repression is an obvious policy recommendation of this research. Yet, that is more easily
said than done, and is of little use in cases where it has already occurred. The most
commonly cited factor that can increase national unity is external conflict (Tilly 1992; Gibler,
Hutchison, and Miller 2012). Obviously, however, this is not a tenable solution. A few
studies have suggested that economic development might promote national identities at
the expense of ethnic ones (Miguel 2004), but much more research is needed in this area.
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Appendix A Supplementary Materials
A.1 Supplementary Materials for Chapter 2
Coding Rules for Rebel Origin Data
I collect data on the origins of rebel groups. The information is drawn from a variety
of sources including news articles, secondary sources such as conflict histories, and
the Uppsala Conflict Data Program Encyclopedia. As it is often difficult to discern the
origins of rank-and-file members, I code group origins on the basis of their leadership.
Whatever social role the leaders of a rebel group had prior to their participation in the
group constitutes its origin. If rebel leaders came from multiple backgrounds, I attempt
to discern the largest source. However, if any rebel leaders came from another rebel
organization, the group is coded as a splinter or alliance.
The categories of origin groups were derived inductively, so as to exhaustively capture
all real world possibilities. The categories are meant to be descriptive, and allow for
maximum flexibility rather than imposing a particular theoretical framework on the
data. The categories are described below:
• Splinter These organizations emerge from pre-existing rebel groups, and differ from
their predecessor in structure (i.e. a group that simply changes its name or objectives
would not be coded as a new group). All groups coded as splinter organizations by
UCDP are included here, as well as several others I identify. Most splinter organi-
zations are factions of existing rebel groups that deliberately choose to break away
and form a separate group (e.g. Red Flag faction of the Communist Party of Burma),
though a few were expelled by the parent organization. Also included are groups
that form from the remnants of rebel groups who were recently inactive due to defeat
or demobilization, yet do not replicate the parent organization to such an extent as to
be a direct continuation.
• AllianceThese organizations are coalitions of two ormore pre-existing violent groups.
All groups coded by UCDP as alliances are placed in this category, as well as many
other not identified by UCDP. Groups that were inactive for a period before the
current round of fighting are considered alliances.
• Militia Militias are groups that are armed but have few or no political aims. In
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practice, this means groups that were previously violent, but do not appear in a
UCDP conflict against the government. Most often these groups form to defend an
ethnic group or community, but previously had no aims beyond that.
• Regime Military Faction Military factions are a portion of the state’s armed forces
acting against their own government without authorization. The vast majority of
coup attempts derive from military factions, but a substantial number of sustained
rebellions do as well. Military commanders who leave the government and recruit
soldiers from outside the military are also included here. I consider cases where a
government official uses government forces to challenge for control of the regime a
coup, while a government official using non-governmental forces is a rebellion.
• Civilian Government These organizations have leadership who previously served
in the government. In some cases the rank-and-file of these groups may come from
the government as well, for instance if the police turn against the government. In
other cases government leaders mobilize their party or other social connections to
build a rebel group. Regional governments that initiate secessionist movements are
also included here.
• Political Party Political parties are defined broadly here. Any organization that
has clear political aims but is not initially violent is included. Organizations that
produce programmatic platforms and contest elections are unsurprisingly included.
However, as many civil wars occur under regimes that are not particularly democratic,
participation in elections is not a requisite for this category. Some groups attempt to
run in elections and resort to arms after being barred from doing so. Others, including
many Communist parties, have most of the attributes of a political party but turn
violent without first attempting to work through non-violent channels. Neither is a
broad platform required; special interest/advocacy groups focusing on a narrow set
of issues are also included. However, single-issue organizations advocating secession
are placed in a separate category.
• Religious Organization Organizations that primarily exist to promote a certain re-
ligion are coded as religious organizations. These differ from political parties with
religious platforms in that they generally include clergy or individuals claiming
religious authority in a less formal capacity, and running candidates in elections is
at most a secondary consideration. The Muslim Brotherhood is an exemplar of this
category.
• Foreign Sponsorship In a few cases rebel groups emerged through the actions of
an outside state, rather than from an organization within a country. This category
includes cases in which rebel elites received training in a foreign country, and cases
where an outside government played the predominant role in organizing individuals
into a rebel group.
• Student Organization Student organizations are relatively self-explanatory. They
generally originate on university campuses, and draw a majority of their members
from the student population.
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• Transnational Organization Transnational organizations are non-state actors that
originated in a different state, and played a crucial role in establishing the rebel group.
In some cases this entails directly establishing a chapter of the organization in a new
country, as is the case for al-Qaeda cells. This category also includes cases where
fighters from one conflict move into a neighboring country and continue fighting
there.
• Economic Organization These organizations originally existed for economic pur-
poses, broadly defined. This primarily includes criminal organizations and labor
unions.
• Protests A small number of rebel groups are not traceable to any pre-existing organi-
zation. Instead, they seem to be the result of protesters or rioters banding together to
form a rebellion through a very organic process.
A.2 Supplementary Materials for Chapter 3
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Responses by Country
Country Wave 6 Wave 5 Wave 4 Wave 3
Algeria 1200 1204 0 0
Benin 1200 1200 1200 1198
Botswana 1200 1200 1200 1200
Burkina Faso 1200 1200 1200 0
Burundi 1200 1200 0 0
Cameroon 1182 1200 0 0
Cape Verde 1200 1208 1264 1256
Cote d’Ivoire 1199 1200 0 0
Egypt 1198 1190 0 0
Gabon 1198 0 0 0
Ghana 2400 2400 1200 1197
Guinea 1200 1200 0 0
Kenya 2397 2399 1104 1278
Lesotho 1200 1197 1200 1161
Liberia 1199 1199 1200 0
Madagascar 1200 1200 1350 1350
Malawi 2400 2407 1200 1200
Mali 1200 1200 1232 1244
Mauritius 1200 1200 0 0
Morocco 1200 1196 0 0
Mozambique 2400 2400 1200 1198
Namibia 1200 1200 1200 1200
Niger 1200 1199 0 0
Nigeria 2400 2400 2324 2363
São Tomé and Príncipe 1196 0 0 0
Senegal 1200 1200 1200 1200
Sierra Leone 1191 1190 0 0
South Africa 2390 2399 2400 2400
Sudan 1200 1199 0 0
Swaziland 1200 1200 0 0
Tanzania 2386 2400 1208 1304
Togo 1200 1200 0 0
Tunisia 1200 1200 0 0
Uganda 2400 2400 2431 2400
Zambia 1199 1200 1200 1200
Zimbabwe 2400 2400 1200 1048
Table A.1: Survey Responses by Country and Wave
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Ordinal Models
M1 Violence (Used) M2 Ethnic ID
Human Rights 0.06 −0.31∗∗∗
(0.22) (0.07)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization −0.11 5.23∗∗
(2.53) (1.95)




Civil War −0.19 0.25∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.04)


















Log Likelihood -15231.43 -78284.32
AIC 30502.85 156608.63
BIC 30673.86 156789.50
Num. obs. 38191 62522
Groups (Ethnic) 452 595
Groups (Country) 26 27
Variance: Ethnic: (Intercept) 0.30 0.19
Variance: Country: (Intercept) 0.32 0.33
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.2: Multilevel Ordinal Models of Attitudes Toward Violence and Ethnic Identity
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A.3 Supplementary Materials for Chapter 4
Group Formation by Conflict Severity
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Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
(Intercept) −3.34∗∗∗ 6.87 6.90 5.12
(0.16) (3.52) (3.53) (20303.10)
Change in Human Rights −1.44∗∗∗ −1.61∗∗ −2.23 −2.12∗∗
(0.40) (0.56) (1.48) (0.77)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 0.06 0.20
(0.99) (1.05)
Human Rights X Fractionalization 1.08
(2.42)
Prev. Multi-rebel 0.19 0.20 −1.08∗
(0.47) (0.47) (0.46)




Logged Area −0.23 −0.23
(0.22) (0.22)
Mountainous Terrain −0.01 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Logged GDP per capita −0.27 −0.27
(0.27) (0.27)




Post Cold War −0.39 −0.39
(0.46) (0.46)
Lootable Resource Sites 0.00 0.00
(0.01) (0.01)
AIC 371.11 226.33 228.13 469.30
BIC 381.29 287.29 293.78 1071.29
Log Likelihood -183.55 -100.16 -100.06 -114.65
Deviance 367.11 200.33 200.13 229.30
Num. obs. 1202 804 804 1115
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.3: Logit Models of Rebel Group Formation (Conflict-Years with < 1000 Fatalities)
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Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8
(Intercept) −3.07∗∗∗ 3.78 0.63 50.69
(0.25) (5.74) (6.49) (20670.34)
Change in Human Rights −1.20∗ −1.25 −14.67∗ −1.16
(0.60) (0.74) (5.80) (1.08)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 0.35 2.45
(2.10) (2.52)
Human Rights X Fractionalization 21.39∗
(8.86)
Prev. Multi-rebel 0.13 0.13 −0.74
(0.75) (0.77) (0.66)




Logged Area −0.50 −0.18
(0.38) (0.43)
Mountainous Terrain 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Logged GDP per capita −0.79 −0.95
(0.55) (0.59)




Post Cold War 0.08 0.52
(0.71) (0.77)
Lootable Resource Sites −0.01 −0.00
(0.02) (0.02)
AIC 153.22 107.02 101.09 208.64
BIC 161.18 153.55 151.21 453.99
Log Likelihood -74.61 -40.51 -36.54 -41.32
Deviance 149.22 81.02 73.09 82.64
Num. obs. 395 265 265 363
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.4: Logit Models of Rebel Group Formation (Conflict-Years with > 1000 Fatalities)
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Group Formation by Conflict Type
Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
(Intercept) −2.78∗∗∗ 4.87 4.56 67.43
(0.16) (3.59) (3.68) (8748.94)
Change in Human Rights −1.37∗∗∗ −1.81∗∗ −4.04∗ −1.98∗∗
(0.37) (0.57) (1.57) (0.69)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 0.27 0.93
(1.03) (1.15)
Human Rights X Fractionalization 4.13
(2.57)
Intensity Level −0.28 −0.32 −0.48
(0.43) (0.44) (0.47)
Prev. Multi-rebel 0.19 0.20 −0.82∗
(0.43) (0.43) (0.40)
Contiguous Civil War −0.13 −0.13 0.39∗
(0.12) (0.13) (0.18)
Logged Area 0.00 0.01
(0.21) (0.21)
Mountainous Terrain 0.01 0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
Logged GDP per capita −0.70∗ −0.69∗
(0.31) (0.31)




Post Cold War −0.40 −0.36
(0.43) (0.44)
Lootable Resource Sites −0.02 −0.01
(0.01) (0.01)
AIC 354.98 231.21 230.42 358.27
BIC 364.25 285.50 288.88 631.67
Log Likelihood -175.49 -102.61 -101.21 -119.13
Deviance 350.98 205.21 202.42 238.27
Num. obs. 760 481 481 704
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.5: Logit Models of Rebel Group Formation (Central Govt Conflicts Only)
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Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16
(Intercept) −4.08∗∗∗ 165.86 225.28 −113.00
(0.27) (126.59) (2935.87) (9945.68)
Change in Human Rights 0.36 −2.16 −2.48 0.29
(1.48) (2.78) (6.04) (1.79)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization −49.52
(1369.31)
Human Rights X Fractionalization 1.39
(21.37)
Intensity Level 0.02 −0.05 1.80
(1.23) (1.26) (1.31)
Prev. Multi-rebel −0.67 −0.52 −2.10∗
(1.20) (1.18) (0.98)
Contiguous Civil War −0.21 −0.26 −0.04
(0.41) (0.40) (0.25)
Logged Area −13.94 −18.96
(10.30) (280.41)
Mountainous Terrain −0.05 0.39
(0.13) (14.02)
Logged GDP per capita −2.26 −0.59
(2.19) (2.81)




Post Cold War 1.05 1.16
(1.54) (1.53)
Lootable Resource Sites 0.38 0.75
(0.31) (10.96)
AIC 146.24 86.28 89.43 227.51
BIC 155.70 138.80 150.70 567.07
Log Likelihood -71.12 -31.14 -30.72 -40.75
Deviance 142.24 62.28 61.43 81.51
Num. obs. 837 588 588 774
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.6: Logit Models of Rebel Group Formation (Secessionist Conflicts Only)
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Group Composition by Conflict Severity
M17 Monoethnic M19 Multiethnic M19 Nonethnic
(Intercept) 0.18 −4.57∗∗∗ 0.05
(0.32) (0.91) (0.34)
Joiner 0.61 −0.87 −0.41
(0.35) (0.69) (0.39)
Secessionist 1.24∗∗∗ −1.15 −1.00∗
(0.34) (0.60) (0.39)
Previously Active 0.25 0.37 −0.60
(0.39) (0.56) (0.49)
Ethnlinguistic Fractionalization 0.02 3.36∗∗ −1.12∗
(0.50) (1.20) (0.55)
Transnational 0.22 0.82 −0.67∗
(0.28) (0.48) (0.33)
AIC 323.06 143.25 274.83
BIC 344.54 164.73 296.31
Log Likelihood -155.53 -65.62 -131.41
Deviance 311.06 131.25 262.83
Num. obs. 265 265 265
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.7: Logit Models of Rebel Group Ethnic Composition (Conflict-Years with < 1000
Fatalities)
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M20 Monoethnic M21 Multiethnic M22 Nonethnic
(Intercept) 0.23 −2.37∗ −0.45
(0.64) (1.02) (0.72)
Joiner 16.75 −16.91 −16.64
(1551.69) (2460.43) (2537.11)
Secessionist 0.61 −0.98 0.14
(0.73) (0.97) (0.97)
Previously Active −1.38 1.35 1.28
(1.14) (1.39) (1.36)
Ethnlinguistic Fractionalization 1.77 −0.64 −2.57
(1.25) (1.59) (1.68)
Transnational −0.88 2.11∗ −0.79
(0.69) (1.00) (0.94)
AIC 73.63 53.60 52.14
BIC 86.00 65.97 64.50
Log Likelihood -30.82 -20.80 -20.07
Deviance 61.63 41.60 40.14
Num. obs. 58 58 58
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.8: Logit Models of Rebel Group Ethnic Composition (Conflict-Years with > 1000
Fatalities)
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Group Composition by Conflict Type
M23 Monoethnic M24 Multiethnic M25 Nonethnic
(Intercept) 0.22 −3.62∗∗∗ −0.13
(0.30) (0.67) (0.32)
Joiner 0.79∗ −1.06 −0.51
(0.36) (0.66) (0.40)
Previously Active −0.16 0.42 −0.06
(0.42) (0.56) (0.49)
Ethnlinguistic Fractionalization 0.23 2.06∗ −1.16∗
(0.50) (0.94) (0.55)
Transnational 0.10 0.98∗ −0.71∗
(0.30) (0.45) (0.35)
AIC 295.09 149.52 249.65
BIC 312.08 166.51 266.64
Log Likelihood -142.54 -69.76 -119.82
Deviance 285.09 139.52 239.65
Num. obs. 221 221 221
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.9: Logit Models of Rebel Group Ethnic Composition (Central Govt Conflicts Only)
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M26 Monoethnic M27 Multiethnic M28 Nonethnic
(Intercept) 1.27 −5.03∗∗ −0.68
(0.85) (1.79) (0.95)
Joiner −0.27 −15.54 0.63
(0.90) (2225.88) (0.92)
Previously Active 1.31 −0.04 −16.66
(1.08) (1.17) (1605.88)
Ethnlinguistic Fractionalization 0.30 2.06 −1.59
(1.22) (2.15) (1.46)
Transnational −0.04 1.55 −0.70
(0.53) (1.13) (0.65)
AIC 102.78 51.33 76.66
BIC 115.90 64.46 89.78
Log Likelihood -46.39 -20.67 -33.33
Deviance 92.78 41.33 66.66
Num. obs. 102 102 102
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.10: Logit Models of Rebel Group Ethnic Composition (Secessionist Conflicts Only)
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A.4 Supplementary Material for Chapter 5
Splintering by Conflict Type
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Change in Human Rights −2.79 −5.17∗ −3.44
(1.82) (2.30) (2.11)




















Stronger than Gov. 0.97
(1.32)
AIC 98.68 37.12 78.12
R2 0.00 0.02 0.01
Max. R2 0.10 0.05 0.09
Num. events 12 4 9
Num. obs. 968 683 900
Missings 393 678 461
PH test 0.00 0.00 0.61
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table A.11: Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Rebel Group Splintering (Central Govt
Conflicts Only)
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Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Change in Human Rights −3.00† −3.30 −3.28∗
(1.63) (2.56) (1.62)





















AIC 47.13 56.15 41.44
R2 0.00 0.01 0.01
Max. R2 0.05 0.05 0.05
Num. events 8 8 8
Num. obs. 940 816 840
Missings 356 480 456
PH test 1.00 1.00 1.00
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table A.12: Cox Proportional Hazard Models of Rebel Group Splintering (Secessionist
Conflicts Only)
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Splinter Group Ethnicity by Conflict Type
M7Monoethnic M8 Multiethnic M9 Nonethnic
(Intercept) 0.18 −3.65∗∗∗ −0.05
(0.30) (0.67) (0.32)
Splinter 0.68 0.27 −1.25
(0.51) (0.66) (0.65)
Joiner 0.87∗ −1.05 −0.61
(0.37) (0.67) (0.41)
Previously Active −0.49 0.25 0.51
(0.50) (0.66) (0.57)
Ethnlinguistic Fractionalization 0.18 2.08∗ −1.14∗
(0.51) (0.94) (0.56)
Transnational 0.07 1.00∗ −0.70∗
(0.30) (0.45) (0.36)
AIC 294.25 150.68 247.09
BIC 314.61 171.04 267.45
Log Likelihood -141.12 -69.34 -117.54
Deviance 282.25 138.68 235.09
Num. obs. 220 220 220
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.13: Logit Models of Rebel Group Ethnic Composition (Central Govt Conflicts Only)
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M10 Monoethnic M11 Multiethnic M12 Nonethnic
(Intercept) 1.29 −5.12∗∗ −0.64
(0.85) (1.77) (0.95)
Splinter −0.26 1.04 −0.60
(0.70) (0.95) (1.13)
Joiner −0.32 −15.24 0.53
(0.91) (2241.35) (0.94)
Previously Active 1.46 −0.56 −16.33
(1.15) (1.25) (1604.27)
Ethnlinguistic Fractionalization 0.27 1.98 −1.54
(1.22) (2.12) (1.46)
Transnational 0.03 1.34 −0.64
(0.54) (1.14) (0.67)
AIC 104.23 52.11 78.06
BIC 119.92 67.80 93.75
Log Likelihood -46.12 -20.06 -33.03
Deviance 92.23 40.11 66.06
Num. obs. 101 101 101
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.14: Logit Models of Rebel Group Ethnic Composition (Secessionist Conflicts Only)
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Alliance Formation by Conflict Intensity
M13 Mono-ethnic M14 Multi-ethnic M15 All
(Intercept) 1.36 −5.41 2.46
(4.62) (27.55) (3.17)
Change in Human Rights −1.71∗ 0.09 −1.47∗
(0.83) (3.05) (0.66)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 0.23 32.86 0.44
(1.43) (48.98) (1.10)
Prev. Multi-rebel −0.71 −0.23 0.06
(1.18) (1.81) (0.62)
Contiguous Civil War −0.05 0.86 −0.13
(0.22) (0.90) (0.19)
Logged GDP per capita −0.25 −0.25 −0.44
(0.42) (1.29) (0.30)
Logged Population −0.37 −2.66 −0.28
(0.33) (2.71) (0.24)
Polity −0.04 0.37 0.01
(0.06) (0.26) (0.04)
AIC 109.48 35.86 166.05
BIC 152.71 79.10 209.29
Log Likelihood -45.74 -8.93 -74.02
Deviance 91.48 17.86 148.05
Num. obs. 901 902 902
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table A.15: Rare Events Logit Models of Alliance Formation (Conflict-Years with < 1000
Fatalities Only)
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M16 Mono-ethnic M17 Multi-ethnic M18 All
(Intercept) −1.57 17.00 0.16
(6.88) (32.36) (6.74)
Change in Human Rights 0.09 −1.22 −0.61
(2.01) (1.72) (1.44)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 1.39 −3.73 2.84
(2.71) (17.46) (2.76)
Prev. Multi-rebel 0.06 0.58 0.45
(1.17) (1.55) (0.79)
Contiguous Civil War 0.12 0.19 0.08
(0.23) (0.82) (0.19)
Logged GDP per capita −0.46 −0.60 −0.54
(0.63) (3.07) (0.60)
Logged Population 0.08 −1.10 −0.18
(0.54) (2.29) (0.49)
Polity 0.02 0.08 −0.04
(0.10) (1.90) (0.11)
AIC 65.67 36.54 84.40
BIC 99.24 70.11 117.97
Log Likelihood -23.84 -9.27 -33.20
Deviance 47.67 18.54 66.40
Num. obs. 308 308 308
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table A.16: Rare Events Logit Models of Alliance Formation (Conflict-Years with > 1000
Fatalities Only)
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Alliance Formation by Conflict Type
M19 Mono-ethnic M20 Multi-ethnic M21 All
(Intercept) −5.22 1.66 −0.70
(5.92) (13.00) (3.77)
Change in Human Rights −1.37† −0.96 −0.93
(0.82) (1.16) (0.63)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 1.71 7.91 1.24
(1.87) (10.50) (1.13)
Intensity Level 0.40 0.31 0.09
(0.74) (0.94) (0.52)
Prev. Multi-rebel −0.17 0.10 0.48
(0.86) (0.89) (0.52)
Contiguous Civil War −0.01 −0.07 −0.09
(0.22) (0.29) (0.16)
Logged GDP per capita 0.06 −1.11 −0.23
(0.51) (1.10) (0.34)
Logged Population −0.07 −0.43 −0.20
(0.41) (0.81) (0.28)
Polity −0.07 0.01 −0.03
(0.09) (0.11) (0.05)
AIC 96.23 68.48 162.22
BIC 139.11 111.38 205.10
Log Likelihood -38.11 -24.24 -71.11
Deviance 76.23 48.48 142.22
Num. obs. 538 539 538
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table A.17: Rare Events Logit Models of Alliance Formation (Central Govt Conflicts Only)
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M22 Mono-ethnic M23 All
(Intercept) 4.59 2.38
(8.60) (5.79)
Change in Human Rights −2.62 −2.02
(2.02) (1.39)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization −0.58 −0.79
(3.24) (2.32)
Intensity Level 0.32 0.04
(1.14) (1.15)
Contiguous Civil War 0.12 −0.09
(0.29) (0.25)
Logged GDP per capita −0.47 −0.69
(0.60) (0.54)






Log Likelihood -30.79 -36.52
Deviance 61.58 73.03
Num. obs. 671 672
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05, †p < 0.1
Table A.18: Rare Events Logit Models of Alliance Formation (Secessionist Conflicts Only)
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Combined Processes by Conflict Intensity
M24 M25 M26
(Intercept) −2.74 −2.40 −2.23
(1.68) (1.72) (1.65)




Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization −0.82 −5.44∗∗∗ −5.02∗∗
(0.52) (1.58) (1.56)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization2 5.15∗∗ 4.60∗∗
(1.67) (1.65)
Prev. Multi-rebel 3.30∗∗∗ 3.25∗∗∗ 3.13∗∗∗
(0.23) (0.24) (0.23)
Contiguous Civil War −0.21∗ −0.18∗ −0.11
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Logged GDP per capita −0.00 0.05 0.04
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Logged Population −0.04 −0.14 −0.22
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Logged Area 0.09 0.14 0.12
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Post Cold War 0.22 0.13 0.25
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
AIC 544.00 536.48 566.62
BIC 596.35 593.59 624.86
Log Likelihood -261.00 -256.24 -271.31
Deviance 522.00 512.48 542.62
Num. obs. 862 862 947
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.19: Logit Models of Multi-Rebel Conflict-Years (< 1000 Fatalities Only)
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M27 M28 M29
(Intercept) −1.44 −1.35 −2.24
(3.16) (3.14) (3.12)




Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 1.09 −2.51 1.51
(1.14) (4.63) (4.31)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization2 3.53 −0.25
(4.38) (4.14)
Prev. Multi-rebel 3.83∗∗∗ 3.78∗∗∗ 3.61∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.45) (0.43)
Contiguous Civil War −0.09 −0.08 −0.13
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Logged GDP per capita −0.25 −0.27 −0.17
(0.28) (0.28) (0.28)
Logged Population 0.13 0.09 −0.03
(0.33) (0.34) (0.32)
Logged Area −0.15 −0.08 −0.12
(0.25) (0.27) (0.26)
Post Cold War 0.70 0.65 0.79
(0.47) (0.47) (0.45)
AIC 184.51 185.86 199.57
BIC 224.49 229.48 243.89
Log Likelihood -81.25 -80.93 -87.78
Deviance 162.51 161.86 175.57
Num. obs. 280 280 297
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.20: Logit Models of Multi-Rebel Conflict-Years (> 1000 Fatalities Only)
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Combined Processes by Conflict Type
M30 M31 M32
(Intercept) −4.68∗ −5.00∗∗ −5.00∗∗
(1.86) (1.90) (1.76)




Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization 0.19 −5.63∗∗ −5.14∗
(0.55) (2.08) (2.01)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization2 6.26∗∗ 5.63∗∗
(2.16) (2.07)
Intensity Level 0.17 0.28 0.11
(0.29) (0.30) (0.29)
Prev. Multi-rebel 3.04∗∗∗ 2.96∗∗∗ 2.77∗∗∗
(0.25) (0.26) (0.25)
Contiguous Civil War −0.21∗ −0.21∗ −0.15
(0.09) (0.09) (0.08)
Logged GDP per capita 0.05 0.16 0.21
(0.17) (0.18) (0.18)
Logged Population 0.12 0.06 −0.04
(0.18) (0.18) (0.17)
Logged Area 0.02 0.08 0.06
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
Post Cold War 0.45 0.41 0.51
(0.27) (0.28) (0.27)
AIC 441.40 434.81 469.09
BIC 492.54 490.21 525.63
Log Likelihood -208.70 -204.41 -221.55
Deviance 417.40 408.81 443.09
Num. obs. 524 524 572
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.21: Logit Models of Multi-Rebel Conflict-Years (Central Gov Conflicts Only)
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M33 M34 M35
(Intercept) 0.59 0.64 0.62
(3.58) (3.62) (3.79)




Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization −0.82 −1.13 0.27
(1.31) (3.14) (3.13)
Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization2 0.34 −1.03
(3.10) (3.13)
Intensity Level −0.02 −0.02 −0.33
(0.51) (0.51) (0.49)
Prev. Multi-rebel 3.77∗∗∗ 3.78∗∗∗ 3.64∗∗∗
(0.36) (0.36) (0.35)
Contiguous Civil War −0.12 −0.12 −0.11
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
Logged GDP per capita −0.11 −0.11 −0.10
(0.25) (0.25) (0.25)
Logged Population 0.14 0.12 0.17
(0.27) (0.31) (0.32)
Logged Area −0.26 −0.25 −0.37
(0.34) (0.35) (0.34)
Post Cold War −0.27 −0.28 −0.23
(0.51) (0.51) (0.52)
AIC 274.37 276.35 285.89
BIC 327.48 333.90 344.52
Log Likelihood -125.18 -125.18 -129.95
Deviance 250.37 250.35 259.89
Num. obs. 618 618 672
∗∗∗p < 0.001, ∗∗p < 0.01, ∗p < 0.05
Table A.22: Logit Models of Multi-Rebel Conflict-Years (Secessionist Conflicts Only)
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